முல்லைப் பெரியாறு அணை விவாகாரம் : கேரளா அரசின் மறுசீராய்வு மனுவை உச்சநீதிமன்றம் தள்ளுபடி செய்தது!-ஜெ.ஜெயலலிதாவின் சட்டப் போராட்டத்திற்கு கிடைத்த மகத்தான வெற்றி! அரசியல் சாசன அமர்வு பிறப்பித்த தீர்ப்பின் உண்மை நகல்!

முல்லைப் பெரியாறு அணையின் நீர்மட்டத்தை 142 அடியாக உயர்த்தலாம் என்றும், அணை தொடர்பாக கேரளா அரசு கொண்டு வந்த சட்டம் செல்லாது என்றும், உச்ச நீதிமன்றம் 07.05.2014 அன்று அதிரடியாக தீர்ப்பளித்தது.

நீதிமன்றத் தீர்ப்புகளை சட்டம் மூலம் தடுக்க முடியாது என்றும், கேரள அரசு கொண்டு வந்த சட்டம் அரசியல் சாசனத்துக்கு புறம்பானது என்றும், நீதிபதிகள் அத்தீர்ப்பில் கூறியுள்ளனர்.

மேலும், முல்லைப் பெரியாறு அணை வலுவாகவே உள்ளது என்று கருத்து தெரிவித்த ஆர்.எம். லோதா தலைமையிலான ஐந்து நீதிபதிகள், அணையை பராமரிக்க 3 பேர் கொண்ட குழுவை அமைத்து தீர்ப்பளித்தனர்.

ஆர்.எம். லோதா தலைமையிலான ஐந்து நீதிபதிகளை உள்ளடக்கிய அரசியல் சாசன அமர்வு பிறப்பித்த அந்த உத்தரவுக்கு எதிராக, கடந்த ஜூன் மாதம் 30 ஆம் தேதி, கேரள அரசு மறு சீராய்வு மனுவைத் தாக்கல் செய்தது.

நீதிபதி ஏ.எஸ். ஆனந்த் தலைமையிலான ஐவர் குழு, இறுதி செய்து வழங்கிய ஆய்வறிக்கை தவறென்றும், மேலும், முல்லைப் பெரியாறு அணையின் கொள்ளளவை 136 அடியிலிருந்து 142 அடியாக உயர்த்த தமிழகத்துக்கு அனுமதி வழங்கியதன் மூலம், அணையின் கீழ் பகுதிகளில் வாழும் மக்களின் பாதுக்காப்புக்கு சவால் விடப்பட்டுள்ளதாகவும், அந்த மறு சீராய்வு மனுவில், கேரள அரசு தரப்பில் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

இந்த மறு சீராய்வு மனுவை தற்போது உச்ச நீதிமன்றம் தள்ளுபடி செய்துள்ளது.

மேலும், முல்லைப் பெரியாறு அணையின் நீர்மட்டத்தை 142 அடியாக உயர்த்த அளிக்கப்பட்ட உத்தரவு சரியானதுதான் என்றும், இதனால் கேரளா அரசின் மறு சீராய்வு மனு மீதான விசாரணை தேவையற்றது என்றும், உச்ச நீதிமன்றம்  கூறயுள்ளது.

இதனால், முல்லைப் பெரியாறு அணையில் 142 அடிக்கு நீர்த் தேக்குவது உறுதி செய்யப்பட்டுள்ளது.

முல்லைப் பெரியாறு அணைப் பிரச்னையில், உச்சநீதிமன்றம் அளித்திருக்கும் இவ்வரலாற்று சிறப்பு மிக்க இத்தீர்ப்பு, ஜெ.ஜெயலலிதா அவர்களின் சட்டப் போராட்டத்திற்கு கிடைத்த மகத்தான வெற்றியாகும்.

-டாக்டர் துரைபெஞ்சமின்.
drduraibenjamin@yahoo.in

அரசியல் சாசன அமர்வு பிறப்பித்த தீர்ப்பின் உண்மை நகல், நமது வாசகர்களின் மேலானப் பார்வைக்கு இத்துடன் இணைக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது.

 

Judgement

                                                                  REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

ORIGINAL SUIT NO. 3 OF 2006

State of Tamil Nadu                                  ……  Plaintiff

Versus

State of Kerala & Anr.                                     ……  Defendants

 JUDGMENT

 R.M. LODHA, CJI.

This Court remains seized of the  problem  with  regard  to  the water  level  of  Mullaperiyar  dam  after  it  had  solved  on   27.02.2006 (Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum[1]) because  the  Kerala  State Legislature enacted the law immediately thereafter fixing and limiting  Full Reservoir Level (FRL) to 136 ft. Mullaperiyar dam : 1886 Lease Agreement

2. Mullaperiyar dam – a masonry dam – was constructed pursuant  to the Periyar Lake Lease Agreement dated 29.10.1886 (“1886  Lease  Agreement”) across Periyar river. The construction continued for about eight  years  and was completed in 1895. The dam is situated at Thekkady  District  in  Kerala and is owned and operated by the Government  of  Tamil  Nadu.  By  the  1886 Lease Agreement between the Maharaja of  Travancore  and  the  Secretary  of State for India in Council, the leased area as set out therein  was  granted on lease for 999 years from 01.01.1886.  The length of the main dam is  1200

5. (365.76 m.) and top of the dam is 155 ft. (47.24 m.). The top of solid parapet and maximum height of the dam from deepest foundation  are  158  ft. (48.16 m.) and 176 ft. (53.64 m.), respectively. The FRL of the dam  is  152

6. (46.33 m.). The original spillway capacity of the dam was 10 vents  of 36’ x 16’ (10.97 m. x 4.88 m.). The length  of  the  Baby  dam  is  240  ft. (73.15 m.). 1979-1980 : Controversy about safety of the Dam

3. In 1979 with regard to the safety of the Mullaperiyar dam,  the Government of Kerala wrote to the Tamil Nadu Government  to  take  immediate steps to strengthen the dam.  Simultaneously,  the  Kerala  Government  also requested the Central  Government  to  depute  a  team  from  Central  Water Commission (CWC) to inspect the dam and suggest strengthening measures.

4. In pursuance of the request from  the  Kerala  Government,  the then Chairman, CWC inspected the dam and held a  meeting  on  25.11.1979  in which the  officers  from  Tamil  Nadu  and  Kerala  participated.  In  that meeting, three level measures, (i) emergency, (ii)  medium  and  (iii)  long term, were suggested  to  strengthen  the  dam.  In  the  meantime,  it  was recommended that water level in the reservoir be kept at 136 ft. (41.45 m.)

5. In the second meeting held on 29.04.1980, it  was  opined  that after the completion of emergency and  medium-term  strengthening  measures, the water level in the reservoir can be restored up to 145 ft. (44.2 m.). 1998 : Litigation begins

6. Tamil Nadu says that all measures – emergency, medium and  long term as suggested by the CWC have been undertaken by it but despite that  no consensus could be reached between the two State Governments (of Tamil  Nadu and Kerala)  to raise the water level in the Mullaperiyar  reservoir  beyond 136 ft. This led to the filing of number of writ  petitions  in  the  Kerala High Court as well as in the Madras High  Court  sometime  in  1998  on  the issue for and against raising of water level in the  Mullaperiyar  reservoir and the safety of the dam. As the controversy was  pending  before  the  two High  Courts  and  there  was  likelihood  of  conflicting  judgments,  some transfer petitions were filed before this Court.

7. On 28.04.2000, in the transfer petitions,  this  Court  desired Union Minister of Water Resources    to  convene  a  meeting  of  the  Chief Ministers of Kerala and Tamil  Nadu  to  amicably  resolve  the  issue.  The meeting was convened on 19.05.2000 but no consensus could be reached in  the meeting as well.  However, in that meeting,  the  Union  Minister  of  Water Resources decided to constitute an Expert Committee to go into  the  details of the safety of the dam and advise him on raising of  water  level  in  the reservoir.

8. On 14.06.2000, the Expert Committee was constituted having  the following terms of reference. “(a)  To study the safety of Mullaperiyar dam located on Periyar river in Kerala with respect to the strengthening of dam carried out by  the Government of Tamil Nadu in accordance with the strengthening measures suggested by CWC and to report/advise the Hon’ble  Minister  of  Water Resources on the safety of the dam.

(b)   To advise the Hon’ble  Minister  of  Water  Resources  regarding      raising of water level in Mullaperiyar reservoir beyond 136 ft. (41.45

1. m) as a result of strengthening of the dam and its safety as  at  (a) above.”

9. After initial resistance, the Government  of  Kerala  nominated one Member to the Expert Committee.

1. The Expert Committee  gave  its  final  report  on  16.03.2001. While the matter was under consideration by the Expert  Committee,  it  also gave certain interim directions. In its report,  the  Expert  Committee  had opined that water level in the Mullaperiyar reservoir  could  be  raised  to 142 ft. (43.28 m.) as that will not endanger the safety  of  the  main  dam, including spillway, baby dam and earthen bund. First litigation before this Court

1. Despite the above recommendation from the Expert Committee, the Government of Kerala continued to resist  raising  of  water  level  in   beyond 136 ft.  It was then that a  writ  petition  was  filed  by Mullaperiyar Environmental  Protection  Forum  directly  before  this  Court wherein diverse prayers were made.  This Court  also  transferred  the  writ petitions which were pending before the Kerala High Court  and  Madras  High Court to this Court.

2. After hearing the parties, including the two states, this Court gave  its  decision  on  27.02.2006  permitting  the  water  level  in   the Mullaperiyar dam to be raised up to 142 ft. The  State  of  Kerala  and  its officers were also restrained from causing any obstruction to the above.  It was also observed that after the strengthening  work  was  complete  to  the satisfaction of CWC, independent experts  would  examine  the  safety  angle before the water level is permitted to be raised up to 152 ft. 2003 Act

3. Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation Act, 2003 (for  short, “2003 Act”) was enacted by Kerala legislature,  which  came  into  force  on 18.09.2003. 2003 Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the laws  relating to construction of irrigation works, conservation and distribution of  water for the purpose of irrigation  and  levy  of  betterment,  contribution  and water cess on lands benefited by irrigation works in  the  State  of  Kerala and to provide for involvement of farmers in water  utilisation  system  and for matters  connected  therewith  or  incidental  thereto.   2003  Act  was neither referred to nor relied upon by Kerala at  the time  of  hearing  in Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum1. 2006 (Amendment) Act

4. On 18.03.2006, in less than three weeks of the decision of this Court in Mullaperiyar Environmental  Protection  Forum1,  the  Kerala  State legislature  amended  2003  Act  by  the   Kerala   Irrigation   and   Water Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2006 [for short, “2006 (Amendment)  Act”)][2].

5. In the Second Schedule, appended to the 2006  (Amendment)  Act, the Mullaperiyar dam owned and maintained by Tamil Nadu is included as  Item No. 1 where the height of the FRL has been fixed at 136 ft. Second litigation before this Court : Suit by Tamil Nadu

6. The State of Tamil Nadu immediately thereafter  instituted  the present suit under Article 131 of the  Constitution  of  India  against  the State of  Kerala.  It  is  necessary  to  elaborate somewhat  on  facts  as proceedings are in the nature of  suit  in  original  jurisdiction  of  this Court.  The  plaint  avers  that  on  coming  into  force  of   the   States Reorganisation Act, 1956, (for short, “SR Act”), the State of  Travancore  – Cochin (Part – B, State) was formed.  The State of Kerala (first  defendant) is the successor in interest of the State of Travancore – Cochin. The  State of Tamil Nadu is the successor in  interest  of  the  Governor  in  Council, Secretary of State for India.  Tamil Nadu has, thus, pleaded that  plaintiff and  the  first  defendant  are  successors  in  interest  of  the  original contracting parties of the 1886 Lease Agreement.

7. It  is  averred  by  Tamil  Nadu  that   on   29.05.1970,   two supplemental agreements were  executed  between  it  and   Kerala.  The  two supplemental agreements did not change  the  basic  character  of  the  1886 Lease Agreement. By first supplemental  agreement,  Tamil  Nadu  surrendered the fishing rights in the  leased  lands  and  also  agreed  to  the  upward revision of the rent of the leased land.  The second supplemental  agreement conferred on  Tamil  Nadu,  the  right  to  generate  power  and   right  to construct all  facilities  required  for  power  generation.  An  additional extent of 42.7 acres was leased to Tamil Nadu  for  the  said  purposes  and correspondingly Tamil Nadu was required to pay to Kerala a sum  annually  as specified in the agreement. Tamil Nadu  claims  that  the  two  supplemental agreements have re-affirmed, re-asserted and ratified 1886 Lease  Agreement, which was statutorily protected and continued by Section 108 of the SR  Act. Grounds of challenge to 2006 (Amendment) Act

8. The challenge to 2006 (Amendment) Act to the extent it  affects Mullaperiyar dam is laid in the plaint on diverse  grounds,  some  of  which are the following:

(a)   The impugned  legislation  amounts  to  usurpation  of  judicial power inasmuch as Kerala State Legislature has arrogated to itself the  role of a judicial body and has itself determined  the  questions regarding  the dam safety and raising the water level when such questions fall  exclusively within the province of the judiciary and have  already  been  determined  by this Court in its judgment dated 27.02.2006.

(b)   2006 Amendment Act is beyond the legislative competence  of  the State of Kerala insofar as it  affects  the  Mullaperiyar  dam  in  view  of Section 108 of the SR Act which is a law made by Parliament  under  Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution, which confer  plenary  power  to  traverse  all legislative entries in all the three lists including Entry 17 List II.

(c)    The  impugned  legislation,  in   its   application   to   the Mullaperiyar dam, violates the rule of law and  the  federal  structure  and the  separation  of  power  under  the  Constitution.   The   Kerala   State Legislature has taken the law in its own hands after the declaration of  law by this Court.  Kerala  having  participated  in  the  adjudicatory  process before this Court cannot become a  Judge  in  its  own  cause  and  seek  to reverse the decision of this Court because it has gone against it.

(d)   The impugned legislation not only fixes and limits the  FRL   to 136 ft. in direct contravention of the  judgment  of  this  Court  but  also proceeds to authorise the Dam Safety Authority of Kerala –  to  disobey  anddisre gard  the  decision  of  this  Court  by  the  following,  among  other provisions:

• Section 62(1)(e) empowers the authority to direct the suspension or restriction of the functioning of any dam or decommissioning.

• Section 62A(1) read  with  Second  Schedule  is  a  legislative judgment that the Mullaperiyar dam is endangered on  account  of its age, degradation, structural or other impediments and limits the water level to 136 ft.

• Sub-section (2) prohibits increase of water level fixed in  the Second Schedule notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or any other law or any treaty,  contract,  agreement, instrument  or  document  except  and  in  accordance  with  the provisions of the Act.

• Sub-section (3) also contains a non-obstante clause and requires prior consent in writing of the authority for increasing storage capacity and for doing any act or work for such purpose.

• Sub-section (4) directs any act or work for preparation by  any executant to stop the work immediately and to apply for  consent of the authority.

• Section 68A protects the authority and any officer or  employee from any suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings in respect of anything done under the Act and also ousts  the jurisdiction of civil courts.

• 2006 (Amendment) Act is not a validation act but a mere  device to defy, obstruct and nullify the judgment  of  this  Court  and constitutionally interfere  with,  restrict  or  extinguish  the legal  rights  of  Tamil  Nadu  as  upheld  by  this  Court.   A Legislature cannot by mere declaration  and  enactment  over rule and nullify a judicial decision. The direct object and effect of the impugned legislation is to overturn  the  judgment  of  this Court and to arrogate to Kerala the power to prevent Tamil  Nadu from exercising its legal rights which have already been  upheld by this Court.

9. On the above grounds, Tamil Nadu has  sought  two-fold  relief,

(i) to declare the 2006 (Amendment) Act passed by the Kerala legislature  as unconstitutional in its application to and effect on  the  Mullaperiyar  dam and (ii) to pass a decree of  permanent  injunction  restraining  the first defendant from applying and enforcing the impugned  legislation  interfering with or obstructing the plaintiff  from increasing the water  level  to  142

1. and from carrying out the repair works as per  the  judgment  of  this Court dated 27.02.2006 in W. P. (Civil)  No.  386  of  2001  with  connected matters. The Union of India has been impleaded as defendant  no.  2  in  the suit. Defence by Kerala

1. Kerala has traversed the claim of Tamil Nadu on merits and  has also raised objections about  the  maintainability  of  the  suit.  Kerala’s defence is that the 1886 Lease Agreement for  999  years  lapsed  under  the provisions of Section 7(1)(b) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 (“Act  of 1947”). From 1947 to 26.01.1950, the lease  was  continued  as  a  temporary lease on annual basis. After 26.01.1950, even the temporary continuation  of the lease  came to an end. The possession of the land held and continued  by the then Government of Madras and now Tamil Nadu, after  26.01.1950  has  no juridical basis.

1. Kerala states that 1886 Lease Agreement, on the basis of  which Tamil Nadu has laid its claim, is an unconscionable contract because of  its duration (999 years) as well as the fact that the lease conveys for a  small rent a vital resource of Kerala. The lease was obtained by the Secretary  of State for India in England obviously by holding threat of  paramountcy  over Maharaja of Travancore, who was his vassal.

2. As regards the two  supplemental  agreements  of  1970,  Kerala states that these agreements have not been executed in  terms  of  mandatory provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution and, therefore,  they  do  not constitute contracts in the eye of law. In any event,  these  agreements  do not bind the State legislature at all.

3. About 2006  (Amendment)  Act,  it  is   stated   that   Kerala legislature enacted the Act regulating the storage levels of 22 dams  listed in the Second Schedule read  with  Section  62A  (1),  as  these  dams  fall entirely within the territory of  Kerala and these dams  are  considered  to be  endangered  on  account  of  their   age,   degeneration,   degradation, structural or other impediments. Kerala states that such  law  is  perfectly valid.  Under Section 62A(3) of the 2006 (Amendment) Act,  the  FRL  can  be increased beyond 136 ft. after obtaining prior consent  of  the  Dam  Safety Authority headed by a retired  Judge  of  the  High  Court.  If  Tamil  Nadu approaches under Section 62A(3), Kerala reserves its right  to  oppose  such plea by demonstrating how such increase would lead to  spread  of  backwater beyond the contour line of 155 ft. and how the  flora  and  fauna  including ecology would be destroyed. The impact of increased storages on  the  safety of the dam will also be demonstrated before the Dam Safety Authority.   This was not the matter that was required to be considered by this Court  in  the previous case, since in that case, the focal issue was the  implications  of the increase in height upon the  safety  and  integrity  of  the  dam.  2006 (Amendment) Act creates a working mechanism to  deal  with  a  problem  like displacement of  those  whose  lands  are  likely  to  be  affected  by  the backwater effect.

4. The competency  of  Kerala  legislature   to  enact  the  2006 (Amendment) Act is sought to be justified by relying upon   Entries  17  and 18 of List II (State List) and Entries 17, 17-A and 17-B of  the  Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Kerala  also  states  that it is competent for the Kerala legislature to modify the terms of the  lease in public interest (if the lease has survived  as  contended  by  the  Tamil Nadu), as the lease inherited under Article 295  of  the  Constitution  does not bind the legislature of the state and that it  is  always  open  to  the legislature to modify such conditions by law.

5. As regards structure of the Mullaperiyar dam, Kerala’s stand is that it is not constructed entirely with rubble masonry in lime mortar.  The front and rear faces are constructed of uncoursed  rubble  masonry  in  lime mortar. The hearting (center core) is of lime  surkhi  concrete,  therefore, dam  cannot  be  considered   as   homogeneous   masonry   dam   under   any circumstances. In view of Kerala, a dam could never have  been  intended  to remain for long years without decommissioning at some  point  of  time.  For this background, people in Kerala living in the  downstream  region  of  the Mullaperiyar dam have raised serious apprehensions  against  the  safety  of the structure.

6. Kerala has denied that river Periyar is an  inter-state  river. It has asserted that river Periyar is an intra-state river as  it  rises  in Quilon District in Kerala  and  traverses  only  through  the  territory  of Kerala before falling into the Arabian sea. The total catchment  of  Periyar basin is  5398 sq. km. of which only about 113 or 114  sq.  km.  lie  within the territory of Tamil Nadu. Even this small catchment of 113 sq. km.  lying in Tamil Nadu,  is  in  the  downstream  region  of  the  Mullaperiyar  dam. Therefore, no water from this catchment  is  contributed  to the  kitty  of Mullaperiyar dam.

7. As regards the earlier judgment of this Court,  Kerala’s  stand is that the judgment concluded the issue relating to safety  of  the  people and degradation of the environment, apart from issue  arising  from  Article 363 of the Constitution. The doctrine of res judicata  or  constructive  res judicata  has  no  relevance  to  the  question  of  powers  on  the  Kerala legislature to regulate the storage level of the Mullaperiyar dam in  larger public interest by legislation. Kerala states that the impugned  legislation removes the legal basis of the judgment, i.e., the right of  Tamil  Nadu  to store water up to 142 ft. in  Mullaperiyar  reservoir.  The  legislature  is competent to remove the basis of any judgment  and,  therefore,  it  is  not permissible  for  Tamil  Nadu  to  claim  any  right  to  store   water   at Mullaperiyar dam beyond  136  ft.  Kerala  has  assailed  the  findings  and conclusions in  the  earlier  judgment  dated  27.02.2006  on  all  possible grounds.

8. Kerala has raised the objection about maintainability  of  the present suit under Article 131 of the Constitution of India.   According  to Kerala, because the basis of claim made by  Tamil  Nadu  lies  in  the  1886 Lease Agreement which is a contractual right leading to  civil  dispute,  if any, but it is not in dispute in  the  constitutional  context  as  required under Article 131 of the Constitution of India.  Kerala’s  further  case  is that 1886 Lease Agreement was executed between the  Maharaja  of  Travancore and Secretary of State for India in England and as such the agreement is  in the nature of treaty and act of state, the enforcement of  which  is  barred by proviso to Article  131  of  the  Constitution.  Tamil  Nadu,  therefore, cannot seek enforcement of 1886 lease deed before this Court.

9. Kerala has also challenged the report of the  Expert  Committee for assessing the structural safety of the dam that was relied upon by  this Court in its judgment on 27.02.2006.    Kerala says that  both  the  interim report and final report submitted by the Expert Committee are  riddled  with inconsistencies and  the  views  of  the  Committee  do  not  constitute  an authoritative opinion. Kerala has denied that storages at  Mullaperiyar  dam beyond 136 ft. will not pose any danger.

1. Kerala states that the storage at Mullaperiyar dam  beyond  136
2. would not be required to meet the irrigation requirement  of  2,08,144 acres in 5  southern  districts  of  Tamil  Nadu,  although  the  irrigation originally planned was not more than 1.5 lakh acres. Kerala has  denied  the contention of Tamil Nadu that due to non-restoration of FRL  from  136  ft., Tamil Nadu’s irrigation is getting  suffered.  According  to  Kerala,  Tamil Nadu was able to irrigate more area  with  Mullaperiyar  water,  even  after lowering the water level to 136 ft.

1. Kerala has, thus, prayed that  suit  filed  by  Tamil  Nadu  be dismissed with costs. Issues

2. On 13.12.2007,  the  Court  framed  the  following  issues  for consideration in the suit:

“1.   Whether the suit  is  maintainable  under  Article  131  of  the Constitution of India.

2.     (a)   Whether  the  Kerala  Irrigation  and  Water  Conservation (Amendment) Act 2006 is unconstitutional and ultra vires, in its application to and effect on the Mullai Periyar Dam?

(b)   Whether plaintiff is entitled to  a  permanent  injunction restraining the first defendant from applying and enforcing  the Kerala Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment)  Act,  2006 with reference to Mullai Periyar Dam?

3. Whether the rights of the plaintiff, crystalised in the Judgment dated 27.02.2006 passed by this Court in WP(C)  No.  386/2001  can  be nullified by a legislation made by the Kerala State Legislature?

4. (a)   Whether the judgment dated  27.2.2006  of  this  Court  in WP(C) No. 386/2001 operated as res judicata, in respect  of  all or any of the defences set up by  the  first  defendant  in  its written statement?

(b)   Whether the pleas relating to validity and binding  nature of the deed dated  29.10.1886,  the  nature  of  Periyar  River, structural safety of Mullai Periyar Dam etc. raised by the first defendant in its defence, are finally decided by the judgment of this  Court  dated  27.2.2006  in  WP(C)   No.   386/2001,   and consequently  first  defendant  is  barred   from   raising   or reagitating  those  issues  and  pleas  in  this  suit,  by  the principle of res judicata and constructive res judicata?

5. Whether the suit based on a legal right claimed under the  lease deed executed between the Government of the Maharaja of Travancore and the Secretary of State for India  on  29.10.1886,  is  barred  by  the proviso to Article 131 of the Constitution of India?

6. Whether the first defendant is estopped from  raising  the  plea that the deed dated 29.10.1886  has  lapsed,  in  view  of  subsequent conduct of the first  defendant  and  execution  of  the  supplemental agreements dated 29.05.1970 ratifying the various provisions  of  the original Deed dated 29.10.1886.

7. Whether the lease deed executed between the  Government  of  the Maharaja of Travancore and Secretary of State for India on  29.10.1886 is valid, binding on first  defendant  and enforceable  by  plaintiff against the first defendant.

8. Whether the first defendant is  estopped  from  contending  that Periyar River is not an inter-State river.

9. Whether the offer of the first defendant, to construct a new dam across River Periyar in the downstream region of  Mullai  Periyar  Dam would meet the ends of justice and requirements of plaintiff.

1. Whether the first defendant  can  obstruct  the  plaintiff  from increasing the water level of Mullai Periyar Dam to 142 ft.  and  from carrying out repair works as per the judgment dated 27.2.2006 of  this Court in WP(C) No. 386/2001.

1. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled to?” Documentary and oral evidence by the parties

3. The admission/denial of documents tendered by the  parties  was completed on 16.05.2008. Documents Ex. P1 to Ex. P44 tendered by Tamil  Nadu were admitted by Kerala and documents Ex. D1 to D17 tendered by Kerala  were admitted by Tamil Nadu. Tamil Nadu’s documents Ex. XP1 to XP4  and  Kerala’s documents Ex. XD1 to XD24 were denied by the other side.

4. As regards oral evidence, Tamil Nadu  produced  R.  Subramanian (PW-1) as the  sole  witness.  On  the  other  hand,  Kerala  produced  five witnesses, V.K. Mahanudevan (DW-1), K. Jayakumar  (DW-2),  Dr.  A.K.  Gosain (DW-3), Dr. Dhrubajyoti Ghosh (DW-4) and M.K. Parameswaran Nair (DW-5). Reference to the 5-Judge Constitution Bench

5. Initially, the matter was heard  by  a  three-Judge  Bench.  On 10.11.2009, matter was referred to the Constitution Bench  as  some  of  the issues  framed  in  the  suit  involved  decision  on  certain   substantial questions of law concerning  interpretation  of  the Constitution  and   in particular:

(i)   Articles 3 and 4 read with Article 246 of the Constitution;

(ii)        Article 131 read with Article 32 of the  Constitution  (in the context of res-judicata);

iii) Proviso to Article 131 read with Articles 295  and  363  of  the Constitution and the effect of the Constitution (26th Amendment) Act, 1971; and

1. iv) The  effect  of  decision  of  this   Court   in   Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum1 in the context of afore-referred constitutional provisions.Constitution of the Empowered Committee (EC)

6. A very important development occurred when the matter was taken up initially by the Constitution Bench.  It was  felt  by  the  Constitution Bench that examination of all aspects of  the  matter  including  safety  of Mullaperiyar dam by an Empowered  Committee  (EC)  may  help  the  Court  in deciding  the  matter   effectively.   Accordingly,   on   18.02.2010,   the Constitution Bench directed the  Central  Government  to  constitute  an  EC under the Chairmanship of Dr. A.S. Anand, former Chief Justice of India  and comprising of two members nominated by the States of Kerala and  Tamil  Nadu and two renowned technical experts. The EC was requested to hear parties  to the suit on all issues that may be raised before it, without  being  limited to the issues that have been raised before  the  Court  in  the  matter  and furnish  a  report  as  far  as  possible  within  six   months   from   its constitution. It was left open to the EC to  frame  its  own  procedure  and issue appropriate directions as to the hearings as  well  as  venue  of  its sittings and it was also left to the EC to receive such further evidence  as it considered appropriate. It was, however, clarified  that  the  legal  and constitutional issues including validity of  the  2006  Amendment  Act,  are matters that would be considered by the Court.

7. The EC submitted status reports from time to time. The time for giving final report was extended also.  The  report  was  submitted  by  the Empowered Committee finally on 23.04.2012. General observation

8. As a general observation, before we embark upon the  discussion on diverse issues, it must be stated, that a suit of this nature cannot  and ought not to be decided with very technical approach  insofar  as  pleadings and procedure are concerned.  A suit filed in original jurisdiction of  this Court is not governed by the procedure prescribed in  Civil  Procedure  Code save and except the procedure which has been expressly  made  applicable  by the Supreme Court Rules.  It is also important to  bear  in  mind  that  the contest between the states is to be settled in the large and ample way  that alone  becomes  the  dignity  of  litigants  concerned  (State   of  Andhra Pradesh[3]). Unfortunately, there is a sharp conflict over  each  and  every aspect of the subject matter between the contesting states. Even in  respect of the report submitted by the EC chaired by a former Chief Justice of  this Court, one nominee each of the two states who  are  former  judges  of  this Court and two renowned technical experts,  the  two  states  have  different views although EC has submitted its report after a very tedious  and  minute consideration of  facts  on  the  safety  of  the  Mullaperiyar  dam,  which embraced the reports of tests, investigation and technical  studies  carried out through the three apex organizations, besides through  other  specialist organizations of the Government of India and specialist expert agencies  and also  after  site  appraisal.  Moreover,  the  investigations,   tests   and technical studies were directed to be carried out by the EC  in  association with the representatives of both the States. Issue Nos. 1, 5, 6 and 7.

9. These four issues are interrelated inasmuch  as  two  of  these issues relate to validity and binding nature of  1886  Lease  Agreement  and the effect of 1970 supplemental agreements and the other two issues  concern maintainability of suit under Article 131, if 1886 Lease Agreement  is  held valid, binding and enforceable. Extensive arguments have been  addressed  to us by the learned senior counsel for the two contesting  states  in  respect of these issues.  However, it must be noted immediately that Kerala did  not dispute the position that under Section 177 of the Government of India  Act, 1935 existing contracts made by the Secretary of State prior to  1935  (made for the purposes of the Government of a Province) would have  effect  as  if they were made on  behalf  of  that  Province.  In  view  of  this  admitted position by Kerala, we shall first see whether 1886 Lease Agreement  was  an existing contract made for the purposes of the  Government  of  Province  of Madras on the commencement of 1935 Act.

1886 Lease Agreement – whether an existing contract under 1935 Act

1. The Madras Presidency (Fort St. George) was established by  the Pitts Act, 1784. Thereafter, by the  Government  of  India  Act,  1858,  the territories under the Government of East India Company were transferred  for being vested in Her Majesty.  Under this enactment, the Secretary  of  State in Council was empowered to enter into contracts. By  the  1859  (Amendment) Act, the British Parliament authorised the Governor in Council of  Fort  St. George to enter  into  contracts  referred  to  as  Secretary  of  State  in Council. 1886 Lease Agreement was entered  into  between  the  Secretary  of State  in  Council  and  Maharaja  of  Travancore  under   this   provision. Government of India Act, 1919 did not alter the position with regard to  the 1886 Lease Agreement since Presidency of Fort  St.  George  was  treated  as Province for the purposes of local government. By virtue of  Section  46  of the 1935 Act, the Presidency of Fort St. George which was  deemed  to  be  a Province under 1919 Act became Governor’s Province of Madras.

1. Section 177 of the 1935  Act,  omitting  the  unnecessary  part reads, “…..any contract made before the commencement of  Part  III  of  this Act by, or on behalf of, the Secretary of State in Council  shall,  as  from that date – (a) if it was  made  for  the  purposes  which  will  after  the commencement of Part III of this Act be purposes  of  the  Government  of  a Province, have effect as if it had been made on behalf  of  that  Province…” By virtue of this provision, the existing  contracts  of  the  Secretary  of State in Council would have the effect as if they had been  made  on  behalf of the Province. When we see 1886 Lease Agreement in light  of  Section  177 of the 1935 Act, there remains no doubt at all that lease that was  executed by the Secretary of State in Council for the Presidency  of  Madras  (Madras Province) had the effect as if it had been made on behalf of the  Presidency of Madras or for that matter Madras Province.  To  put  it  differently,  by legal fiction created under Section  177(1)(a),  the  Presidency  of  Madras (Madras Province) became lessee under the 1886  Lease  Agreement.  We  have, therefore, no hesitation in accepting the submission  of  Mr.  Vinod  Bobde, learned senior counsel for Tamil Nadu that by virtue of Section 177  of  the 1935 Act, as from the commencement of the 1935 Act, the  Government  of  the Province of Madras is deemed to be substituted as the  lessee  in  the  1886 Lease Agreement.

Effect and impact of events between 18.07.1947 and 26.01.1950

2. In light of the above holding, we have to see  the  effect  and impact of certain events that occurred between 18.07.1947 (when Act of  1947 was enacted by British Parliament) and 26.01.1950 (the date of  commencement of Constitution).

42.1.       On  18.07.1947,  a  bulletin  was  issued  by  the  Maharaja  of Travancore State denouncing all agreements.

42.2.       On 22.07.1947, the Dewan of Travancore is said  to  have  stated in his notes submitted to the Maharaja  that  in  his  discussion  with  the Viceroy, he had unequivocally denounced the 1886 Lease  Agreement  and  that the Viceroy had accepted the good sense underlying the denouncement.

42.3.       On  10.08.1947,  in  his  letter,  Mr.  C.C.  Desai,  Additional Secretary gave an assurance that all agreements would be renegotiated.

42.4.       On 12.08.1947, Instrument  of  Accession  was  executed  by  the Ruler of Travancore declaring that Travancore has acceded  to  the  Dominion

of India.

42.5.       Following Instrument  of  Accession,  on  12.08.1947  itself,  a standstill agreement was entered into between State of  Travancore  and  the Dominion of India.

42.6.       On 14.08.1947, India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947  was promulgated whereby, inter alia, Section 177 of the 1935 Act was omitted.

42.7.       On 15.08.1947, Act of 1947 came into effect.

42.8.       On 24.05.1949, the two States – Travancore and Cochin  –  merged together.

Whether 1886 Lease Agreement lapsed?

3. Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned senior counsel for Kerala, in view of the above events submits that 1886 Lease Agreement  lapsed  and  did  not survive on and from 15.08.1947.

4. By Act of 1947, the provisions were  made  for  setting  up  in India of two  Indian  dominions  to  be  known  respectively  as  India  and Pakistan from 15.08.1947. Section 7 of Act of 1947 reads as follows :

“7.   Consequences of the setting up of the  new  Dominions.—(1)

As from the appointed day—

(a)  His Majesty’s Government in  the  United  Kingdom  have  no responsibility as respects the government of any  of  the  territories which, immediately before that day, were included in British India;

(b)   the suzerainty of  His  Majesty  over  the  Indian  States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the  date of the passing of this Act between  His  Majesty  and  the  rulers  of Indian States, all functions exercisable by His Majesty at  that  date with respect to Indian States, all obligations of His Majesty existing at that date towards Indian States or  the  rulers  thereof,  and  all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by  His  Majesty at that date in or in relation to  Indian  States  by  treaty,  grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise; and

(c)   there lapse also any treaties or agreements  in  force  at the date of the passing of  this  Act  between  His  Majesty  and  any persons having authority in the tribal areas, any obligations  of  His Majesty existing at that date to any such persons or with  respect  to the tribal areas, and all powers, rights,  authority  or  jurisdiction exercisable at that date of His Majesty  in  or  in  relation  to  the tribal areas by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise: Provided that, notwithstanding  anything  in  paragraph  (b)  or paragraph (c) of this sub-section, effect shall, as nearly as  may  be continued to be given to the provisions of any such  agreement  as  is therein  referred  to   which   relate   to   customs,   transit   and communications, posts and telegraphs, or other like matters, until the provisions in question are denounced by the ruler of the Indian  State or person having authority in the tribal areas on the one hand, or  by the Dominion or Province or other part thereof concerned on the  other hand, or are superseded by subsequent agreements.

(2)   …………….”

5. As noted above, Act of 1947 came into effect  from  15.08.1947. Section 7 deals  with  the  consequences  of  the  setting  up  of  the  new dominions. Clause  (b)  of  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  7  declares  that suzerainty of His Majesty over the  Indian  States  lapses.  On  lapsing  of suzerainty, it provides for lapsing of all treaties and agreements in  force between His Majesty and the Rulers of Indian States from that date.  Proviso appended to sub-section (1), however, continues such agreements  unless  the provisions in such agreement are denounced by the Ruler of the Indian  State or are superseded by a subsequent agreement.

6. It is the contention of Mr. Harish N. Salve that firstly,  1886 Lease Agreement lapsed by virtue of main provision  of  Section  7(1)(b)  of the Act of 1947 as it comprehends all treaties and agreements and  secondly, the Maharaja of Travancore denounced all  agreements  including  1886  Lease Agreement.

7. It is true that Section 7(1)(b) of Act of  1947  Act  uses  the expression “all treaties and agreements”  but,  in  our  opinion,  the  word “all” is not intended to cover the agreements which  are  not  political  in nature. This is clear from the purpose  of   Section  7  as  it  deals  with lapsing of suzerainty  of  His  Majesty  over  the  Indian  States  and  the consequence of lapsing of  suzerainty.  Obviously,  the  provision  was  not intended to cover the agreements and  treaties  other  than  political.  We, accordingly,  hold  that  Section  7(1)(b)  concerns  only  with   political treaties and agreements.

8. The nature of 1886  Lease  Agreement  being  not  political  is already  concluded  by   this   Court   in   2006   judgment   (Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum1). This Court has held therein – and we  have no justifiable reason to take a different view – that 1886  Lease  Agreement is an ordinary agreement being a lease  agreement  and  it  is  wholly  non-political in nature.

9. There is, thus, no merit in the contention advanced  on  behalf of Kerala that 1886 Lease Agreement  lapsed  under  the  main  provision  of Section 7(1)(b) of 1947 Act.

1. Now, for consideration of the  other  limb  of  the  argument addressed to us by Mr. Harish N. Salve that even otherwise, the Maharaja  of Travancore denounced all agreements including 1886 Lease  Agreement,  it  is necessary  to  refer  to  the  proviso  appended  to  Section  7(1)(b).  The expression “denounced by the Ruler of  the  Indian  State”  in  the  proviso appended to Section 7, in our opinion, refers  to  unambiguous,  unequivocal and express denouncement. Kerala has not produced any material  or  document to show that there was express denouncement of that nature by the  Ruler  of Travancore insofar as 1886 Lease Agreement is concerned.  We  do  not  think that the bulletin issued on 18.07.1947  clearly  or  finally  denounced  the 1886 Lease Agreement.

1. Moreover, to be a  valid  and  effective  denouncement  of  the agreement between the Ruler and His Majesty such denouncement must  be  made after 1947 Act came into effect. Admittedly, there  is  no  denouncement  of 1886 Lease Agreement by the Travancore Ruler after 15.08.1947.

2. The relevant  portion  of  the  standstill   agreement   dated 12.08.1947 reads as follows:

“Agreement between the State of Travancore and the Dominion of India Whereas it is to the benefit and advantage of  the  Dominion  of India as well as of the Indian States  that  existing  agreements  and administrative arrangements in the matters of common  concern,  should continue for the time being, between the Dominion of India or any part thereof and the Indian States : Now therefore it is agreed between the Travancore State and  the Dominion of India that:-

1. (1) Until  new  agreements  in  this  behalf  are  made,  all agreements and administrative arrangements as to  matters  of common concern now existing between the Crown and any  Indian State shall, in so far as may  be  appropriate,  continue  as between the Dominion of India or as the case may be, the part thereof and the State.

(2)      In  particular,  and  without  derogation  from  the

generality of sub-clause  (1)  of  this  clause  the  matters referred to above shall include the matters specified in  the Schedule to this Agreement.”

3. It is argued  by  Mr.  Harish  N.  Salve  that  the  standstill agreement, which is between parties different from those  who  had  executed the 1886 Lease Agreement, is a fresh agreement  which  brought  into  force, for  the  time  being,  contractual  obligations  between  the  Maharaja  of Travancore and the Dominion of India.  As the  parties  were  different  and the Act of 1947 provided for the lapse of the British  suzerainty  over  the Princely States, the question of continuance of 1886  lease  agreement  does not arise.  In any case, learned  senior  counsel  for  Kerala  argues  that standstill agreement could not survive after the deletion of Section 177  of the 1935  Act.   We  find  no  merit  in  these  arguments.  The  standstill agreement is not a fresh agreement between Dominion of India  and  State  of Travancore as suggested by Mr. Harish N.  Salve.  The  standstill  agreement was intended for the  benefit  of  the  parties  who  were  parties  to  the agreements and arrangements, which were matters of common  concern  existing between the Crown and  the  State  of  Travancore.   In  the  background  of Instrument of Accession, it became necessary to  have  some  arrangement  so that the existing agreements and arrangements  between  the  Crown  and  the Indian States continued.  We do  not  think  that  standstill  agreement  is political in nature as contended on behalf of Kerala.

4. The argument that standstill agreement could not survive  after the deletion of Section 177 with effect from 15.08.1947 by virtue  of  India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 is also without  substance.   Section 177 was deleted because it could no longer  work  and  because  Dominion  of India was to come into being with provinces as  part  of  the  Dominion  and there was to be no Secretary of State in Council.  We are in agreement  with Mr. Vinod Bobde, learned senior counsel for  Tamil  Nadu  that  deletion  of Section 177 was prospective and it did  not  affect  the  deeming  that  had already taken place in 1935.  The standstill agreement, in our view,  cannot be said to have been wiped out by the deletion of Section 177.

5. Mr. Harish N. Salve is right in submitting that  under  Section 177 existing contracts made by the Secretary of State prior  to  1935  would have effect as if they were made on behalf of the concerned Province and  by virtue of this provision, the Province  of  Madras  was   a  beneficiary  of standstill agreement but he does not seem to be right   when  he  says  thatthis  situation  changed  on  14.08.1947   when   the   India   (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 was issued and the  standstill  agreement  arrived at on 12.08.1947 ceased to be for the benefit of  Province  of  Madras.   As stated by us earlier, the deletion of Section 177  is  prospective  and  did not undo what had already taken place.  This also negates  the  argument  of Mr. Salve that the rights of the Crown, which were enjoyed by  the  Province of Madras under Section 177, on deletion of the said Section   had  come  to an end as there was no successor to the  Crown.

6. The argument that there is no successor of Crown is  irrelevant because by virtue of Section 177, the Government of Province of  Madras  had already become lessee in  the  1886  Lease  Agreement  by  deeming  in  1935 itself.  The standstill agreement continued  1886  Lease  Agreement  between the Province of Madras and the State of Travancore.   1886  Lease  Agreement did not lapse under the main provision of Section  7(i)(b)  of  the  Act  of

7. There was no unequivocal and unambiguous denouncement of 1886  Lease Agreement by the Ruler of Travancore under proviso to Section 7(i)(b).   The Province of Madras was beneficiary of  the  standstill  agreement.   Surely, deletion of Section 177 has not affected the rights  of Province of  Madras.

7. Relying upon Babu Ram Saksena[4], it is  vehemently  argued  by Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned senior counsel for Kerala that upon  merger  of two states – Travancore and Cochin – in 1949 all treaties  entered  into  by the  Rulers  of  erstwhile  states  lapsed.  His  submission  is  that   the standstill  agreement,  whether  it  was  an  independent  agreement  or  in continuation of 1886 Lease Agreement, came to an end in light of  the  legal position exposited in Babu Ram Saksena4.  Learned  senior  counsel  in  this regard also relied upon the decision of this  Court  in  State  of  Himachal Pradesh[5]. Babu Ram Saksena

8. Let us carefully consider Babu  Ram  Saksena4.   The  facts  in Babu Ram Saksena4  were as follows:  Babu Ram Saksena was a member of  Uttar Pradesh Civil Service and served Tonk State in various  capacities.  It  was alleged that during service, he helped the Nawab of Tonk  in  obtaining  the sanction of the Government of India to the payment of Rs.14,00,000/- to  the Nawab out of State treasury for the discharge of his debts, and induced  the Nawab by threats and deception to pay him, in return  for  such  help,  sums totaling Rs.3,00,000/- on various dates. Dr. Babu Ram  Saksena  was  charged with the offences under Sections 383, 575 and 420 of the Indian Penal  Code. These offences were extraditable offences under the Indian Extradition  Act, 1903 (for short, ‘1903 Act’). The warrant was issued under Section 7 of  the 1903 Act to  the  District  Magistrate,  Nainital,  where  the  accused  was residing after reverting to the service of the Uttar Pradesh Government,  to arrest and deliver him up to the District Magistrate of  Tonk.  The  accused raised defences on merits as well as to the  validity  of  the  warrant  and challenged  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Magistrate  at  Nainital   to   take cognizance of the matter and arrest the appellant. The High Court  overruled all the objections and dismissed the application  for  the  release  of  the appellant.  The  matter  was  carried  to  this  Court.   Inter  alia,  thecontention on behalf of the appellant before this Court was that the  treaty entered  into  between  the  British  Government  and  the  Tonk  state   on 28.01.1869, although declared by Section 7 of the 1947 Act, to  have  lapsed as from 15.08.1947 was  continued  in  force  by  the  standstill  agreement entered into on  08.08.1947;  that  that  treaty  exclusively  governed  all matters relating to extradition between the two states, and  that,  inasmuch as it did not cover the offences  now  charged  against  the  appellant,  no extradition of the appellant could be  demanded  or  ordered.  The  Attorney General, on the other hand, responded  by  contending  that  the  standstill agreement entered into with various  Indian  States  were  purely  temporary arrangements designed to maintain the status quo ante in respect of  certain administrative matters of common concern  pending  the  accession  of  those States to the Dominion of India and they were superseded by  the  instrument of Accession executed by the Rulers of those states.   Tonk  having  acceded to the Dominion on 16.08.1947, the standstill agreement  relied  on  by  the appellant must be taken to have lapsed as  from  that  date.  Secondly,  the treaty was no longer subsisting and its execution became impossible, as  the Tonk State ceased to accede  politically  and  as  such  sovereignty  as  it possessed was extinguished, when it covenanted w ith  certain  other  states, with the concurrence of the Indian Government “to unite and integrate  their territories in  one  state,  with  the  common  executive,  legislature  and judiciary, by the name of the United State of Rajasthan”, the last  of  such covenants which superseded the earlier ones, having  been  entered  into  on 13.03.1949. Lastly, it was argued by the Attorney General  that  the  treaty was still in operation as a binding executory contract  and  its  provisions were in no way derogated from by the application of Section 7  of  the  1903 Act in the extradition warrant issued under  that  Section  and  the  arrest made in pursuance thereof were legal and valid and could not  be  called  in question under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

9. It is important  to  note  that  in   Babu  Ram  Saksena4,  two opinions have been given by this Court, one by Patanjali Sastri, J. and  the other by Mukherjea, J.  Insofar as Patanjali Sastri, J.  is  concerned,  His Lordship did not give any opinion on the first  two  contentions  raised  by the Attorney General. This is clear when Patanjali Sastri, J. said,  “As  weare clearly of the opinion that the appellant’s  conten tions  must  fail  on this last ground, we consider it  unnecessary  to  pronounce  on  the  other points raised by the Attorney General especially as the issues involved  are not purely legal but also of a political character, and we have not had  the views  of  the  accused  concerned  on  those  points”.  Having  said  that, Patanjali Sastri, J.  considered  the  question  whether  extradition  under Section 7 of the 1903 Act for an offence which  is  not  extraditable  under the treaty is, in any sense, a derogation from the provisions of the  treaty which provides for  the  extradition  of  offenders  for  certain  specified offences committed in the respective territories  of  the  high  contracting parties.

59.1.       In the other opinion given  by  Mukherjea,  J.  as  regards  the question, how far was the Extradition Treaty between the Tonk State and  the British Government affected by reason of the merger of the Tonk State  along with eight other States in view of a covenant entered into by the Rulers  of these nine States, into the United State of  Rajasthan,  it  has  been  held that as a result of amalgamation or merger,  a  State  loses  its  full  and independent power of action over the subject matter of a  treaty  previously concluded, the treaty must lapse.  Mukherjea, J.  noted  Article  6  of  the merger and the general opinion of the  international  jurists  that  when  a State  relinquishes  its  life  as  such  through  incorporation   into   or absorption by another State either voluntarily or as a  result  of  conquest or annexation, the treaties of  the  former  are  automatically  terminated.

Mukherjea, J. observed as follows:

“………..The result is said to be produced by reason of complete loss  of personality  consequent  on  extinction  of  State  life.  The   cases discussed in this connection are  generally  cases  where  independent States have  ceased  to  be  such  through  constrained  or  voluntary absorption by  another  with  attendant  extinction  of  the  former’s treaties with  other  States.  Thus  the  forceable  incorporation  of Hanover into the Prussian Kingdom destroyed the previous  treaties  of Hanover. The admission of Texas into the United States of  America  by joint resolution extinguished the Treaties of the Independent Republic of Texas. The position is the  same  when  Korea  merged  into  Japan.

According to Oppenheim, whose opinion has  been  relied  upon  by  Sir Alladi, no succession of rights and duties ordinarily takes  place  in such cases, and as political  and  personal  treaties  presuppose  the existence of a contracting State, they are altogether extinguished. It is a debatable point  whether  succession  takes  place  in  cases  of treaties relating to  commerce  or  extradition  but  here  again  the majority of writers are of opinion that they do not survive merger  or annexation”

59.2.       The above observations of Mukherjea, J. were based  on  the  two renowned books, (one) Hyde on International Law,  Vol.  III,  Pg.  1529  and (two) Oppenheim on International Law, Vol. I, Pg. 152.

59.3.       Dealing with the covenant  under  consideration,  Mukherjea,  J.

went on to state as follows:

“The remarks quoted above do not, however, seem quite appropriate to a case of the present description. Here there was no absorption  of  one State by another which would put an end  to  the  State  life  of  the former and extinguish its personality. What  happened  here  was  that several  States  voluntarily  united  together  and  integrated  their territories so as to form a larger and composite State of which  every one of the covenanting parties was a component part. There was  to  be one common executive, legislature and judiciary  and  the  Council  of Rulers would consist of the Rulers of all the Covenanting  States.  It may not be said, therefore, that the  Covenanting  States  lost  their personality altogether and it is to be  noted  that  for  purposes  of succession of Rulership and for counting  votes  on  the  strength  of population and other purposes the  Covenant  of  Merger  recognises  a quasi-separation between the territories of the different States.  But although such separation exists for some purposes  between  one  State territory and another, it is clear that the  inhabitants  of  all  the different States became, from the date of merger, the subjects of  the United State of Rajasthan and they could not be described as  subjects of any particular State. There is no such thing as subject of the Tonk State existing at the  present  day  and  the  Ruler  of  Tonk  cannotindepe ndently and in his own right exercise any form of sovereignty or control over the  Tonk  territory.  The  Government,  which  exercises sovereign powers, is only one, even though the  different  Rulers  may have a voice in it. It seems to us that in those altered circumstances the Extradition Treaty  of  1869  has  become  entirely  incapable  of execution. It is not possible for the Tonk State, which is one of  the contracting parties to act in accordance with the terms of the treaty, for it has no longer any independent  authority  or  sovereign  rights over the Tonk territory and can neither make nor  demand  extradition.

When as a result of amalgamation or merger, a State loses its full and independent power of  action  over  the  subject-matter  of  a  treaty previously concluded, the treaty must necessarily lapse. It cannot  be said that the sovereignty of the Tonk State in  this  respect  is  now vested in the United State of Rajasthan.  The  authority,  so  far  as extradition was concerned, was already surrendered by the  Tonk  State in favour of the Dominion Government by the Instrument  of  Accession. But even assuming that these treaty  rights  could  devolve  upon  the United State of Rajasthan by reason of Article 6 of  the  Covenant  of Merger, the latter, it seems to me,  could  be  totally  incapable  of giving effect to the terms of the treaty. As has  been  said  already, there could be no such thing as a subject of the  Tonk  State  at  the present moment  and  Article  2  of  the  Treaty  which  provides  for extradition of Tonk  subjects  accused  of  having  committed  heinous offences within Tonk territory and seeking asylum elsewhere  would  be wholly infructuous. The United State of Rajasthan could  not  possibly demand extradition on the basis of this article, and  if  reciprocity, which is the essence of an Extradition Agreement, is gone, the  Treaty must be deemed to be void and inoperative.”

59.4.       The view of Mukherjea, J. was  concurred  with  by  Mahajan,  J. Das, J. substantially agreed with the reasoning of Mukherjea, J.  Fazl  Ali,

1. agreed with the line of reasoning in both the  judgments  delivered  by Patanjali Sastri, J. and Mukherjea, J.

59.5.       A careful consideration of the  judgment  by  Mukherjea,  J.  in Babu Ram Saksena4 would show that His Lordship’s opinion has no  application to a non-political agreement such as 1886 Lease Agreement.  The  observation of Mukherjea, J., “When as a result  of  amalgamation  or  merger,  a   Stateloses its full independent power of action over  the  subject  matter  of  a treaty previously concluded, the treaty must necessarily lapse…” is  in  the context of an extradition treaty which is purely political in  nature.    In our view, Babu Ram Saksena4  is clearly distinguishable and  does  not  help Kerala in its argument that 1886 Lease Agreement lapsed  on  merger  of  the two States, Travancore and Cochin, into the United State of  Travancore  and Cochin.

State of Himachal Pradesh

1. Mr. Harish  N.  Salve  also  placed  heavy  reliance  upon  the decision of this Court in the case  of  State  of  Himachal  Pradesh5.   The dispute in that case was between the State of Himachal Pradesh  on  the  one hand and the Union of India, State of Punjab, State of  Haryana,   State  of Rajasthan and  Union Territory of Chandigarh on the other  relating  to  the power generated in the Bhakra-Nangal and Beas Projects. One  of  the  issue sunder consideration was whether after the merger of the  State  of  Bilaspur with the Dominion of India, the State of Himachal Pradesh could  still  have any cause of action to file the suit. While dealing with  this  issue,  this Court referred to Bilaspur Merger Agreement dated 15.08.1948,  particularly, Article 1 thereof.  After having  noticed  that  provision,  this  Court  in paragraph 48 of the Report (Pgs. 359-360) held as under:

“48. It is thus clear that by the Bilaspur Merger Agreement dated  15-8-1948 the Raja of Bilaspur ceded to  the  Dominion  Government  full  and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to  the governance of the State and agreed to transfer the administration of the State  to  the  Dominion  Government  on  12-10-1948.  Thereafter,   the Government of India, Ministry of Law, issued a Notification dated  20-7-1949 (Ext. D-4/2-A) in exercise of its powers under Section 290-A of the Government  of  India  Act,  1935  making  the  States   Merger   (Chief Commissioners’ Provinces) Order, 1949, which came into force  from  1-8- Under this States Merger (Chief Commissioners’ Provinces)  Order, 1949, Bilaspur was to be administered in all respects as  if  it  was  a Chief Commissioner’s Province. Under  the  Constitution  of  India  also initially  Bilaspur  continued  to  be   administered   as   the   Chief Commissioner’s Province and was included in the First  Schedule  to  the Constitution as a  Part  C  State.  Under  Article  294(b)  all  rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government of the Dominion of  India, whether arising out of any contract or  otherwise,  became  the  rights,

liabilities and obligations of the Government of India. These provisions of the Bilaspur Merger Agreement dated  15-8-1948  (Ext.  D-4/1-A),  the States Merger (Chief Commissioners’ Provinces) Order,  1949,  the  First Schedule to the Constitution and Article 294(b) of the Constitution make it clear that Bilaspur became the part of  the  Dominion  of  India  and thereafter was administered as a Chief Commissioner’s  Province  by  the Government of India and all rights of the Raja of Bilaspur vested in the Government of India. We, therefore, hold that  the  plaintiff  will  not have any cause of action to make any claim on the basis of any right  of the Raja of Bilaspur prior to the merger  of  Bilaspur  State  with  the Dominion of India.”

1. The above observations in State of Himachal  Pradesh5  must  be read in the context of Bilaspur Merger Agreement  dated  15.08.1948  whereby the Raja of Bilaspur ceded to the Dominion  Government  full  and  exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governance  of the State and all rights of Raja of Bilaspur had vested  in  the  Government of India. We find it difficult to appreciate  how  these  observations  have any application insofar as the  continuance  of  the  1886  Lease  Agreement after the merger of the Travancore State and the Cochin  State  into  a  new state, namely, United State of Travancore and  Cochin  are  concerned.   The judgment of this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh5, in our  view,  has  no application to the submission advanced on behalf of Kerala. Status of Indian States on accession

2. It is important to bear in mind that accession of Indian States

to the Dominion of India did not extinguish those States as  entities.  They

only became part of Dominion of India as constituent States along  with  the

provinces of erstwhile British  India.  We  are  unable  to  hold  that  the

entities of those States who acceded to the Dominion of India  were  totally

wiped out. There is merit in the submission of  Tamil  Nadu  that  the  fact

that on 24.05.1949 the States of Travancore and Cochin merged together  also

establishes that Indian States which acceded to the  Dominion  continued  as

entities.

3. In light of the above, we are unable to accept the argument  of

Kerala that Madras ceased to be a lessee on 15.08.1947.  It is pertinent  to

observe here that Kerala  entered  into  the  supplemental  agreements  with

Tamil Nadu in 1970.  In these supplemental agreements,  the  continuance  of

1886 lease is stated  in  clear  and  unambiguous  words.   Had  1886  Lease

Agreement ceased to be operational on and  from  15.08.1947,  there  was  no

occasion for Kerala to enter into supplemental agreements  with  Tamil  Nadu

in 1970.  By  first  supplemental  agreement,  Tamil  Nadu  surrendered  the

fishing rights in the leased lands and also agreed to  the  upward  revision

of  the  rent  of  the  leased  land.   The  second  supplemental  agreement

conferred on Tamil Nadu the right to generate power and right  to  construct

all facilities required for power generation.  An additional extent of  42.7

acres was leased to Tamil Nadu for the said purposes. Mr. Harish  N.  Salve,

learned senior counsel for Kerala argued that 1970  supplemental  agreements

and the statement therein about continuance of  1886  Lease  Agreement  were

based on a mistake of law (wrongful assumption) of continuance of  lease  of

6. The submission of the learned senior counsel for Kerala  can  hardly

be accepted firstly, in view  of  our  finding  that  1886  Lease  Agreement

continued on and from 15.08.1947 and secondly, in view of  the  decision  of

this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh3, wherein a three-Judge Bench of  this

Court speaking through one of us (R.M. Lodha, J., as he then was)  observed,

“when an agreement is entered into between two or  more  states,  they  have

assistance of competent, legal and technical minds available with them.  The

states do not have lack of drafting ability. Such agreement is  provided  by

trained minds…….”. The 1970  supplemental  agreements  having  been  entered

into by two high parties, namely, State of Kerala and State of  Tamil  Nadu,

it can hardly be accepted that the continuance of  1886  lease  was  wrongly

assumed though it had lapsed on 15.08.1947. Kerala obviously must  have  had

competent and legal minds available with them when  supplemental  agreements

were entered into in 1970  with  Tamil  Nadu.  There  is  no  merit  in  the

argument of Kerala that supplemental agreements were  based  on  mistake  of

law.

 

 

 

Is 1886 lease agreement an act of State?

4. Is 1886 Lease  Agreement  an  act  of  State  or  International

Treaty?   The answer has to be in the negative. It is well settled  that  an

act of State is the taking over of sovereign powers by a  State  in  respect

of territory which was not till  then  part  of  it,  by  conquest,  treaty,

cession or otherwise,  and  the  municipal  courts  recognised  by  the  new

sovereign have the power and jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain  only

such rights as the new sovereign has chosen to recognise or  acknowledge  by

legislation, agreement or otherwise, and that  such  a  recognition  may  be

express or may be implied from the circumstances. 1886  Lease  Agreement  is

an ordinary contract of lease. Merely, because the contract was  arrived  at

between the Crown through the Secretary of State and the Travancore State  –

a princely Indian State – the nature of contract is not changed and it  does

not  become  a  political  arrangement.   As  noted  above,  this  Court  in

Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum1 has already declared that  1886

Lease Agreement is not political in nature. We are in  agreement  with  this

view. The same reasoning applies equally to standstill agreement.

 

Virendra Singh

5. Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned senior counsel for  Kerala  relied

upon the decision of this Court  in  Virendra  Singh[6].   The  Constitution

Bench in Virendra Singh6  was concerned with the question  about  the  post-

Constitutional rights to property situate in Indian  States  that  were  not

part of British India before the  Constitution  but  which  acceded  to  the

dominion of India shortly before the Constitution  and  became  an  integral

part  of  the  Indian  Republic  after  it.   Charkhari  and   Sarila   were

independent  States  under  the  paramountcy  of  the  British  Crown.  They

acknowledged the British  Crown  as  the  suzerain  power.   India  obtained

Independence and became a Dominion by  reason  of  Act  of  1947.   The  two

States – Charkhari and  Sarila  –  executed  Instruments  of  Accession  and

acceded to dominion. In the Instrument of Accession, the sovereignty of  the

acceding States was expressly  recognised  and  safeguarded.  The  Ruler  of

Sarila granted, on 28.01.1948, one village to the writ petitioners  and  the

Ruler of Charkhari also granted certain  villages  to  the  petitioners.  On

13.03.1948, thirty-five  States in Bundelkhand  and  Baghelkhand  (including

Charkhari and Sarila) agreed to unite themselves in one State which  was  to

be called United State of Vindhya  Pradesh. Few days later, pursuant to  the

above agreement, a  covenant was signed by all the thirty-five Rulers  which

brought the new State into being. This arrangement was domestic  arrangement

and not a treaty with the dominion of India.  Soon after this,  the  Revenue

Officers of the newly formed Vindhya Pradesh  Union tried to interfere  with

the grants  made  by  the  above  Rulers.   The  integration  did  not  work

satisfactorily.  So, on 26.12.1949,  the  same  thirty-five  Rulers  entered

into another agreement abrogating their covenant and  dissolving  the  newly

created State as from 01.01.1950. By the same instrument  each  Ruler  ceded

to the Government of  the  Indian  Dominion  as  from  the  same  date.  The

instrument was called the Vindhya Pradesh Merger Agreement.  The  Government

of  Indian  Dominion  was  also  party  to  the  agreement.   The   Dominion

Government took over the administration of the States which  formed  Vindhya

Pradesh on 01.01.1950 and decided to form them into a  Chief  Commissioner’s

province. The Constitution came into force  on  26.01.1950.  The  grants  of

Jagirs and Muafis made by the Rulers of Charkhari and  Sarila  were  revoked

somewhere in August, 1952.  It  was  this  order  of  revocation  which  was

challenged before this Court by invoking Article 32 of the Constitution.

65.1.       While dealing with  the  issue  noted  above  and  in  light  of

various decisions cited at the bar, this Court exposited as follows:

“Now it is undoubted that the accessions and the acceptance of them by

the Dominion of India were acts of  State  into  whose  competency  no

municipal Court could enquire; nor can any Court in India,  after  the

Constitution, accept jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising out of

them because of article 363 and the proviso to article 131;  all  they

can do is to register the fact of accession;  see  section  6  of  the

Government of India Act, 1935 relating to  the  Accession  of  States.

But what then?  Whether the Privy Council view is correct or that  put

forward by Chief Justice Marshall in its  broadest  outlines  is  more

proper, all authorities are agreed that it is within the competence of

the new sovereign to accord recognition  to  existing  rights  in  the

conquered or ceded territories and, by legislation  or  otherwise,  to

apply its own laws to them; and these laws can, and  indeed  when  the

occasion arises must, be examined and  interpreted  by  the  municipal

Courts of the absorbing State.”

 

65.2.       The exposition of  above  legal  position  by  the  Constitution

Bench hardly admits of any doubt. Obviously,  the  accession  of  an  Indian

State to the dominion of India and acceptance of  it  by  the  Dominion  are

acts of State and jurisdiction of the courts to go into  its  competency  or

settle any dispute arising out of them are clearly barred under Article  363

and the proviso to Article 131. As we have already held – and that  is  what

has been held in the 2006 judgment as well – that 1886  Lease  Agreement  is

an ordinary agreement and that it is not political in  nature,  the  embargo

of Article 363 and the proviso to Article 131 have no application.

 

Scope of Article 363 and Article 131

6. Article 363[7] of the Constitution is an embargo for the courts

including Supreme Court to deal with any dispute arising out  of  a  treaty,

agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or  other  similar  instrument  which

was entered into or executed before the commencement of the Constitution  by

any Ruler of an Indian state and to which the Government of the dominion  of

India or any of its predecessors Government was a party and it  has  or  has

been continued in operation after such  commencement.  The  jurisdiction  of

the courts is also barred to interfere in any  dispute  in  respect  of  any

right accruing under any liability or obligation arising out of any  of  the

provisions of this Constitution relating  to  any  such  treaty,  agreement,

covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument.

7. A plain reading of Article 363 leaves no manner of  doubt  that

if the dispute arises in respect of a document of that  description  and  if

such document had been executed before  the  commencement  of  Constitution,

the interference by courts is barred. The documents referred to  in  Article

363 are those which are political in  nature.  Any  dispute  regarding  such

documents is non-justiciable. The object behind Article 363 is to  bind  the

Indian Rulers with treaties, agreements, covenants, engagements,  sanads  or

other similar instruments entered into or executed before  the  commencement

of the Constitution and to prevent the  Indian  Rulers  from  resiling  from

such agreements as the integrity of India was to be maintained at  all  cost

and could not be  affected  by  raising  certain  disputes.  It  may  be  of

relevance to refer to the White Paper  on  Indian  States  prepared  by  the

Government of India in 1948 which  brings  out  the  historical  perspective

which necessitated the adoption of the provisions in Article 363.   It  says

“Article 363 has therefore been embodied in the Constitution which  excludes

specifically  the  Agreements  of  Merger  and  the   Covenants   from   the

jurisdiction of courts except in cases which may be referred to the  Supreme

Court by the President”.

8. Article 131[8] of the  Constitution  deals  with  the  original

jurisdiction of this Court. Subject to the provisions of  the  Constitution,

this Court has original jurisdiction in any  dispute,  inter  alia,  between

the Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or  more

other States on the other  if  and  insofar  as  the  dispute  involves  any

question (whether of law or fact) on which  the  existence  of  legal  right

depends. However, by proviso appended  thereto,  the  jurisdiction  of  this

Court is barred if the dispute to which a State specified in Part B  of  the

First Schedule is a party if the dispute arises out of any  provision  of  a

treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other  similar  instrument

was entered into or executed before the  commencement  of  the  Constitution

and has or has been continued in operation after such commencement.

9. There is similarity of provision in Article 363 and proviso  to

Article 131. The original jurisdiction conferred on this Court by  the  main

provision contained in Article 131 is excepted by virtue of proviso  in  the

matters of political settlements.  By making provisions such as Article  363

and proviso to Article 131, the political settlements have  been  taken  out

of purview of judicial pronouncements.   Proviso  appended  to  Article  131

renders  a  dispute  arising  out  of  any  treaty,   agreement,   covenant,

engagement, sanad  or  similar  instrument  which  is  political  in  nature

executed before the commencement of the Constitution and which  has  or  has

been continued in operation, non-justiciable and jurisdiction of this  Court

is barred.  The jurisdiction of this Court is not taken away in  respect  of

the dispute arising out of an ordinary agreement. The  instruments  referred

to and described in proviso are only those which are  political  in  nature.

Non-political instruments are not covered by the proviso.

1. 1886 Lease Agreement does provide for  resolution  of  disputes

between the parties to the agreement by way of arbitration; it  contains  an

arbitration clause. The submission of Kerala that enforcement of  any  award

under the arbitration clause would be  political  in  nature  is  misplaced.

The assumption of Kerala that 1886 Lease Agreement was not  justiciable  and

enforceable in court of law  prior  to  the  Constitution  as  no  court  in

Travancore would obviously entertain a claim against Maharaja and  no  court

outside the State of Travancore  have  jurisdiction  over  the  Maharaja  of

Travancore is not relevant at all and devoid of any merit.

1. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by this  Court

in  Mullaperiyar  Environmental  Protection  Forum1      that   1886   Lease

Agreement would not come within the purview of Article 363 and  jurisdiction

of this Court is not barred.  As a necessary corollary, the dispute  arising

out of 1886 Lease Agreement is not  barred  under  Article  131  proviso  as

well.  Moreover, the principal  challenge  laid  in  the  suit  pertains  to

constitutional validity of 2006 (Amendment) Act for  which  Article  363  or

for that matter under Article 131 proviso does not come  into  operation  at

all.

 

Article 294 and Article 295

2. By virtue of Article 294[9], all properties immediately  before

the commencement of the Constitution which vested in  His  Majesty  for  the

purposes of the Government of the Dominion of India vest in  the  Union  and

all properties  which  vested  in  His  Majesty  for  the  purposes  of  the

Government of each Governor’s Province vest in the corresponding  State  and

all rights, liabilities and obligations of the  Government  of  Dominion  of

India and the Government of each Governor’s Province are  recognised  to  be

rights, liabilities and obligations respectively of the Government of  India

and the Government  of  each  corresponding  State.  In  other  words,  this

article declares which property would vest in  the  Union  and  which  would

vest in the State Government. There remains  no  doubt  that  by  virtue  of

Article 294(b) read  with  First  Schedule  appended  to  the  Constitution,

leasehold rights devolved upon the State of  Madras  under  the  1886  Lease

Agreement.

3. Article 295[10] relates  to  succession  to  property,  assets,

rights, liabilities and obligations.   Clause  1(a)  states  that  from  the

commencement of the Constitution all property and assets  which  immediately

before such commencement were vested in an Indian State corresponding  to  a

State specified in Part B of the First Schedule shall vest in the Union,  if

the purposes for which such property and assets were held,  be  purposes  of

the Union.  Clause  1(b)  provides  that  all  rights  and  liabilities  and

obligations of the Government of any Indian State corresponding to  a  State

specified in Part B of the  First  Schedule,  whether  arising  out  of  any

contract or otherwise shall be the rights, liabilities  and  obligations  of

the Government of India if the purposes for which such rights were  acquired

or liabilities and obligations were incurred, be purposes of the  Government

of India. Clause (2) of this Article provides that Government of each  State

specified in Part B of the First Schedule shall  be  the  successor  of  the

corresponding State as regards all  property  and  assets  and  all  rights,

liabilities  and  obligations,  whether  arising  out  of  any  contract  or

otherwise, other than those referred to in clause (1). This  is  subject  to

any agreement entered into that behalf by the Government of India  with  the

Government of  the  State  concerned.  The  expression  ‘Government  of  the

corresponding  Indian  State”  in  Article  295(2),  in  our  opinion,  with

reference to Government of Part B State of Travancore—Cochin meant not  only

the  merged  erstwhile  State  of  Travancore  and  Cochin  but   also   its

components. Seen thus, by virtue of Article 295(2), the Government  of  Part

B State of Travancore – Cochin became successor of the  corresponding  State

of Travancore as regards all rights,  liabilities  and  obligations  arising

out of 1886 Lease Agreement.

 

Findings on issue Nos. 1, 5, 6 and 7

4. In light of the above, our finding on issue Nos. 1, 5, 6 and  7

are:

(i)   The suit filed by the  State  of  Tamil  Nadu  is  maintainable  under

Article 131 of the Constitution.

(ii)  The suit based on a legal right claimed under the lease deed  executed

between the Government of the Maharaja of Travancore and  the  Secretary  of

State for India in Council on 29.10.1886 is not barred  by  the  proviso  to

Article 131 of the Constitution.

(iii) The State of Kerala (first defendant) is  estopped  from  raising  the

plea that the lease deed  dated  29.10.1886  has  lapsed,  in  view  of  the

supplemental agreements dated 28.05.1970.

(iv)  The lease deed executed between the  Government  of  the  Maharaja  of

Travancore and Secretary of State for India  in  Council  on  29.10.1886  is

valid and binding on the first defendant and it is enforceable by  plaintiff

against the first defendant.

 

Issue Nos. 2(a), 3, 4(a), 4(b) and 10

5. These issues are inter-related and, therefore, they  are  being

discussed together.

 

Contentions on behalf of Tamil Nadu

6. Mr. Vinod Bobde, learned senior counsel for Tamil Nadu  submits

that 2006 judgment  had  rendered  a  finding  of  fact  on  the  safety  of

Mullaperiyar dam for raising water level to 142  ft.  2006  (Amendment)  Act

could not have taken away the legal right of Tamil  Nadu  flowing  from  the

judgment. Section 62(A) of  the  2006  (Amendment)  Act  directly  seeks  to

nullify the judgment of this Court by declaring the  dam  to  be  endangered

and by fixing the height of the water level at 136 ft.  It  also  authorises

the Dam Safety Authority to discard the judgment and to adjudge  for  itself

whether to allow raising of water level. The Section also goes on to  freeze

all work on the  dam  allowed  by  this  Court  in  2006  judgment.  Section

62(1)(e) of the 2006 (Amendment) Act in its application to the subject  dam,

seeks to overcome the finding  of  safety  by  authorizing  the  Dam  Safety

Authority  to  order,  inter  alia,  decommissioning   of   the   dam.   The

nullification of judgment is, thus, plain and  obvious.  A  final  judgment,

once rendered, operates and remains in force until altered by the  court  in

an  appropriate  proceeding.  He   submits   that   unilateral   legislation

nullifying a judgment is constitutionally impermissible.

7. Relying upon the judgment of this Court in Prithvi  Cotton[11],

learned senior counsel for  Tamil  Nadu  submits  that  nullification  of  a

judgment without removal of its legal basis is  one  of  the  categories  of

usurpation. A judgment on a question of fact cannot  be  nullified  so  also

the effect of judgment, which enforces a legal right.  By relying  upon  the

Privy Council judgment in Liyanage[12], he submitted that interference  with

the judicial process in a pending  matter  also  amounts  to  usurpation  of

judicial power.  In both categories of usurpation, the answer  would  depend

on facts of each case after considering the legal effect of  the  law  on  a

judgment or a judicial proceeding. Mr. Vinod Bobde  submits  that  the  true

purpose of the legislation, the haste with which it  was  enacted,  and  the

surrounding circumstances, are relevant circumstances.

8. It is argued by learned senior counsel for Tamil Nadu that  the

test for determining whether a judgment is nullified is to see  whether  the

law and the judgment  are  inconsistent  and  irreconcilable  so  that  both

cannot stand together.  The finding of fact by this Court in  2006  judgment

that the dam is safe can never be deemed to be imaginary  by  legal  fiction

which then  proceeds to deem the opposite to be real, namely, that  the  dam

is endangered. The provision limiting the height of water level to  136  ft,

enacted within 15 days after the judgment of this Court finding the  dam  to

be safe and allowing the water level to be raised  to  142  ft.,  shows  the

true purpose of the legislation, the situation to which it was directed  and

the clear intention  to defy and act as  a  judicial  authority  sitting  in

appeal over the judgment of this Court.

9. Mr. Vinod  Bobde  submits  that  between  27.02.2006  when  the

judgment was rendered by this Court and  15.03.2006  when  2006  (Amendment)

Act was enacted by Kerala State legislature, no new facts emerged nor  there

was  any  change  in  circumstances.  Kerala  Government  and  Kerala  State

Legislature did not have a single piece of information  of  fact  before  it

concerning seismic coefficient values, Probable Maximum Flood  (PMF)  levels

or any other matter or material contradicting or even doubting  the  finding

of this Court in 2006 judgment which  was  based  on  the  findings  of  the

Expert Committee.

1. It is strenuously urged by learned  senior  counsel  for  Tamil

Nadu that once a dispute is before a court and parties are at issue  on  any

question of fact, the decision on that question can be rendered only by  the

court and not by the legislature or the executive.  The  legislature  cannot

decide that the water level shall not exceed 136 ft.  when  the  very  issue

had been adjudicated upon by the court.

1. Learned senior counsel for Tamil Nadu argues that  the  finding

of fact about safety of the  dam  for  water  level  upto  142  ft.  is  res

judicata and binds the two States. It is not  within  the  province  of  the

Kerala Legislature to sit in judgment on  the  finding  of  this  Court  and

purport to reverse the same by directing that water level  shall  remain  at

136 ft. According to Tamil Nadu, this  is  not  a  legislation;  it  is  the

exercise of “despotic discretion” and  offends  the  rule  of  law  and  the

principle of separation of powers.

2. Relying upon a decision of this Court in Indra Sawhney[13],  it

is argued by learned senior counsel for  Tamil  Nadu  that  the  legislative

declaration of fact in Section 62A that the  dams  in  Second  Schedule  are

endangered on account of their age, degeneration, degradation, structure  or

other impediments is not beyond judicial scrutiny and  it  is  open  to  the

court to examine the true facts.

3. Mr. Vinod Bobde argues that  2006  (Amendment)  Act  is  not  a

validating enactment because (i) the judgment of this Court  did  not  reach

the finding about the safety of  the  dam  founded  on  any  law  which  was

considered to suffer from any constitutional vice or defect; (ii) there  was

no occasion at all to remove any vice or cure any  defect  in  any  law  and

perform a validating exercise; and (iii) in fact, the 2006  (Amendment)  Act

does not purport to cure any defect found by this Court in any law. In  this

regard,  reliance  is  placed  upon  decisions  of  this  Court  in  Prithvi

Cotton11,  Madan  Mohan  Pathak[14],  People’s  Union  for  Civil  Liberties

(PUCL)[15], Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Anr.[16]  and

Janapada Sabha[17].

4. It is argued by Mr. Vinod Bobde that validating laws are passed

by the legislature after curing the defects  in  the  law  which  have  been

struck down but where a fact is adjudicated upon, there is no power  in  the

legislature or executive to sit in  judgment upon a decision on  a  disputed

question of fact and substitute its  own  “legislative  judgment”  for  that

Court. Learned senior counsel places reliance upon  the   judgment  of  this

Court in Cauvery reference[18].

5. It is, thus, argued by the learned  senior  counsel  for  Tamil

Nadu that 2006 (Amendment) Act is unconstitutional.

 

 

 

Contentions on behalf of Kerala

6. Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned senior counsel for Kerala  on  the

other hand argues that Kerala  legislature  is  competent  to  override  the

contracts and regulate the safety of Mullaperiyar dam  situated  within  its

territory  across  river  Periyar.  Even  agreements  entered  into  between

foreign sovereigns can be overridden in exercise of legislative  powers.  He

relies upon the decisions of  this  Court  in  Thakur  Jagannath  Baksh[19],

Maharaj Umeg Singh[20], Manigault[21] and an article by Roderick E.  Walston

titled “The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Contexts”[22].

7. Learned senior counsel for Kerala contends that on the basis of

“age”, etc., as safety standards, the Kerala legislature as a  precautionary

measure has declared that 22 dams are “endangered” and  restricted  storages

thereunder by virtue of Section 62(A)(1) and (2) read with Second  Schedule.

Learned senior counsel relies upon Brotherhood  of  Locomotive  Firemen[23],

Raymond Motor  Transportation[24],  Raymond  Kassel[25],  American  Trucking

Association[26] and Pfizer Animal Health[27]. Learned  senior  counsel  also

relies  upon,  “Science  and  Risk  Regulation  and  International  Law”  by

Jacqueline Peel[28] wherein Pfizer Animal Health27  has been referred.

8. Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior counsel for Kerala argues that

legislature is competent to remove the basis of judgment and neutralize  its

effect. In response to the  contention of Tamil Nadu that  2006  (Amendment)

Act constitutes usurpation of judicial power, learned senior counsel  argues

that 2003 Act was in place when the judgment was delivered by this Court  on

27.02.2006 but the Court has not taken into consideration Sections 3  and  4

and so also Section 30 of the 2003 Act.  It was assumed that Section 108  of

the 1956 Act would save the contractual rights arising from the  1886  Lease

Agreement and purportedly  continued  by  the  supplementary  agreements  of

1. The 2003  Act  was  not  under  challenge  either  in  the  previous

litigation nor in the present  suit.  Learned  senior  counsel  for  Kerala,

thus, submits that where a judgment is per incuriam, one remedy  is  by  way

of further appropriate legislation.

9. Learned senior counsel for Kerala in the  course  of  arguments

extensively referred to the provisions of 2003 Act and the  substitution  of

Section 62 by providing with  non  obstante  clause  that  the  function  of

evaluation of safety of a dam and the  power  to  issue  directions  to  the

custodian are  conferred  upon  Dam  Safety  Authority  notwithstanding  any

decree of any court, and notwithstanding anything contained in  any  treaty,

contract, instrument or other documents and  submitted  that  2003  Act  and

2006 (Amendment) Act have  created  a  statutory  framework  for  regulating

water level in respect of dams within the State of  Kerala,  both  scheduled

and non-scheduled. 2006 (Amendment) Act establishes a  statutory  authority,

which confers upon it the power to take certain measures in the interest  of

public safety. The judgment of this Court in  2006,  Kerala  contends,  even

does not suggest remotely  that  Kerala  legislature  lacks  power  to  make

measures for public safety in relation to the reservoir situated within  the

State.

1. Mr. Harish Salve argues that in declaring a dam to  be  unsafe,

the Legislature does not render a finding of fact. It deems the  dam  to  be

unsafe and sets up an authority to regulate the dam in a particular  manner.

The legislative competence of the legislature  to  put  in  place  statutory

machinery to regulate water levels in a dam situated  within  the  State  in

the interest of public safety cannot be denied. He argues that  as  to  what

constitutes an endangered dam is a matter of legislative policy  and  safety

is accepted to be a matter primarily of policy. A court through the  process

of adjudication renders findings and adjudication is always as  per  law  in

force. Once the law is altered, the adjudication cannot stand  on  its  own.

According  to  Mr.  Salve,  the  argument  of  Tamil  Nadu   that   impugned

legislation is usurpation of judicial power is misconceived.

1. Learned senior  counsel  for  Kerala  relies  upon    Wheeling

Bridge[29]  in support of  the  principle  that  private  rights  pass  into

judgments but not the public rights and also submits that Wheeling  Bridge29

principle has been  applied  in  the  subsequent  cases  viz.,  The  Clinton

Bridge[30], Hodges[31] and Charles B. Miller[32].

2. Shri Harish N. Salve, argues that 2006 (Amendment) Act is not a

Validation Act in a stricto sensu. While  adjudicating  upon  constitutional

validity, he argues that the court must proceed  on  the  premise  that  the

legislature understands and correctly  appreciates  the  needs  of  its  own

people and its laws are directed  to  the  problems  made  manifest  by  its

experience and are based on adequate grounds.  Learned  senior  counsel  for

Kerala relies upon the decision of this Court  in  Elphinstone  Spinning[33]

which approved  the  earlier  decisions  in  Sanjeev  Coke[34]  and  Doypack

Systems[35].

 

Indian Constitution : Separation of powers

3. Indian Constitution, unlike Constitution of  United  States  of

America and Australia, does not have  express  provision  of  separation  of

powers. However, the  structure  provided  in  our  Constitution  leaves  no

manner of doubt that the doctrine of separation of powers runs  through  the

Indian Constitution. It is for this reason that this  Court  has  recognized

separation of  power  as  a  basic  feature  of  the  Constitution  and   an

essential constituent of the rule of law.  The  doctrine  of  separation  of

powers is, though, not expressly engrafted in the Constitution,  its  sweep,

operation  and  visibility  are  apparent  from  the  Constitution.   Indian

Constitution has made demarcation without drawing formal lines  between  the

three organs – legislature, executive and judiciary.

 

Mahal Chand Sethia

4. In Mahal Chand Sethia[36], while dealing with the argument that

although it was open to the State legislature by an Act and the Governor  by

an Ordinance to amend  the  West  Bengal  Criminal  Law  Amendment  (Special

Courts) Act,  1949, it was incompetent for either of  them  to  validate  an

order of transfer which  had  been  quashed  by  the  issue  of  a  writ  of

certiorari by the High Court and  the  order  of  transfer  being  virtually

dead, could not be resuscitated by  the  Governor  or  legislature  and  the

validating measures could not touch any adjudication by the Court.    Mitter

1. speaking for the Court stated the legal position :-

“……A legislature of a State is competent to pass any measure  which  is

within its legislative competence under the Constitution of  India.  Of

course,  this  is  subject  to  the  provisions  of  Part  III  of  the

Constitution. Laws can be enacted either by the Ordinance making  power

of a Governor or the Legislature of a State in respect  of  the  topics

covered by the entries in the appropriate List in the Seventh  Schedule

to the Constitution. Subject to  the  above  limitations  laws  can  be

prospective as also retrospective in operation.  A  court  of  law  can

pronounce upon the validity of any law and declare the same to be  null

and void if it was beyond the legislative competence of the Legislature

or  if  it  infringed  the  rights  enshrined  in  Part  III   of   the

Constitution. Needless to add it can strike down or declare invalid any

Act or direction of a State Government which is not authorised by  law.

The position of a Legislature is however different. It  cannot  declare

any decision of a Court of law to be void or of no effect.”

 

 

(emphasis supplied)

 

Prithvi Cotton

5. One of the leading cases  of  this  Court  on  the  legislative

competence vis-à-vis decision of the Court  is  Prithvi  Cotton11.  In  that

case, the validity of the Gujarat  Imposition  of  Taxes  by  Municipalities

(Validation) Act, 1963 was  assailed  on  behalf  of  the  petitioners.  The

Validation Act had to be enacted in view of the decision of  this  Court  in

Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas[37].  Section 3 of the Validation Act  provided

that notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order  of

a court or tribunal or any other authority, no tax assessed or purported  to

have been assessed by a municipality on the basis  of  capital  value  of  a

building or land and imposed, collected or recovered by the municipality  at

any time before the commencement of the Validation Act shall  be  deemed  to

have been invalidly  assessed,  imposed,  collected  or  recovered  and  the

imposition, collection or recovery of the tax so  assessed  shall  be  valid

and shall be deemed to have been always valid and shall  not  be  called  in

question merely on the ground that the assessment of the tax on  the   basis

of capital value of the building or land  was  not  authorized  by  law  and

accordingly any tax so assessed before the commencement  of  the  Validation

Act and leviable for a period prior to such commencement but  not  collected

or recovered before such commencement  may  be  collected  or  recovered  in

accordance  with  the  relevant  municipal  law.  The   Constitution   Bench

exposited  that the validity of a validating law depended upon  whether  the

legislature possesses the  competence  which  it  claims  over  the  subject

matter and whether in making the validation it removed the defect which  the

courts had found in the existing law and made  adequate  provisions  in  the

validating law for a valid imposition of the taxes.  In  the  words  of  the

Constitution Bench:

 

“….When a Legislature sets out to validate a tax declared by  a  court

to be illegally collected under an ineffective or an invalid law,  the

cause  for  ineffectiveness  or  invalidity  must  be  removed  before

validation can be said to take place effectively. The  most  important

condition, of course, is that the Legislature must possess  the  power

to impose the tax, for, if it does not, the action  must  ever  remain

ineffective and illegal. Granted legislative  competence,  it  is  not

sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall  not

bind for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in  exercise  of

judicial power which the Legislature does not possess or  exercise.  A

court’s decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is

based are so fundamentally altered that the decision  could  not  have

been given in the altered circumstances. Ordinarily, a court  holds  a

tax to be invalidly imposed because the power to tax is wanting or the

statute or the rules or both are invalid or do not sufficiently create

the jurisdiction. Validation of a tax so declared illegal may be  done

only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are capable  of  being

removed and are in fact removed and the tax thus made legal. Sometimes

this is done by providing for jurisdiction where jurisdiction had  not

been properly invested before. Sometimes this is done  by  re-enacting

retrospectively a valid and legal taxing provision and then by fiction

making the tax already collected to stand under  the  re-enacted  law.

Sometimes the Legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation  of

the law under which tax was collected and by  legislative  fiat  makes

the new meaning binding upon courts. The Legislature  may  follow  any

one method or all of them and while it does so it may  neutralise  the

effect of the earlier decision of the court which becomes  ineffective

after the change of the law. Whichever method is adopted  it  must  be

within the competence of the legislature and  legal  and  adequate  to

attain the object of validation. If the Legislature has the power over

the subject-matter and competence to make a valid law, it can  at  any

time make such a valid law and make it retrospectively so as  to  bind

even past transactions. The validity of a Validating  Law,  therefore,

depends upon whether the Legislature possesses the competence which it

claims over the subject-matter and whether in making the validation it

removes the defect which the courts had found in the existing law  and

makes adequate provisions in the Validating Law for a valid imposition

of the tax.”

 

 

(emphasis supplied)

 

 

 

Janapada Sabha

6. The Constitution Bench  in  Janapada  Sabha17,  considered  the

position with regard to legislative power and  a  decision  of  the  Supreme

Court and made the following weighty observations:

 

“..On the words used in the Act,  it  is  plain  that  the  Legislature

attempted to overrule or set aside the decision of this Court. That, in

our  judgment,  is  not  open  to  the  Legislature  to  do  under  our

constitutional scheme. It is open to  the  Legislature  within  certain

limits to amend the provisions of an Act retrospectively and to declare

what the law shall be deemed to have been, but it is not  open  to  the

Legislature to say that a judgment of a Court properly constituted  and

rendered in exercise of its powers in a matter brought before it  shall

be deemed to be ineffective and the interpretation of the law shall  be

otherwise than as declared by the Court.”

 

(emphasis supplied by us)

 

Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad

7. The above three decisions and one more decision of  this  Court

in Amalgamated Coal Fields[38] were noted by the  two-Judge  Bench  of  this

Court in the  Municipal  Corporation  of  the  City  of  Ahmedabad16.  While

accepting that the  legislature  under  our  Constitution  have  within  the

prescribed  limits,  powers  to  make  laws   prospectively   as   well   as

retrospectively and that by exercise of those powers,  the  legislature  can

remove the basis of  a  decision  rendered  by  a  competent  court  thereby

rendering that decision ineffective but no legislature has power to ask  the

instrumentalities of the State to disobey or disregard  the decisions  given

by courts.

 

Madan Mohan Pathak

8. Yet another important  decision  by  the  7-Judge  Constitution

Bench of this Court on the subject is Madan Mohan Pathak14.  P.N.  Bhagwati,

1. speaking for himself, Krishna Iyer and Desai, JJ. while dealing with the

constitutional validity of the Life Insurance Corporation  (Modification  of

Settlement) Act, 1976, which was enacted by the Parliament in light  of  the

decision of the Calcutta High Court holding an impost or tax to be  invalid,

observed that irrespective of whether the impugned Act was  constitutionally

valid or not, Life Insurance Corporation was  bound  to  obey  the  writ  of

mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court. M.H. Beg,  C.J.,  agreeing  with

the view of P.N. Bhagwati, J. that the  benefits  of  rights  recognized  by

the judgment of the Calcutta High Court could not be indirectly  taken  away

under Section 3 of the impugned Act selectively,  said  that  if  the  right

conferred by the judgment independently is sought  to  be  set  aside,  then

Section 3 would be invalid for trenching  upon  the  judicial  power.   M.H.

Beg, C.J. further said:

 

“ I may, however, observe that even though the real object of the  Act

may be to set aside the result of the mandamus issued by the  Calcutta

High Court, yet, the section does not  mention  this  object  at  all.

Probably this was so because the jurisdiction of a High Court and  the

effectiveness of its orders derived their force from  Article  226  of

the Constitution itself. These could not be touched by an ordinary act

of Parliament. Even if Section 3 of the Act seeks  to  take  away  the

basis of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court,  without  mentioning

it, by enacting what may appear to be a law, yet, I think that,  where

the rights of the citizen against the State are concerned,  we  should

adopt  an  interpretation  which  upholds  those  rights.   Therefore,

according to the interpretation I prefer to adopt the rights which had

passed into those embodied in a judgment and became  the  basis  of  a

mandamus from the High Court could not be taken away in this  indirect

fashion.”

 

(emphasis

supplied by us)

1. Sambamurthy
2. The importance of power of judicial review in rule of  law  has

been significantly highlighted in P. Sambamurthy[39].  In  that  case,  this

Court while holding  that  proviso  to  clause  (5)  of  Article  371-D  was

violative of the basic structure doctrine, observed that if the exercise  of

the power of judicial review could be set at naught by the State  Government

by overriding the decision against it, it would sound  the  death  knell  of

the rule of law.  Sounding a word of caution, this Court said that the  rule

of law would cease to have any meaning if the State Government were to  defy

the law and yet to get away with it.

 

Cauvery Reference

1. In Cauvery reference18,  this  Court  was  concerned  with  the

validity of Karnataka Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection  Ordinance,  1991.

Relying  upon  its  previous  decisions  in  Madan  Mohan  Pathak14  and  P.

Sambamurthy39, this Court declared  the  Ordinance  unconstitutional  as  it

sought to nullify the order of the Tribunal impinging on the judicial  power

of the State.

PUCL

1. In People’s Union for Civil Liberties  (PUCL)15,  the  question

under consideration before the three-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  was  the

validity of the Representation of the People  (Amendment)  Ordinance,  2002.

The amendment followed  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Association  for

Democratic Reforms[40]. M.B. Shah, J. speaking for the majority noticed  the

earlier decisions of this Court in P. Sambamurthy39, Cauvery  reference18  ,

Municipal Corporation of the  City  of  Ahmedabad16,  Prithvi  Cotton11  and

Mahal Chand Sethia36 and stated :

“The Legislature can change the basis on which a decision is  rendered

by this Court and change the law in general. However, this  power  can

be  exercised  subject  to  constitutional  provision,   particularly,

legislative competence and if it is violative  of  fundamental  rights

enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, such law would be  void  as

provided under Article 13 of the Constitution.  The  Legislature  also

cannot declare any decision of a court of law to  be  void  or  of  no

effect”.

 

 

 

Kesavananda Bharti, Indira Nehru Gandhi, Bal Mukund Sah and I.R. Coelho

 

 

2. That separation  of  powers  between  the   legislature,   the

executive and the judiciary is the basic structure of  the  Constitution  is

expressly stated by  Sikri,  C.J.  in  Kesavananda  Bharti[41].  Shelat  and

Grover, JJ. reiterating the views of Sikri,  J.  said  that  demarcation  of

power between the legislature, the executive  and  the  judiciary  could  be

regarded as basic elements of the Constitutional structure.  The  same  view

is  expressed  in  subsequent  decisions  of  this  Court  in  Indira  Nehru

Gandhi[42],  Bal  Mukund  Sah[43]  and  I.R.  Coelho[44].   The   nine-Judge

Constitution Bench in I.R. Coelho44 has described  that  equality,  rule  of

law, judicial review and separation  of  powers  form  parts  of  the  basic

structure of the Constitution.  The Court in I.R. Coelho44  said:

 

“. . . . . .. Each of these concepts are intimately  connected.  There

can be no rule of law, if there is no equality before the  law.  These

would be meaningless if the violation was not subject to the  judicial

review. All these would be redundant if the legislative, executive and

judicial powers are vested in one organ. Therefore, the duty to decide

whether the limits have been  transgressed  has  been  placed  on  the

judiciary.”

 

 

I.N. Saksena

3. Drawing distinction between legislative and judicial  acts  and

functions, this Court in I.N. Saksena[45]  held  (para  21  and  22  of  the

Report):

 

 

“21. The distinction between a “legislative” act and a  “judicial”  act

is well known,  though  in  some  specific  instances  the  line  which

separates one category from the other may not  be  easily  discernible.

Adjudication of the rights of the parties according to law  enacted  by

the legislature is a judicial function.  In  the  performance  of  this

function, the court interprets and  gives  effect  to  the  intent  and

mandate of the legislature as embodied in the  statute.  On  the  other

hand, it is for the legislature to lay down the law, prescribing  norms

of conduct which will govern parties and transactions  and  to  require

the court to give effect to that law.

2. While, in view of this distinction between legislative and judicial

functions, the legislature cannot by a bare declaration, without  more,

directly overrule, reverse or override a judicial decision, it may,  at

any time in exercise of the plenary powers conferred on it by  Articles

245 and 246 of the Constitution render a judicial decision  ineffective

by enacting a valid  law  on  a  topic  within  its  legislative  field

fundamentally altering or  changing  with  retrospective,  curative  or

neutralising effect the conditions on which such decision is based.  As

pointed out by Ray, C.J. in Indira Nehru  Gandhi  v.  Raj  Narain,  the

rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of  competent  courts  and

Tribunals by changing their basis by legislative enactment is  a  well-

known pattern of all validating Acts. Such validating legislation which

removes the causes for ineffectiveness  or  invalidity  of  actions  or

proceedings is not an encroachment on judicial power.”

 

103.1.           In I.N.  Saksena45,  this  Court  referred  to  an  earlier

decision in Hari Singh[46] wherein a Bench of seven  Judges  of  this  Court

noted the two tests for judging  the  validity  of  a  validating  law:  (i)

whether the legislature possesses competence over the  subject-matter,  and,

(ii) whether by validation, the legislature has  removed  the  defect  which

the courts have found in the previous law. While following these two  tests,

the four-Judge Bench in I.N. Saksena45 added a third  test:  whether  it  is

consistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.

 

1. Kannadasan
2. Prithvi Cotton11  has  been  followed  in  Hindustan  Gum  and

Chemicals[47], Vijay Mills Company[48] and P. Kannadasan[49].    It  is  not

necessary to burden this judgment with all the three judgments  as,  in  our

view, reference to one of them, i.e., P. Kannadasan49 will suffice.   In  P.

Kannadasan49 this Court noted that the Constitution of India recognised  the

doctrine of separation of powers between the  three  organs  of  the  State,

namely, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.  The Court said :

“15.……. It must be remembered that  our  Constitution  recognises  and

incorporates the doctrine of separation of powers  between  the  three

organs of the State, viz., the  Legislature,  the  Executive  and  the

Judiciary. Even though the Constitution has adopted the  parliamentary

form of government where the dividing line between the legislature and

the executive becomes thin, the theory  of  separation  of  powers  is

still valid. Ours is also a federal form of government.  The  subjects

in respect of which the  Union  and  the  States  can  make  laws  are

separately set out in List I and List II of the  Seventh  Schedule  to

the Constitution respectively. (List III is, of course,  a  concurrent

list.) The Constitution has invested the Supreme Court and High Courts

with the power to invalidate laws made by  Parliament  and  the  State

Legislatures transgressing the constitutional  limitations.  Where  an

Act made by a State Legislature is invalidated by the  courts  on  the

ground that the State Legislature was not competent to enact  it,  the

State Legislature cannot enact a law declaring that  the  judgment  of

the court shall not operate; it cannot overrule or annul the  decision

of the court. But this does not mean that the other legislature  which

is competent to  enact  that  law  cannot  enact  that  law.  It  can.

Similarly, it is open to a legislature  to  alter  the  basis  of  the

judgment as pointed out by this Court in  Shri  Prithvi  Cotton  Mills

Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality— all the  while  adhering  to  the

constitutional limitations; in such a case, the decision of the  court

becomes ineffective in the sense that  the  basis  upon  which  it  is

rendered, is changed. The new law or the amended law so  made  can  be

challenged on other grounds but not on the ground  that  it  seeks  to

ineffectuate or circumvent the decision of the court. This is what  is

meant by “checks and balances” inherent  in  a  system  of  government

incorporating the concept of separation of  powers.  This  aspect  has

been  repeatedly  emphasised  by  this  Court  in  numerous  decisions

commencing from Shri Prithvi Cotton  Mills.  Under  our  Constitution,

neither wing is superior to the other. Each wing derives its power and

jurisdiction from the  Constitution.  Each  must  operate  within  the

sphere allotted to it. Trying to make one wing superior to  the  other

would be to introduce an imbalance in the system and a negation of the

basic concept of separation  of  powers  inherent  in  our  system  of

government……..”

 

Indian Aluminium Company

5. In Indian  Aluminium  Company[50],  one  of  the   contentions

addressed to this Court was that the Kerala  legislature  had  no  power  to

enact Section 11 of the impugned Act validating the levy with  retrospective

effect as it amounted to encroachment upon judicial  power  of  the  courts.

While dealing with this contention, the Court referred to earlier  decisions

of this Court and culled out the following principles (para  56;  Pgs.  662-

663 of the Report):

“(1) The adjudication of the rights of the parties  is  the  essential

judicial function. Legislature has to lay down the norms of conduct or

rules which will govern the parties and the transactions  and  require

the court to give effect to them;

(2) The Constitution delineated delicate balance in  the  exercise  of

the sovereign power by the legislature, executive and judiciary;

(3) In a democracy governed by rule of law, the legislature  exercises

the power under Articles 245 and 246 and other companion articles read

with the entries in the respective lists in the  Seventh  Schedule  to

make the law which includes power to amend the law.

(4) Courts in their concern and endeavour to preserve judicial  power

equally must be guarded to maintain the delicate  balance  devised  by

the Constitution between the three sovereign functionaries.  In  order

that rule of law permeates  to  fulfil  constitutional  objectives  of

establishing an egalitarian social  order,  the  respective  sovereign

functionaries need free play in their joints  so  that  the  march  of

social progress and order remains unimpeded. The smooth balance  built

with delicacy must always be maintained;

(5) In its anxiety to safeguard judicial power, it is  unnecessary  to

be overzealous and conjure up incursion  into  the  judicial  preserve

invalidating the valid law competently made;

(6) The court, therefore, needs to carefully scan the law to find out:

(a) whether the vice pointed out by the court and invalidity  suffered

by previous law is cured complying with the legal  and  constitutional

requirements; (b) whether the legislature has competence  to  validate

the law; (c) whether such validation is  consistent  with  the  rights

guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution.

(7) The court does not have the power to validate an invalid law or to

legalise impost of tax illegally made and collected or to  remove  the

norm of invalidation or provide  a  remedy.  These  are  not  judicial

functions but the exclusive province of  the  legislature.  Therefore,

they are not encroachment on judicial power.

(8)  In  exercising  legislative  power,  the  legislature   by   mere

declaration, without anything more, cannot directly  overrule,  revise

or override a judicial  decision.  It  can  render  judicial  decision

ineffective by enacting valid law on the topic within its  legislative

field   fundamentally   altering    or    changing    its    character

retrospectively. The changed or altered conditions are such  that  the

previous decision would not have been rendered by the court, if  those

conditions had existed at the time of declaring the law as invalid. It

is also empowered to give effect to retrospective legislation  with  a

deeming date or with effect from a particular  date.  The  legislature

can change the character of the tax  or  duty  from  impermissible  to

permissible tax but the tax or levy should answer such  character  and

the legislature is competent to recover  the  invalid  tax  validating

such a tax on removing the invalid base for recovery from the  subject

or render the recovery from the State ineffectual. It is competent for

the legislature  to  enact  the  law  with  retrospective  effect  and

authorise its agencies to levy and collect the tax on that basis, make

the imposition of levy collected and recovery of the tax  made  valid,

notwithstanding the declaration by the court or  the  direction  given

for recovery thereof.

(9) The consistent thread that runs through all the decisions of this

Court is that the legislature cannot directly overrule the decision or

make a direction as not binding on  it  but  has  power  to  make  the

decision ineffective by removing the base on which  the  decision  was

rendered,  consistent  with  the  law  of  the  Constitution  and  the

legislature must have competence to do the same.”

 

Arooran Sugars

6. In Arooran Sugars[51], the matter reached this Court  from  the

judgment of the Madras High  Court.   Before  the  Madras  High  Court,  the

challenge was laid to the  constitutional  validity  of  T.N.  Land  Reforms

(Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Amendment Act, 1978 on diverse  grounds.   The

Division Bench of the Madras High Court  allowed  the  writ  petitions.  The

State of Tamil Nadu being not satisfied with that judgment  approached  this

Court. While dealing with the power of  the  legislature,  the  Constitution

Bench of this Court observed:  “The  power  of  the  legislature  to  amend,

delete or obliterate a statute  or  to  enact  a  statute  prospectively  or

retrospectively cannot be questioned and challenged unless the court  is  of

the  view  that  such  exercise  is  in  violation  of  Article  14  of  the

Constitution. It need not be impressed that whenever any  Act  or  amendment

is brought in force retrospectively or any provision of the Act  is  deleted

retrospectively, in this process rights of some are  bound  to  be  affected

one way or the other. In every case, it cannot be urged  that  the  exercise

by the  legislature  while  introducing  a  new  provision  or  deleting  an

existing provision with retrospective effect per se shall  be  violative  of

Article 14 of  the  Constitution.  If  that  stand  is  accepted,  then  the

necessary corollary shall be that legislature  has  no  power  to  legislate

retrospectively, because in that  event  a  vested  right  is  effected;  of

course, in a special situation this Court has held that  such  exercise  was

violative of Article 14 of the Constitution……..” .  The  Constitution  Bench

held that the provisions of the impugned Act do not purport  to  affect  any

vested or acquired right, it only restores the position which  existed  when

the principal Act was in force.  It further held that the Amending  Act  did

not ask the instrumentalities of the  State  to  disobey  or  disregard  the

decision given by the High Court but  what  it  has  done  is  that  it  has

removed the basis of its decision.

 

Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Company

7. The Constitution Bench of this Court  in  Elphinstone  Spinning

and Weaving Company33  laid down: (a) there is  always  a  presumption  that

the legislature  does  not  exceed  its  jurisdiction,  (b)  the  burden  of

establishing that the legislature has transgressed  constitutional  mandates

is always on the person who challenges its vires, and (c) unless it  becomes

clear  beyond  reasonable  doubt  that  the  legislation  in  question   has

transgressed the constitutional limits, it must be allowed to stand.

 

Dharam Dutt

8. The principle that the doctrine of colorable  legislation  does

not involve bona fides or mala fides on  the  part  of  the  legislature  is

highlighted  by  this  Court  in  Dharam  Dutt[52].   Relying  upon  earlier

decisions in K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo[53] and  Ayurvedic  and  Unani  Tibia

College[54], the Court in                  Dharam Dutt52 further observed  :

 

“16……The whole doctrine resolves  itself  into  the  question  of  the

competency of a particular legislature to enact a particular  law.  If

the legislature is competent to pass a  particular  law,  the  motives

which impelled it to act are really irrelevant. On the other hand,  if

the legislature lacks competency, the  question  of  motive  does  not

arise at all. We  will,  therefore,  concentrate  on  the  legislative

competence  of  Parliament  to  enact  the  impugned  legislation.  If

Parliament has the requisite competence to enact the impugned Act, the

enquiry into the motive which persuaded Parliament  into  passing  the

Act would be of no use at all.”

 

108.1.           On the question of the effect of the previous  judgment  of

the High Court on the impugned legislation,  this  Court  in  Dharam  Dutt52

referred  to  Madan  Mohan  Pathak14,  Prithvi  Cotton11,  Indian  Aluminium

Company50, Indira Nehru Gandhi42 and other decisions of this Court and  held

in paragraph 69 (pg. 753) of the Report as follows:

“69.  That  decision  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  was  not   left

unchallenged. In fact, the correctness of the judgment of the  learned

Single Judge was put in issue by the Union of India by filing an intra-

court appeal. Filing  of  an  appeal  destroys  the  finality  of  the

judgment under appeal. The issues determined  by  the  learned  Single

Judge were open for consideration before the Division Bench.  However,

the Division Bench was denied  the  opportunity  of  hearing  and  the

aggrieved party could also not press for decision  of  the  appeal  on

merits,  as  before  the  appeal  could  be  heard  it  was   rendered

infructuous on account  of  the  Ordinance  itself  having  ceased  to

operate. The Union of India, howsoever it may have felt  aggrieved  by

the pronouncement of the learned Single  Judge,  had  no  remedy  left

available to it to pursue. The judgment of the Division Bench refusing

to dwell upon the correctness of the judgment of the Single Judge  had

the effect of leaving the matter at large. Upon  the  lapsing  of  the

earlier Ordinance pending an  appeal  before  a  Division  Bench,  the

judgment of the Single Judge  about  the  illegality  of  the  earlier

Ordinance, cannot any longer bar this Court from  deciding  about  the

validity of a fresh law on its own  merits,  even  if  the  fresh  law

contains similar provisions.”

 

108.2.           The Court, however, did not invalidate  the  impugned  Act.

This is what the court said in para 70 (pg.753) of the Report:

“…The  doctrine  of  separation  of  powers  and  the   constitutional

convention of the three organs of the State, having regard and respect

for each other, is enough answer to the plea raised on behalf  of  the

petitioners founded on the doctrine of separation of powers. We cannot

strike down a legislation which we have  on  an  independent  scrutiny

held  to  be  within  the  legislative  competence  of  the   enacting

legislature merely because the legislature  has  re-enacted  the  same

legal  provisions  into  an  Act  which,  ten   years   before,   were

incorporated in an Ordinance and were found to be unconstitutional  in

an erroneous judgment of the High Court and before the error could  be

corrected in  appeal  the  Ordinance  itself  lapsed.  It  has  to  be

remembered that by the impugned Act Parliament has not  overruled  the

judgment of the High Court nor has it declared  the  same  law  to  be

valid which has been pronounced to be void by the Court. It would have

been better if before passing the Bill into an Act  the  attention  of

Parliament was specifically invited to the factum of an  earlier  pari

materia Ordinance having been  annulled  by  the  High  Court.  If  an

Ordinance invalidated by the High Court is still  re-enacted  into  an

Act after the pronouncement by the  High  Court,  the  subsequent  Act

would be liable to be annulled once again on  finding  that  the  High

Court was right in taking the view of the illegality of the Ordinance,

which it did. However, as we have already  stated,  this  is  not  the

position obtaining in the present case. The impugned Act is not liable

to be  annulled  on  the  ground  of  violation  of  the  doctrine  of

separation of powers.”

 

 

Virender Singh Hooda (II)

9. In Virender Singh Hooda (II)[55], this Court was concerned with

the validity  of  Haryana  Civil  Services  (Executive)  Branch  and  Allied

Services and other Services,  Common/Combined  Examination  Act,  2002  (for

short, ‘the Act’). The contention of the petitioners in that case  was  that

the Act amounted to usurpation of judicial power by  the  State  legislature

with a view to overrule the decisions of this Court in Virender Singh  Hooda

(I)[56] and Sandeep Singh[57]. Having  regard  to  the  contentions  of  the

petitioners, one of the questions framed  by  the  Court  for  determination

was, whether the Act, to the extent of its retrospectivity, is  ultra  vires

as it amounts to usurpation of judicial power by the  State  legislature  or

it removes the basis of decisions in Virender Singh Hooda (I)56 and  Sandeep

Singh57 cases. The Court noted that one of the facets of the question  under

consideration was whether a writ of Mandamus can be made ineffective  by  an

enactment of the legislature. Dealing with the legislative power, the  Court

observed, “The legislative power to make law with  retrospective  effect  is

well recognised. It is also well-settled that though the legislature has  no

power to sit over Court’s judgment or usurp  judicial  power,  but,  it  has

subject to the competence to make law, power to remove the basis  which  led

to the Court’s decision. The  legislature  has  power  to  enact  laws  with

retrospective effect but has no power to change a judgment of court  of  law

either retrospectively or prospectively. The  Constitution  clearly  defines

the limits of legislative power and judicial power. None can  encroach  upon

the field covered by the other. The laws made by  the  legislature  have  to

conform to the constitutional provisions ….”.

109.1       The Court further  said:   “It  is  well  settled  that  if  the

legislature has the power over the subject-matter and competence to  make  a

valid law,  it  can  at  any  time  make  such  a  valid  law  and  make  it

retrospectively so as to bind even past  transactions.  The  validity  of  a

validating law, therefore, depends upon whether  the  legislature  possesses

the competence which it claims  over  the  subject  matter  and  whether  in

making the validation it removes the defect which the courts  had  found  in

the existing law”.

109.2.      The Court also said :  “It  is  equally  well-settled  that  the

legislature cannot by a bare declaration, without  anything  more,  directly

overrule, reverse or override a judicial decision; it may, at  any  time  in

exercise of the plenary power conferred on it by the Constitution  render  a

judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law on a topic within  its

legislative field, fundamentally altering or  changing  with  retrospective,

curative or neutralizing effect the conditions on  which  such  decision  is

based……”

109.3.      While drawing distinction between encroachment on  the  judicial

power and the  nullification  of  the  effect  of  a  judicial  decision  by

changing the law retrospectively, the Court referred to Tirath Ram  Rajinder

Nath[58]  and  stated,  “the  former  is  outside  the  competence  of   the

legislature but the latter is within its permissible limits. The reason  for

this  lies  in  the  concept  of  separation  of  powers  adopted   by   our

constitutional scheme.  The  adjudication  of  the  rights  of  the  parties

according to law is a judicial function. The legislature  has  to  lay  down

the  law  prescribing  norms  of  conduct  which  will  govern  parties  and

transactions and to require the court to give effect to that law”.

109.4.      Relying upon a decision of this  Court  in  S.S.  Bola[59],  the

Court in  Virender Singh Hooda (II)55 said :

“49. When a particular rule or the Act is interpreted by  a  court  of

law in a specified manner  and  the  law-making  authority  forms  the

opinion that such an interpretation would adversely affect the  rights

of the parties and would be grossly iniquitous and accordingly  a  new

set of rules or laws is enacted, it is very often  challenged  on  the

ground that the legislature has usurped the judicial power. In such  a

case the court has a delicate function to examine the new set of  laws

enacted by the legislature  and  to  find  out  whether  in  fact  the

legislature has exercised the legislative power by merely declaring an

earlier judicial  decision  to  be  invalid  and  ineffective  or  the

legislature has altered and changed the character of  the  legislation

which ultimately may render the judicial decision ineffective.”

 

Liyanage

1. Having surveyed good number of decisions of this Court  on  the

separation of powers doctrine, it is time  that  we  consider  some  leading

foreign judgments on this aspect.  The first judgment in this category  that

deserves consideration, which was also  referred  to  by  Mr.  Vinod  Bobde,

learned  senior  counsel  for  Tamil  Nadu  is  Liyanage12.   The  facts  in

Liyanage12 provide a classic example of usurpation of judicial  function  by

the legislature in a pending case.  In that case, the Judicial Committee  of

the Privy Council held that the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act No.  1

of 1962 usurped and infringed judicial power and  was,  therefore,  invalid.

This Act modified the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  applicable  in  Ceylon  by

purporting to legalise ex-post facto the detention of persons imprisoned  in

respect of an attempted coup, to widen  the  class  of  offences  for  which

trial by three Judges, nominated by the Minister of Justice sitting  without

a jury, could be ordered  to  validate  retrospective  arrests  for  certain

offences made without warrant and to prescribe  new  minimum  penalties  for

the offence of waging war against the Queen.  The legislation  was  held  to

involve “a grave and deliberate incursion into the  judicial  sphere”  which

was inconsistent with the separation  of  judicial  power  from  legislative

power required by the Constitution of Ceylon.   Liyanage12 effectively  lays

down  that  judicial  power  is  usurped  (i)  when  there  is   legislative

interference in a specific proceeding, (ii)  the  interference  affects  the

pending litigation and (iii) the interference affects the  judicial  process

itself, i.e., the discretion or judgment of the  judiciary  or  the  rights,

authority or jurisdiction of the Court.  Liyanage12 inter  alia  holds  that

powers in case of countries with written Constitutions must be exercised  in

accordance with the terms of  Constitution  from  which  they  are  derived.

Making  observations  on  the  true  nature  and  purpose  of  the  impugned

enactment, Liyanage12 says  that  alterations  made  by  Parliament  in  the

function of the judiciary constituted a grave and  deliberate  incursion  in

the judicial sphere.  It  is  worth  noticing  the  following  passage  from

Liyanage12 :

“If such Acts as these were valid the judicial  power  could  be

wholly absorbed by the Legislature and taken out of the hands  of  the

Judges.  It is appreciated that the Legislature has  no  such  general

intention.  It was beset by  a  grave  situation  and  it  took  grave

measures to deal with it, thinking, one  must  presume,  that  it  had

power to do so and was acting  rightly.   But  that  consideration  is

irrelevant,  and  gives  no  validity  to  acts  which  infringe   the

Constitution.  What is done once, if it be allowed, may be done  again

and in a lesser crisis  and  less  serious  circumstances.   And  thus

judicial power may be eroded.  Such an  erosion  is  contrary  to  the

clear intention of the Constitution.”

 

 

 

110.1.            Liyanage12  is  based  on   the   principle   of   implied

limitations on the legislative power.  This position is accepted by our  own

Court in Kesavananda Bharati41 (per Shelat and Grover, JJ.).

Nicholas

1. As regards the constitutional position  in  Australia,  it

needs to be mentioned that Australia  has  a  Constitution  with  the  rigid

demarcation of powers between the legislative and  judicial  organs  of  the

Government. The  Australian  Constitution  has  imperatively  separated  the

three branches of the Government, and has  assigned  to  each,  by  its  own

authority the appropriate organ.

2. In Nicholas[60], the High Court of Australia, dealing with

the infringement and usurpation of judicial power, held the  legislation  to

be invalid on the ground that it revised the final  judgment  of  a  federal

court in breach of separation  of  powers.  It  lays  down  that  usurpation

occurs when the legislature has exercised judicial power on its own behalf.

 

Wheeling Bridge

3. The decision of the  US  Supreme  Court  in  Wheeling  Bridge29

deserves a little elaborate consideration since a  great  deal  of  reliance

has been placed by Mr. Harish Salve on this judgment.  The dispute  in  that

case concerned navigation on  the  Ohio  River.   In  the  earlier  decision

involving the same parties, the U.S. Supreme Court had held the  defendant’s

bridge to be  an  unlawful  structure  to  the  extent  that  it  obstructed

navigation on the Ohio River in breach of the federal statutes  and  thereby

obstructing public right of free  navigation.   The  State  of  Pennsylvania

which filed the suit  was  granted  an  injunctive  relief.   The  defendant

(Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company) was ordered to remove the  bridge,  or

elevate it to the levels  prescribed  by  statute.   Subsequently,  Congress

enacted legislation by which the bridge was rendered a lawful structure  and

ships were mandated to be modified so as not to interfere with  the  bridge.

As the luck would have been, the bridge was destroyed by  high  winds.   The

State of Pennsylvania applied for injunction from reconstructing the  bridge

except in a manner consistent with the order of the court  in  the  previous

proceedings which was granted.  The company  despite  the  injunction  order

proceeded to construct the bridge lower than that required by  the  original

court order.  The State of Pennsylvania brought the matter again before  the

court.  The defendant relied upon the federal  statute  which  declared  the

original bridge lawful, and  argued  that  the  requirements  for  a  lawful

structure were set out therein, rendering  the  requirements  on  which  the

original  judgment  was  based  redundant.   The  question  that  arose  for

consideration was whether the statute that overturned the final judgment  of

the US Supreme Court in the form of  injunction  in  the  earlier  suit  was

constitutional?  Nelson, J., who  delivered  the  majority  opinion  of  the

court, accepted the general proposition that an act of Congress cannot  have

the effect and  operation  to  annul  the  judgment  of  the  court  already

rendered, or the rights thereby determined.  It was  further  observed  that

adjudications upon the private rights of the parties which have passed  into

judgment, become absolute and it is the duty of the  court  to  enforce  it.

Nelson, J. held: “But that part of the decree  directing  the  abatement  of

the obstruction, is executory, a continuing decree, which requires not  only

the  removal  of  the  bridge  but  enjoins  the  defendants   against   any

reconstruction or continuance.  Now, whether it  is  a  future  existing  or

continuing  obstruction  depends  upon  the  question  whether  or  not   it

interferes with the right of navigation.  If, in the mean  time,  since  the

decree, this right has been modified by the  competent  authority,  so  that

the bridge is no longer an unlawful  obstruction,  it  is  quite  plain  the

decree  of  the  court  cannot  be  enforced.   There  is  no   longer   any

interference with the enjoyment of the public right inconsistent  with  law,

no more than there would be where the plaintiff  himself  had  consented  to

it, after the rendition of the decree…….”  Nelson, J., opined that  although

bridge could still  be  an  obstruction  in  fact  but  it  was  not  so  in

contemplation of the law. Consequently, the court  vacated  its  injunction.

Nelson, J. distinguished adjudication upon private rights from  adjudication

upon public rights and held :

 

“In respect to these purely internal streams of a  State,  the  public

right of navigation is exclusively under the control and regulation of

the  state  legislature;  and  in  cases  where  these  erections   or

obstructions to the navigation are constructed  under  a  law  of  the

State, or sanctioned by legislative  authority,  they  are  neither  a

public nuisance subject to abatement, nor is the  individual  who  may

have sustained special damage from their interference with the  public

use entitled to any remedy for his loss. So far as the public  use  of

the stream is concerned, the legislature having the power  to  control

and regulate it, the statute authorizing the structure, though it  may

be a real impediment to the navigation, makes it lawful.”

 

 

113.1.           The opinion of Nelson, J., which  is  majority  opinion  in

The Wheeling  Bridge29   though  maintains  the  general  principle  of  the

inviolability of final  judgments  pursuant  to  the  separation  of  powers

doctrine but it  is  made  subject  to  qualification  that  unlike  private

rights, public rights do  not  pass  into  judgments.   In  the  opinion  of

Nelson, J., the nature of judicial remedy is relevant;  an equitable  relief

such as injunction is not beyond the reach of the  power  of  the  congress

but a decree of damages or costs is unaffected by the subsequent law.

113.2.              McLean, J., who dissented from the majority opinion,  on

the other hand, emphasized in  Wheeling Bridge29  that  the  earlier  decree

was the result of a judicial investigation, founded upon  facts  ascertained

in the course of the hearing and it was strictly a  judicial  question.  The

complaint was an obstruction of commerce, by the bridge, to  the  injury  of

the complainant, and the court found the fact to be as alleged in the  bill.

Following the statement of Chief Justice Marshall that  congress  could  do

many things but that it cannot alter a  fact,  McLean,  J.  in  his  opinion

stated :

“The judicial power  is  exercised  in  the  decision  of  cases;  the

legislative, in making general regulations by the enactment  of  laws.

The latter acts from considerations of public policy;  the  former  by

the pleadings and evidence in a case. From this view  it  is  at  once

seen, that congress could not  undertake  to  hear  the  complaint  of

Pennsylvania in this case, take testimony or cause  it  to  be  taken,

examine the surveys and reports of engineers, decide the questions  of

law which arise on the admission of the testimony, and give the proper

and legal effect to the evidence in the final decree. To  do  this  is

the appropriate duty of the judicial power. And this is what was  done

by this court, before the above act of congress was passed. The  court

held, that the bridge obstructed the navigation of the Ohio River, and

that, consequently, it was a nuisance. The act declared the bridge  to

be a legal structure, and, consequently, that it was not  a  nuisance.

Now, is this a legislative or a judicial act? Whether it be a nuisance

or not, depends upon the fact of obstruction; and this would  seem  to

be strictly a judicial question, to be decided on evidence produced by

the parties in a case.”

 

113.3.           In the minority opinion, McLean. J.  declared  the  act  of

the Congress inoperative and void and reiterated that decree already  passed

be carried into effect according to its true intent.

113.4.           In another minority opinion in  Wheeling  Bridge29,  Wayne,

J., while dissenting with the majority and concurring with McLean J.  stated

that Congress had no power to  interfere  with  the  judgment  of  the  U.S.

Supreme Court under the pretence of a power to  legalize  the  structure  of

bridges over the public  navigable  rivers  of  the  United  States,  either

within the States,  or  dividing  States  from  each  other,  or  under  the

commercial powers of Congress to regulate commerce among the States.

 

Clinton Bridge

4. Nelson,J., who delivered majority opinion in Wheeling Bridge29,

also delivered opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in  the  Clinton  Bridge30.

Although in Wheeling Bridge29 a  decree  had  been  rendered  by  the  court

against the bridge, while in the Clinton  Bridge30  the  cause  was  pending

undecided, but he followed the majority opinion in Wheeling Bridge29.

 

Manigault

5. Mr. Harish Salve, learned counsel  for  the  State  of  Kerala,

placed reliance upon Arthur M. Manigault21.  In that case, the U.S.  Supreme

Court followed the principle that interdiction  of  the  statutes  impairing

the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising  such

powers as are vested in it for the promotion of  the  common  weal,  or  are

necessary for the general good of the public,  though  contracts  previously

entered  into  between  individuals  may  thereby   be   affected.     While

explaining that this power  is  known  as  the  ‘police  power’,  it  is  an

exercise of the sovereign right of the  Government  to  protect  the  lives,

health,  morals,  comfort,  and  general  welfare  of  the  people,  and  is

paramount to any right under the contracts between the  individuals.  It  is

stated  that  subject  to  limitations  in  certain  cases,  there  is  wide

discretion on the part of the legislature in determining what  is  and  what

is not necessary.  In  such  discretion,  the  courts  ordinarily  will  not

interfere with. Dealing with the exposition of law,  flowing  from  some  of

its previous decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court, observed:

 

“…….We see no reason why the same principle should not apply to  cases

where the state legislature, exercising its police  power,  directs  a

certain dam to be built, and thereby incidentally  impairs  access  to

lands above the dam. In both cases the  sovereign  is  exercising  its

constitutional right, in one case in improving the navigation  of  the

river, and in  the  other,  in  draining  its  lowlands,  and  thereby

enhancing their value for agricultural purposes.”

 

 

 

Hodges

6. In Hodges31,  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court,  following   Wheeling

Bridge29 held as follows :-

“In the Wheeling Bridge Case, as  in  the  Clinton  Bridge  Case,  the

public right involved was  that  of  abating  an  obstruction  to  the

navigation of a river. The right involved  in  the  present  suit,  of

enjoining the maintenance  of  an  illegal  school  district  and  the

issuance of its bonds, is  likewise  a  public  right  shared  by  the

plaintiffs with  all  other  resident  taxpayers.  And  while  in  the

Wheeling Bridge Case the bill was filed by the State, although  partly

in its proprietary  capacity  as  the  owner  of  certain  canals  and

railways, the doctrine that a judgment declaring a public right may be

annulled by subsequent legislation, applies with  like  force  in  the

present suit, although brought by individuals primarily for their  own

benefit; the right involved and adjudged, in the one case  as  in  the

other, being public, and not private.”

 

 

 

 

116.1.      Hodges31 was a case where the U.S. Supreme  Court  dissolved  an

injunction  against  the  formation  of  a  consolidated   school   district

following legislation which authorised such a consolidation, and yet  upheld

the judgment in the previous decision making to an award of damages.

 

Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen

 

7. In Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen23, the U.S. Supreme  Court

was confronted with the  question  whether  the  Arkansas  “full-crew”  laws

specifying a minimum number of employees who must serve as part of  a  train

crew under  certain  circumstances,  violate  the  commerce  clause  or  the

Fourteenth Amendment of the  U.S.  Constitution.  The  constitutionality  of

these Arkansas Laws had been specifically upheld  against  challenges  under

the same constitutional provisions  in  three  decisions  earlier.  However,

from the case that reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the District Court  found

that as a result of economic  and  technical  developments  since  the  last

decision on the subject, the statutes were no  longer  justified  as  safety

measures – the ground on  which  they  had  formerly  been  sustained.   The

Supreme Court of United States struck down the impugned laws as contrary  to

the commerce clause of the Constitution and the due process  clause  of  the

Fourteenth Amendment. Black, J., who delivered the opinion on behalf of  the

majority, held that the District Court indulged in  a  legislative  judgment

wholly beyond its limited authority to review state  legislation  under  the

commerce clause. The Court said that it was not open for the District  Court

to place a value on the additional safety in terms of dollars and  cents  in

order to see whether this value as calculated  by  the  Court  exceeded  the

financial cost to the rail roads. The majority view, thus, concluded:

 

“Under all the circumstances we see no  reason  to  depart  from  this

Court’s previous decisions holding that the Arkansas   full-crew  laws

do not unduly burden interstate  commerce  or  otherwise  violate  the

Constitution.  Undoubtedly  heated disputes will continue  as  to  the

extent to which these laws  contribute  to  safety  and  other  public

interests, and the extent to which such contributions are justified by

the cost of the additional manpower.  These disputes will continue  to

be worked out in the legislatures and in various forms  of  collective

bargaining between   management and the unions. As we have  said  many

times,  Congress unquestionably  has power under the  Commerce  Clause

to regulate the number of employees who shall be used  to  man  trains

used  in interstate commerce.  In the absence of congressional action,

however, we cannot  invoke  the  judicial  power  to  invalidate  this

judgment of the people of Arkansas and their  elected  representatives

as to the price society should pay  to promote safety in the  railroad

industry……”

 

 

 

Raymond Motor Transportation

8. Two more decisions of the U.S.  Supreme  Court,  one,   Raymond

Motor  Transportation24   and  the  other,  Raymond  Kassel25  may  now   be

considered.  Raymond Motor Transportation24 was concerned with the  question

whether administrative regulations of the State of Wisconsin  governing  the

length and configuration of contracts that may be operated within the  state

violated the commerce clause. The three-Judge District Court held  that  the

regulations were not unconstitutional on either ground. Upsetting  the  view

of the District Court, Powell, J., who delivered the opinion  of  the  Court

first noted the general rule, “…… Where the statute  regulates  evenhandedly

to effectuate a  legitimate  local  public  interest,  and  its  effects  on

interstate commerce are only  incidental,  it  will  be  upheld  unless  the

burden imposed on such commerce is clearly  excessive  in  relation  to  the

putative local benefits”. Powell, J., then  concluded  that  the  challenged

regulations violated the commerce clause because they placed  a  substantial

burden on interstate commerce and they cannot be  said  to  make  more  than

most speculative contribution to highway safety.

118.1.       Blackmun,  J.,  with  whom  Brennan,  CJ.  and  Rehnquist,   J.

concurred, held that if  safety justifications were not illusory, the  Court

will  not  second-guess  legislative  judgment  about  their  importance  in

comparison with related burdens on interstate  commerce.  Blackmun  J,  also

held :

 

“Here, the Court does not engage in a balance of policies it does  not

make a legislative  choice.   Instead,  after  searching  the  factual

record  developed  by  the  parties,  it  concludes  that  the  safety

interests have not been shown to exist as a matter of law.”

 

Raymond Kassel

9. In Raymond Kassel25, after recording evidence and conclusion of

trial, the District  Court  applied  the  standard  which  was  accepted  in

Raymond  Motor  Transportation24  and   concluded   that   the   state   law

impermissibly  created  burden  on   inter-state  commerce.   The  Court  of

appeals accepted the District Court’s findings and the  view.  This  is  how

the  matter reached the U.S. Supreme Court. Powell, J.,  who  delivered  the

opinion of the Court in  which  White,  Blackmun  and  Stevens  JJ.  joined,

observed: “while Supreme Court has been most reluctant to  invalidate  state

regulations   that   touch   upon   safety,   especially   highway   safety,

constitutionality of such regulations nevertheless  depends  upon  sensitive

consideration of weight and nature of state regulatory concern in  light  of

extent of burden imposed on course of interstate commerce”.

119.1.      Brennan, J., with whom  Marshall,  J.  joined,  concurring  with

the judgment observed : “This Court’s heightened deference to the  judgments

of state law makers in the field of safety  is  largely  attributable  to  a

judicial disinclination to  weigh  the  interest  of  safety  against  other

societal interests, such as the  economic  interest  in  the  free  flow  of

commerce………..”

 

Plaut

 

1. The judgment of the  US  Supreme  Court  in  Plaut[61]  on  the

doctrine of separation of powers is  significant  and  deserves  appropriate

consideration.  In that case, the US Supreme Court was  presented  with  the

question whether Section 27A(b) of the Securities  Exchange  Act,  1934  was

violative of the Constitution’s separation of  powers  or  the  due  process

clause of the Fifth Amendment to the extent it required  Federal  Courts  to

reopen final judgments in private civil actions under Section 10(b)  of  the

Act. Scalia, J.,  who  delivered  the  majority  opinion,  referred  to  the

following  First  Inaugural  Address  by  President  Lincoln  in  which  the

President explained why the political  branches  could  not,  and  need  not

interfere with the judgment :

 

“I do not forget the position assumed  by  some,  that  constitutional

questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I  deny  that

such decisions must be binding in any case,  upon  the  parties  to  a

suit, as to the object of that suit . . . . And while it is  obviously

possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case,  still

the evil  effect  following  it,  being  limited  to  that  particular

case,  with the chance that it may be over-ruled, and never  become  a

precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of

a different practice.”

 

 

120.1.      Scalia, J. also referred  to  the  views  of  Thomas  Cooley  (a

constitutional Scholar) who had said :

 

“If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action  of  the

courts, by requiring of them a construction of the  law  according  to

its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly,  by  setting

aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new  trials,  ordering

the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular  steps  shall

be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry.”

 

120.2.      Scalia J, observed that the power to analyze  a  final  judgment

was “an assumption of judicial power” and,  therefore,  forbidden.  Finality

rule was  given  pre-eminence.  This  becomes  evident  from  his  following

observations: “……Having achieved  finality,  however,  a  judicial  decision

becomes  the  last  word  of  the  judicial  department  with  regard  to  a

particular case or controversy, and Congress may not declare by  retroactive

legislation that the law applicable to that very case  was  something  other

than what the courts said it was…..”

120.3.      In Plaut61, the majority opinion also holds that  considerations

such as that legislation was motivated by a  genuine  concern  to  implement

public  policy  was  irrelevant.   The  majority  opinion   exposited   that

prohibition (separation of power) was  violated  when  an  individual  final

judgment is legislatively rescinded for even the best of  reasons,  such  as

legislature’s genuine conviction (supported by all the professionals in  the

land) that the judgment was wrong,…….”

120.4.      The US Supreme Court, thus, by majority  declared  that  Section

27A(b) of the Act was violative of the separation of the powers doctrine.

 

 

Summary of Separation of powers doctrine under the Indian Constitution

 

1. On deep reflection of the above discussion, in our opinion, the

constitutional principles in the context of Indian Constitution relating  to

separation of powers between  legislature, executive and judiciary  may,  in

brief, be summarized thus :

(i)   Even without express provision of the separation of powers,  the

doctrine  of  separation  of  powers  is  an  entrenched  principle  in  the

Constitution of India.  The doctrine of separation  of  powers  informs  the

Indian constitutional structure and it is an essential constituent  of  rule

of law.  In other words, the doctrine of  separation  of  power  though  not

expressly  engrafted  in  the  Constitution,  its   sweep,   operation   and

visibility  are  apparent  from   the   scheme   of   Indian   Constitution.

Constitution has made demarcation, without drawing formal lines between  the

three organs – legislature, executive and judiciary.  In  that  sense,  even

in the absence of express provision for separation of power, the  separation

of power between legislature, executive and judiciary is not different  from

the constitutions of the  countries  which  contain  express  provision  for

separation of powers.

 

(ii)  Independence of courts from the  executive  and  legislature  is

fundamental to the rule of law  and  one  of  the  basic  tenets  of  Indian

Constitution.  Separation of judicial power is a significant  constitutional

principle under the Constitution of India.

 

(iii)  Separation  of  powers  between  three  organs  –  legislature,

executive and judiciary – is also nothing but a  consequence  of  principles

of  equality  enshrined  in  Article  14  of  the  Constitution  of   India.

Accordingly, breach of separation of judicial power may amount  to  negation

of equality under Article 14. Stated thus, a legislation can be  invalidated

on the basis of breach of the separation of  powers  since  such  breach  is

negation of equality under  Article 14 of the Constitution.

 

(iv)  The superior  judiciary  (High  Courts  and  Supreme  Court)  is

empowered by the Constitution to declare  a  law  made  by  the  legislature

(Parliament  and  State  legislatures)  void  if  it  is   found   to   have

transgressed the constitutional limitations or if it  infringed  the  rights

enshrined in Part III of the Constitution.

 

(v)   The doctrine of  separation  of  powers  applies  to  the  final

judgments of the courts. Legislature cannot declare any decision of a  court

of law to be void or of no effect.  It can, however, pass  an  amending  Act

to remedy the defects pointed out by a court of law or on coming to know  of

it aliunde. In other words, a court’s decision must always bind  unless  the

conditions on which it is  based  are  so  fundamentally  altered  that  the

decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances.

 

(vi)  If the legislature has the power  over  the  subject-matter  and

competence to make a validating  law,  it  can  at  any  time  make  such  a

validating law and make it retrospective.   The  validity  of  a  validating

law,  therefore,  depends  upon  whether  the  legislature   possesses   the

competence which it claims over the subject-matter  and  whether  in  making

the validation law it removes the defect which the courts had found  in  the

existing law.

 

(vii)   The law enacted by the legislature may apparently seem  to  be

within its competence but yet in substance if it is shown as an  attempt  to

interfere with the judicial process, such law may be  invalidated  being  in

breach of doctrine of separation of powers.  In such  situation,  the  legal

effect of the law on a judgment or a judicial proceeding  must  be  examined

closely, having  regard  to  legislative  prescription  or  direction.   The

questions to  be  asked  are,  (i)  Does  the  legislative  prescription  or

legislative direction interfere with the judicial  functions?  (ii)  Is  the

legislation  targeted at the decided case or whether impugned  law  requires

its application to a case already finally decided? (iii) What are the  terms

of law; the issues with which it deals and the nature of the  judgment  that

has attained finality?  If the answer to (i) to (ii) is in  the  affirmative

and the consideration  of  aspects  noted  in  question  (iii)  sufficiently

establishes that the impugned law interferes with  the  judicial  functions,

the Court may declare the law unconstitutional.

 

 

Analysis of the Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum  Judgment  (2006

Judgment)

 

2. In light of the above  constitutional  principles  relating  to

separation of powers between legislature, executive and judiciary, we  shall

now examine the constitutional validity of the 2006 (Amendment) Act  in  its

application to and effect  on  the  Mullaperiyar  dam.   For  deciding  this

question, it is appropriate to first refer to the decision of this Court  in

Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum1 at some length.  That  decision

was rendered by  this  Court  in  a  writ  petition  filed  by  Mullaperiyar

Environment Protection Forum under Article 32 of the Constitution  of  India

and few transferred cases. In that case, the  petitioner’s  claim  was  that

water level in the reservoir cannot be raised from its present level of  136

1. That was the stand of Kerala as well. According to Kerala, the life of

Mullaperiyar dam was fifty years from the date of construction  but  it  had

already completed more than hundred years  and  it  had  served  its  useful

life. In Kerala’s view, it was dangerous to allow raising  of  water  levels

beyond 136 ft. and serious consequences could ensue resulting in wiping  out

of three adjoining districts completely. On the other hand, Tamil  Nadu  set

up the case that as per the report of the Expert  Committee  constituted  by

this Court, the water level could be raised  upto  142  ft.  as  an  interim

measure  and  on  taking  certain  steps  and   after   execution   of   the

strengthening  measure  in  respect  of  baby  dam,  earthen  bund  and   on

completion of  remaining  portion,  water  level  could  be  allowed  to  be

restored at FRL of 152 ft. Tamil Nadu sought specific direction for  raising

water level to 142 ft. and after strengthening, to its  full  level  of  152

ft.

 

122.1.      The Court noted the following terms of reference  and  the  task

given to the Expert Committee:

“(a) To study the safety of Mullaperiyar dam located on Periyar  river

in Kerala with respect to the strengthening of dam carried out by  the

Government of Tamil Nadu in accordance with the strengthening measures

suggested by CWC and to report/advise the Hon’ble  Minister  of  Water

Resources on the safety of the dam.

 

(b) To advise  the  Hon’ble  Minister  of  Water  Resources  regarding

raising of water level in Mullaperiyar reservoir beyond 136 ft  (41.45

1. m) as a result of strengthening of the dam and its safety as  at  (a)

above.

 

The Committee will visit the dam to have first-hand information and to

assess the safety aspects of the dam. It will  hold  discussions  with

the  Secretary,  Irrigation  of  the  Kerala  Government  as  well  as

Secretary, PWD, Government of Tamil Nadu with respect to safety of the

dam and other related issues.”

 

 

122.2.      Then the Court adverted to the  recommendations  of  the  Expert

Committee as follows:

“1. The strengthening measures pertaining to baby dam and the  earthen

bund, as already suggested by CWC and formulated by the Government  of

Tamil Nadu, should be carried out at the earliest.

 

2. The  Government  of  Kerala  should   allow   the   execution   of

strengthening measures of baby dam, earthen  bund  and  the  remaining

portion of about 20 m of parapet wall on the main Mullaperiyar dam  up

to EL 160 ft. (48.77 m) immediately.

 

3. CWC will finalise the instrumentation for installation at the main

dam. In addition, instruments will be installed  during  strengthening

of baby dam, including the earthen bund, so  that  monitoring  of  the

health of Mullaperiyar dam, baby dam and earthen bund can be done on a

continuous basis.

 

4. The water level in the Mullaperiyar reservoir be raised to a level

where the tensile stress in the baby dam does not exceed 2.85 t/m2 (as

suggested by Shri Parameswaran Nair, Kerala representative) especially

in condition E (full reservoir level with earthquake) as per BIS  Code

IS 6512-1984 with ah= 0.12 g and analysis as per clauses  3.4.2.3  and

7.3.1 of BIS Code 1893-1984.

 

5. The committee members discussed the issue of raising of water level

above EL 136.00 ft (41.45 m) after studying the analysis of safety  of

baby dam. Prof. A. Mohanakrishnan, Member of  Tamil  Nadu  Government,

opined in the light of para 4 that the water level should be raised up

to at least EL 143.00 ft (43.59 m) as the tensile stresses are  within

the permissible limits. Shri M.K. Parameswaran Nair, Member of  Kerala

Government did not agree to raise the water level above EL  136.00  ft

(41.45 m). However, the Committee after  detailed  deliberations,  has

opined that the water level in the Mullaperiyar reservoir be raised to

EL 142.00 ft (43.28 m) which will not endanger the safety of the  main

dam, including spillway, baby dam and earthen bund. The  abstracts  of

the calculations for stress analysis are enclosed as Annexure XIX.

 

6. This raising of reservoir level up to a level  where  the  tensile

stress does not exceed 2.85 t/m2 during the earthquake condition is an

interim measure and further raising of  water  level  to  the  FRL  EL

152.00  ft  (46.33  m)  (original  design  FRL  of  the   Mullaperiyar

reservoir) be studied after the strengthening measures on baby dam are

carried out and completed.”

 

 

122.3        The   Court   framed   the   following   five   questions   for

consideration:

“1. Whether Section 108 of the  States  Reorganisation  Act,  1956  is

unconstitutional?

 

2. Whether the jurisdiction of this Court is barred in view of Article

262 read with Section 11 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956?

 

3. Whether Article 363 of the Constitution bars the  jurisdiction  of

this Court?

 

4. Whether disputes are liable to be referred to arbitration?

 

5. Whether the raising of water level of the reservoir from 136 ft to

142 ft would result in jeopardising the safety of the people and  also

degradation of the environment?”

 

 

122.4       While dealing with question No. 1, the Court, inter  alia,  held

that law making power under  Articles  3  and  4  of  the  Constitution  was

paramount and it was neither subjected to nor fettered by  Article  246  and

Lists II and III of the Seventh Schedule. The Court also held that power  of

Parliament to make law under Articles 3 and  4  was  plenary  and  traverses

over all legislative subjects as are necessary  for  effectuating  a  proper

reorganization of the states. Accordingly,  the  Court  found  no  merit  in

challenge to the validity of Section 108 of the States  Reorganisation  Act,

1956.

 

122.5       Dealing with question No. 2, the Court noted  that  the  dispute

relating to raising the water level in the Mullaperiyar dam was not a  water

dispute since  the  right  of  Tamil  Nadu  to  divert  water  from  Periyar

reservoir to Tamil Nadu for integrated purpose of irrigation or to  use  the

water to generate power or for other uses  was  not  in  dispute.    It  was

observed that there was no dispute about the lease granted to Tamil Nadu  in

1886 or about supplementary agreements of 1970 and that till 1979 there  was

no dispute with regard to water level at all. In 1979, the water  level  was

brought down to 136 ft. to  facilitate  Tamil  Nadu  to  carry  out  certain

strengthening measures suggested by the CWC.  The  Court,  thus,  held  that

safety of the dam on increase of water level to 142 ft. was  not  the  issue

hit by Article 262 of  the  Constitution  or  the  Inter-State  River  Water

Disputes Act, 1956.

 

122.6       With regard to question No. 3, the Court held that there was  no

question of the jurisdiction of this Court being barred as Article  363  has

no application to an agreement such as 1886  Lease  Agreement  which  is  an

ordinary agreement of lease and is not a political arrangement.

 

122.7       On question No. 4, the Court observed that present  dispute  was

not about the rights, powers and obligations or interpretation of  any  part

of the agreement but the controversy was confined to whether water level  in

the reservoir could be increased to 142 ft. for which there  was  already  a

report by an Expert Committee.

 

122.8       For  consideration  of  question  No.  5,  the  Court  carefully

referred to the report of the Expert Committee with regard to safety of  the

dam on water level being raised to 142 ft.  In  para  30  of  the  judgment,

this Court held as under:

 

“30. Regarding the issue as to the safety of the dam  on  water  level

being raised to 142 ft from the present level of 136 ft,  the  various

reports  have  examined  the  safety  angle  in-depth  including   the

viewpoint of earthquake resistance. The apprehensions have been  found

to be  baseless.  In  fact,  the  reports  suggest  an  obstructionist

attitude on the part of the State of Kerala. The Expert Committee  was

comprised  of  independent  officers.  Seismic  forces  as   per   the

provisions  were  taken  into  account  and  structural  designs  made

accordingly while  carrying  out  strengthening  measures.  The  final

report of the Committee set up by the  Ministry  of  Water  Resources,

Government of India to study the water safety aspect of  the  dam  and

raising the water  level  has  examined  the  matter  in  detail.  The

Chairman of the Committee was a Member  (D&R)  of  the  Central  Water

Commission, two Chief  Engineers  of  the  Central  Water  Commission,

Director,  Dam  Safety,  Government  of  Madhya  Pradesh  and  retired

Engineer-in-Chief, U.P. besides two representatives of the Governments

of Tamil Nadu and Kerala, were members of the Committee. All  appended

their signatures except the representative of the  Kerala  Government.

The summary of the results of stability analysis of Mullaperiyar  baby

dam contains a note which shows that the permissible tensile  strength

was masonry as per the specifications mentioned therein based on  test

conducted by CSMRS, Delhi on the time  and  agreed  by  all  committee

members including the Kerala representative  in  the  meeting  of  the

Committee held on 9/10-2-2001. It also shows the various strengthening

measures suggested by CWC having been completed by the Tamil Nadu  PWD

on the dam including providing of RCC backing to the dam.  The  report

also suggests that the parapet wall of baby dam and main dam have been

raised to 160 ft (48.77 m) except for a 20 m stretch on the  main  dam

due to denial of permission by the Government of  Kerala.  Some  other

works as stated therein were not allowed to be carried on by the State

of Kerala. The report of CWC after inspection of  the  main  dam,  the

galleries, baby dam, earthen bund and spillway, concludes that the dam

is safe and no excessive seepage is seen and that Mullaperiyar dam has

been recently strengthened. There are  no  visible  cracks  that  have

occurred in the body of the dam and seepage measurements  indicate  no

cracks in the upstream side of the dam. Our attention  has  also  been

drawn to various documents and drawings  including  cross-sections  of

the Periyar dam to demonstrate the strengthening measures. Further, it

is  pertinent  to  note  that  the  dam  immediately  in  line   after

Mullaperiyar dam is Idukki dam. It is the case of the State of  Kerala

that despite the “copious rain”, the Idukki reservoir is not filled to

its capacity, while the capacity of the reservoir is  70.500  TMC,  it

was filled only to the extent of 57.365  TMC.  This  also  shows  that

assuming the worst happens, more than 11 TMC water would be  taken  by

Idukki dam. The Deputy Director, Dam Safety,  Monitoring  Directorate,

Central Water Commission, Ministry of Water Resources in the affidavit

of  April  2004  has,  inter  alia,  stated  that  during  the  recent

earthquake mentioned by the Kerala Government  in  its  affidavit,  no

damage to the dam was reported by CWC officers who inspected the  dam.

The experts having reported about the safety of the dam and the Kerala

Government having adopted an obstructionist approach,  cannot  now  be

permitted to take shelter under  the  plea  that  these  are  disputed

questions of fact. There is no report to suggest that  the  safety  of

the dam would be jeopardised if the water  level  is  raised  for  the

present to 142 ft. The report is to the contrary.”

 

 

 

(emphasis supplied by us)

 

122.9       In view  of  the  above  consideration,  this  Court  restrained

Kerala and its officers from  causing  any  obstruction  from  carrying  out

further strengthening measures by Tamil Nadu as suggested by CWC  and  Tamil

Nadu was permitted to increase water level of Mullaperiyar dam to 142 ft.

122.10.     The judgment in  Mullaperiyar  Environmental  Protection  Forum1

was pronounced on 27.02.2006.

3. On 14/15.03.2006, a special session of the  Kerala  Legislative

Assembly was convened and a Bill was  introduced  to  amend  the  2003  Act,

which was passed on 15.03.2006. On 18.03.2006, the Bill received the  assent

of the Governor and became an enactment with effect from that day.

4. It is, thus, seen that one of the issues that directly fell for

consideration before this Court  in  Mullaperiyar  Environmental  Protection

Forum1 was whether the raising of water level of the reservoir from 136  ft.

to 142 ft. would result in jeopardising the safety of the people?  From  the

various reports including the report of  the  Expert  Committee,  the  Court

held that apprehensions (wiping out  of  three  districts)  of  Kerala  were

found to be baseless in these reports and there was nothing to suggest  that

the safety of dam would be jeopardised if the water level was raised to  142

1. The judgment records the finding regarding the safety of the  dam  on

water level being raised to 142 ft. from the present level of  136  ft.,  in

these words: “the various reports have examined the  safety  angle  in-depth

including the viewpoint of earthquake resistance.   The  apprehensions  have

been found to  be baseless.”  and, “The report of CWC  after  inspection  of

main dam, the galleries, baby dam,  earthen  bund  and  spillway,  concludes

that the dam is safe ……. .”

5. For these reasons, and others contained in the  judgment,  this

Court reached to the firm conclusion that raising the water level  from  136

1. to 142 ft. would not jeopardise the safety of the dam in  any  manner.

Consequently, this Court restrained Kerala and  its  officers  from  causing

any obstruction from carrying out further strengthening  measures  by  Tamil

Nadu as suggested by CWC and Tamil Nadu  was  permitted  to  increase  water

level of Mullaperiyar dam to 142 ft.

6. The decision of this Court on 27.02.2006  in  the  Mullaperiyar

Environmental  Protection  Forum1  case   was   the   result   of   judicial

investigation, founded upon facts ascertained in the course of hearing.   It

was strictly a judicial question.  The claim of  the  State  of  Kerala  was

that water level cannot be raised from its present level of 136 ft.  On  the

other hand, Tamil Nadu sought direction for raising the water level  to  142

1. and, after  strengthening,  to  its  full  level  of  152  ft.     The

obstruction by Kerala to the water level in  the   Mullaperiyar  dam   being

raised to 142 ft. on the ground of safety was found untenable, and,  in  its

judgment, this Court so pronounced.

 

Whether 2006 (Amendment) Act in its application to Mullaperiyar dam  amounts

to usurpation of judicial power

 

7. The question now is: Does the impugned  legislation  amount  to

usurpation of judicial power and whether it is  violative  of  the  rule  of

law?

8. As noted in the earlier part of the judgment, the 2003 Act  was

enacted to consolidate and  amend  the  laws  relating  to  construction  of

irrigation works, conservation and distribution of water for the purpose  of

irrigation in the State of Kerala  and  other  incidental  matters.  Section

2(b) defines  “Authority”  which  means  the  Kerala  Dam  Safety  Authority

constituted under Section 57. Section  2(k)  defines  “distributory  system”

which means and includes, inter alia, all works, structures  and  appliances

connected with the  distribution  of  water  for  irrigation.  Section  2(w)

defines “irrigation work” which, inter alia, includes all  reservoirs  which

may be used for the supply, collection, storage or retention  of  water  for

agricultural purposes and reservoirs  installed  to  supply  water.  Section

2(aq) defines “water course” which means a river, stream, springs,  channel,

lake or any natural collection of water other than in  a  private  land  and

includes any tributary or branch of any river, stream, springs  or  channel.

Section 3 starts with non  obstante  clause  and  provides  that  all  water

courses and all water in such water  courses  in  the  State  shall  be  the

property of the Government (Government of Kerala), and the Government  shall

be entitled to conserve and regulate the use of such water courses  and  the

water in all those water courses for the  purposes  of  irrigation  and  the

generation of electricity and for matters connected therewith or  for  both.

Section 4 makes provision for regulation on abstraction of water from  water

course. Section 5 provides for regulation  on  construction  of  reservoirs,

anicut, etc. Section 30 deals with distribution of water  to  another  State

or Union Territory. It is provided in Section 30 that no water from a  water

course in the State shall  be  distributed  to  any  other  State  or  Union

Territory,  except  in  accordance  with  an  agreement  between  the  State

Government and the Government of such other State or the Union Territory  in

terms of a resolution to that effect passed by the Legislative  Assembly  of

the State. Section 57 provides for constitution of Dam Safety Authority  for

the purpose of surveillance, inspection and advice on  maintenance  of  dams

situated within the territory  of  the  State.  For  the  purposes  of  this

section “dam”  means  any  artificial  barrier  including  appurtenant  work

constructed across a river or tributaries thereof with a view to impound  or

divert water  for  irrigation,  drinking  water  supply  or  for  any  other

purpose. Section 62 spells out the functions of the Authority. This  section

says that notwithstanding anything contained in  any  treaty,  agreement  or

instrument, the Dam Safety Authority, inter alia, has the functions  (1)  to

arrange for the safety evaluation of all dams in the State;  (2)  to  advice

Government to suspend the functioning of any dam if  the  public  safety  so

demands; (3) to examine the precariousness of any  dam  in  public  interest

and to submit its recommendations including decommissioning of  dam  to  the

Government; (4) to inspect and advice  the  Government  on  advisability  of

raising or lowering of the reservoir level of any dam  taking  into  account

the safety of the dam concerned and the environmental aspects involved;  and

(5) to inspect and advice the Government on the sustainability  of  any  dam

to hold the water in the reservoir thereof. Sub-section (3)  of  Section  62

provides that where the advice or recommendations of  the  Authority  relate

to a dam owned or controlled by person other than the Government,  it  shall

be lawful for the Government to issue orders or directions as it deems  fit,

requiring any person having possession or control of such dam to  take  such

measures or to do such things within such time as may be  specified  therein

to give effect to the advice or recommendations, and such  person  shall  be

bound to comply with the orders and directions issued by the Government.

9. Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned senior counsel for  Kerala  argued

that these provisions were not taken into consideration  by  this  Court  in

its  judgment  in  Mullaperiyar   Environmental   Protection   Forum1   and,

therefore, judgment of this Court is per incuriam.

1. We are not persuaded by this argument  at  all.  2003  Act  was

neither referred to nor relied upon by Kerala at  the  time  of  hearing  in

Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum1.  It  was  rightly  so  because

2003  Act  had  no  direct  bearing  on  the   issues   which   were   under

consideration. Section 3 refers to  water  courses  and  the  definition  of

“water  course”  in  Section  2  (aq)  does  not  include  a  dam  such   as

Mullaperiyar dam. Kerala Dam Safety Authority was  not  in  place  when  the

arguments in Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection  Forum1  were  concluded.

We are informed  that  Dam  Safety  Authority  came  to  be  constituted  on

18.2.2006, i.e., few days before the judgment was pronounced by  this  Court

in that case. We have carefully considered the provisions  of  amended  2003

Act and, in our view, in whatever  way  2003  Act  is  seen,  there  was  no

impediment for this Court  to  consider  and  decide  the  question  whether

raising the water level from 136 ft. to 142 ft. would jeopardize the  safety

of the dam. This Court answered the  question  based  on  the  materials  on

record, in  the  negative.  The  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Mullaperiyar

Environmental Protection Forum1 by no stretch of imagination can  be  termed

as per  incuriam.  The  judgment  wholly  and  squarely  binds  the  parties

including Kerala.

1. The Kerala legislature amended the 2003 Act by 2006 (Amendment)

Act. By the 2006 (Amendment) Act,  in  Section  2,  clauses  (ja)  and  (jb)

defining “custodian” and “dam” were inserted after clause (j). Clause  (ala)

defining “scheduled dam” was  also  inserted  after  clause  (al).  In  sub-

section (1) of Section 57 of the principal  Act,  the  words  “surveillance,

inspection” were substituted by “ensuring  the  safety  and  security”.  The

explanation in sub-section (2) of Section 57 was deleted. Section 62 of  the

principal Act was substituted by new Section 62. The new Section  62,  inter

alia, empowers the Dam Safety Authority with following functions:

 

“(1)            xxx              xxx        xxx

 

(a) to evaluate the safety and security  of  all  dams  in  the  State

considering among other factors, the age of the structures, geological

and seismic factors, degeneration or degradation caused over  time  or

otherwise;

 

(b) to (d)  xxx              xxx        xxx

 

(e) to direct the custodian to suspend the functioning of any dam,  to

decommission any dam or restrict the functioning of any dam if  public

safety or threat to human life or property so requires;

 

(f) to advise the  Government,  custodian,  or  other  agencies  about

policies and procedures to be followed in site investigation,  design,

construction, operation and maintenance of dams;

 

(g) to conduct studies, inspect and advise the custodian or any  other

agency on the advisability of raising or lowering of the maximum water

level or full reservoir level of any dam, not being a  scheduled  dam,

taking into account the safety of the dam concerned;

 

(h) to (j)  xxx              xxx        xxx”

 

2. The functions conferred on the Dam Safety Authority  under  new

Section 62 override the judgment, decree  or  order  of  any  Court  or  any

treaty, agreement, contract, instrument or any other  document.  Sub-section

(3) of new Section 62 provides that where a direction is issued by  the  Dam

Safety Authority under sub-Section (1), the custodian or  any  other  agency

to whom it is directed shall take immediate measures within the  time  frame

stipulated by the Authority or do or refrain from doing such  things  within

such time frame as may be stipulated and to comply with  the  directions  of

the Authority. After Section 62, new Sections 62A and 62B have  been  added.

The details of the dams which  are  endangered  on  account  of  their  age,

degeneration, degradation, structural or other impediments are specified  in

the Second Schedule. Sub-sections  (2)  and  (3)  to  new  Section  62A  are

overriding provisions, which read as under:

 

“(1)       xxx              xxx             xxx

 

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any  other  law  or  in  any

judgment, decree, order or direction of  any  court,  or  any  treaty,

contract, agreement, instrument or document, no Government,  custodian

or any other agency shall increase, augment, add to or expand the Full

Reservoir Level Fixed or in any other way do or omit  to  do  any  act

with a view to increase the water level  fixed  and  set  out  in  THE

SECOND SCHEDULE. Such level shall not be altered except in  accordance

with the provisions of this Act in respect of any Scheduled dam.

 

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other  law,  or  in  any

judgment, decree,  order,  direction  of  any  court  or  any  treaty,

contract, agreement, instrument or document, any Government, custodian

or any other agency intending to, or having secured  any  right  under

any treaty, contract, agreement, instrument  or  document  or  by  any

other means to increase,  augment,  add  to  or  expand,  the  storage

capacity or increase the Full Reservoir Level Fixed of  any  Scheduled

dam, shall not do any act or work for  such  purpose  without  seeking

prior consent in writing of the Authority  and  without  obtaining  an

order permitting such work by the Authority.

 

(4) and  (5)     xxx         xxx             xxx”

 

3. Section 62B gives powers of a Civil Court  to  the  Dam  Safety

Authority in respect of the matters specified  therein  while  dealing  with

applications for consent in writing for increasing,  augmenting,  adding  to

or  expanding  the  storage  capacity  or  the  water  spread  area  or  for

increasing of  Maximum  Water  Level  or  Full  Reservoir  Level  fixed  for

Scheduled dams. Section 68A  bars  the  jurisdiction  of  Civil  Court  from

settling, deciding or dealing with any question of fact or to determine  any

matter which under the 2003 Act, as amended  by  2006  (Amendment)  Act,  is

required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to  be  determined  by  the

Authority under the Act. In Second Schedule, at item  No.1  is  the  subject

“Mullaperiyar Dam” for which FRL is fixed at 41.45 meter (136 ft.) from  the

deepest point of the level of Periyar river at the site of the main dam.

 

4. Tamil Nadu says that 2006 (Amendment)  Act  to  the  extent  it

applies to Mullaperiyar dam seeks to nullify the judgment of this  Court  in

Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum1 by  declaring  the  dam  to  be

endangered and by fixing the height of the water level at 136 ft.;  that  It

authorizes the Dam  Safety  Authority  to  disregard  the  judgment  and  to

adjudge for itself whether to allow  raising  of  water  level  and  Section

62(1)(e)  authorizes  the  Dam  Safety  Authority  to   order   inter   alia

decommissioning of the dam despite the finding of safety  recorded  by  this

Court  in  the  2006  judgment  and,  thus,  the  2006  (Amendment)  Act  is

unconstitutional being  violative  of  separation  of  powers  doctrine  and

consequently rule of law.

 

5. On the other hand, the argument of Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned

senior counsel for Kerala, is that the legislature of every  State  has  not

just the power but the obligation to take appropriate  legislative  measures

to ensure the safety and security of its residents.  Where  the  legislature

of a State is satisfied that there is a need to curtail the use  or  storage

of  a  water  reservoir  to  protect  its  citizenry  and  elects  to  enact

legislation as a precautionary measure, the legislation cannot  be  said  to

be in excess of the legislative competence of the State  if  it  relates  to

reservoir and dam within  the  legislating  State.  Kerala  legislature  has

imposed precautionary measures  by  placing  pro  tem  restrictions  on  the

storage level of the  dams  mentioned  in  the  Second  Schedule  read  with

Section 62A(2) of the 2006 (Amendment) Act and  the  said  restrictions  are

based on the legislative wisdom of the Kerala legislature  that  these  dams

are  endangered  on  account  of  their  age,   degeneration,   degradation,

structural or other impediments. While adjudicating upon the  constitutional

validity, Mr. Harish Salve  argues  that  the  Court  must  proceed  on  the

premise that the  legislature  understands  and  correctly  appreciates  the

needs of its own people and its laws  are  directed  to  the  problems  made

manifest by its experience and are based on adequate grounds.

 

6. Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned senior counsel for Kerala  heavily

relies upon  ‘precautionary  principle’  and  ‘public  trust  doctrine’  and

argues that Kerala legislature was competent to override the  contracts  and

regulate safety of  the  Mullaperiyar  dam  situated  within  its  territory

across river Periyar. His submission is that the State as sovereign  retains

continuing supervisory control over navigable waters  and  underlying  beds.

It is his submission that the State has a duty of  ‘continuing  supervision’

even after such rights have been granted. In this regard strong reliance  is

placed by him on Pfizer Animal Health27.

 

7. In Pfizer Animal Health27,  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of

European Communities (Third Chamber) was concerned  with  the  legality  and

validity of the regulations which, inter alia, banned particular use of  the

substance in question. Pfizer argued that it was directly concerned  by  the

contested regulation as it withdraws  authorization  of  Virginiamycin.  The

counsel for the European Union  argued that the regulations were enacted  to

general  application  which  was  applicable   to   objectively   determined

situations and that  they  ban  the  particular  use  of  the  substance  in

question, whether they are marketed by Pfizer or by any  one  else  under  a

different  name.  The  Court  observed  that  for  the  purpose  of   taking

preventive action, to wait for  the  adverse  effects  of  the  use  of  the

products was not required.

 

8. Dealing with precautionary  principle,  the  Court  made  these

observations:

“First, it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that,  when  the  precautionary

principle is applied, the fact that there  is  scientific  uncertainty

and that it is impossible to carry out a full risk assessment  in  the

time available does not prevent the competent  public  authority  from

taking  preventive  protective  measures  if  such   measures   appear

essential, regard being had to the level of risk to human health which

the public authority has decided is the critical threshold above which

it is necessary to take preventive measures.

………….

The precautionary principle allows the competent public  authority  to

take, on a provisional basis, preventive protective measures  on  what

is as yet an incomplete scientific basis, pending the availability  of

additional scientific evidence.

………………

It is not for the  Court  to  assess  the  merits  of  either  of  the

scientific points of view argued  before  it  and  to  substitute  its

assessment for that of the Community institutions, on which the Treaty

confers sole responsibility in that regard.

………………..”

 

 

9. Kerala has also relied  upon  the  article,  “The  Public  Trust

Doctrine in the Water Rights Context” by Roderick E. Walston22.  The  author

has culled out following four principles of the Public Trust doctrine:

 

“(1)  The state as sovereign “retains continuing supervisory control”

over navigable waters and underlying beds;

 

(2)   The legislature, either directly or  through  the  water  rights

agency, has the right to grant usufructuary water rights  even  though

such rights will “not promote, and may  unavoidably  harm,  the  trust

uses at the sources stream;”

 

(3)   The state has the “affirmative duty” to take  the  public  trust

into account in planning and allocating water resources; and

 

(4)   The state has a “duty  of  continuing  supervision”  over  water

rights even after such rights have been granted.”

 

139.1       Public trust doctrine, Roderick E. Walston says, is regarded  by

some as an exercise of sovereign state regulatory, analogous to  the  police

power.

 

1. In our opinion, the principle of ‘public trust doctrine’ in the

context  of  water  rights  culled  out  by  Roderick  E.  Walston  or   the

‘precautionary principle’ explained in Pfizer Animal Health27 can hardly  be

doubted but these principles have no application in the  context  of  safety

of Mullaperiyar dam on raising the water level from  the  present  level  to

142 ft., which was directly in issue and has been  expressly,  categorically

and unambiguously determined by the Court. This Court has found –  supported

by the Expert Committee Reports – that the safety of the subject dam is  not

at all jeopardized if the water level is raised from the  present  level  to

142 ft. Kerala,  which  is  contesting  party,  by  applying  ‘public  trust

doctrine’ or ‘precautionary measure’, cannot through legislation do  an  act

in conflict with the judgment  of  the  highest  Court  which  has  attained

finality.  If a legislation  is  found  to  have  breached  the  established

constitutional limitation such as separation of powers, it  has  to  go  and

cannot be allowed to remain.

 

1. It is true that the State’s  sovereign  interests  provide  the

foundation of the public trust doctrine but the judicial function is also  a

very important sovereign function of the State and  the  foundation  of  the

rule of law. The legislature cannot by invoking ‘public trust  doctrine’  or

‘precautionary principle’ indirectly control the action of  the  Courts  and

directly or indirectly set aside the authoritative and  binding  finding  of

fact by the Court, particularly, in situations where  the  executive  branch

(Government of the State) was a  party  in  the  litigation  and  the  final

judgment was delivered after hearing them.

 

2. 2006 (Amendment) Act in its application to and  effect  on  the

Mullaperiyar dam seeks to attain the following:

(a)    It  substitutes  Section   62   with   a   new   provision   whereby,

notwithstanding the judgment of  this  Court  and  notwithstanding  anything

contained  in  any  treaty,  contract,  1886  Lease   Agreement   and   1970

supplemental agreements,  the  function  of  evaluation  of  safety  of  the

Mullaperiyar dam and  the  power  to  issue  directions  to  Tamil  Nadu  as

custodian are conferred upon Dam Safety Authority;

(b)   the Dam Safety Authority is empowered, inter  alia,  to  restrict  the

functioning  of  Mullaperiyar  dam  and/or  to  conduct   studies   on   the

advisability of raising or lowering of the maximum water level or  the  full

reservoir level;

(c)   Mullaperiyar dam is considered by Kerala legislature to be  endangered

and by virtue of Section 62(A), it takes away the right  of  Tamil  Nadu  to

increase, expand the FRL or in any manner increase the water  level  as  set

out in the Second Schedule except in accordance with the provisions  of  the

Act;

(d)   under Section 62A(4),  Tamil  Nadu  as  custodian  has  to  submit  an

application to the Dam Safety  Authority  for  its  prior  consent  for  the

increase in the water level;

(e)    it takes away all rights of Tamil Nadu including the right which  has

passed into judgment of this Court to increase the water level;

(f)   the Dams Safety Authority has power to order de-commissioning  of  the

Mullaperiyar dam.

3. This Court in  Mullaperiyar  Environmental  Protection  Forum1,

after hearing the State of Kerala, was not persuaded  by  Kerala’s  argument

that Mullaperiyar dam was unsafe or storage of water in that dam  cannot  be

increased. Rather, it permitted Tamil Nadu to  increase  the  present  water

level from 136 ft. to 142 ft. and  restrained  Kerala  from  interfering  in

Tamil Nadu’s right in increasing the water level in Mullaperiyar dam to  142

1. Thus, a judgment has been given by this court in contest  between  the

two States in respect of safety of Mullaperiyar dam for raising water  level

to 142 ft.  The essential element of the judicial function is  the  decision

of a dispute actually arising between the parties  and  brought  before  the

court.  Necessarily, such decision must be  binding  upon  the  parties  and

enforceable  according  to  the  decision.   A  plain  and  simple  judicial

decision on fact cannot be altered by a legislative  decision  by  employing

doctrines or principles such  as  ‘public  trust  doctrine’,  ‘precautionary

principle’  ‘larger  safety  principle’  and,  ‘competence  of   the   State

legislature  to  override  agreements  between  the   two   States’.     The

Constitutional principle that the legislature can render  judicial  decision

ineffective  by  enacting  validating  law  within  its  legislative   field

fundamentally altering or changing  its  character  retrospectively  has  no

application where a judicial decision  has  been  rendered  by  recording  a

finding of fact. Under  the  pretence  of  power,  the  legislature,  cannot

neutralize the effect of the judgment given after ascertainment of  fact  by

means of evidence/materials  placed  by  the  parties  to  the  dispute.   A

decision which disposes of the matter by giving findings upon the  facts  is

not open to  change  by  legislature.   A  final  judgment,  once  rendered,

operates and remains in force until altered  by  the  court  in  appropriate

proceedings.

4. 2006 (Amendment) Act plainly seeks to nullify the  judgment  of

this court which is constitutionally  impermissible.  Moreover,  it  is  not

disputed by Kerala that 2006 (Amendment) Act is not a validation  enactment.

Since the impugned law is not a  validating  law,  it  is  not  required  to

inquire whether in making the validation the  legislature  has  removed  the

defect which the Court has found in existing law. The 2006  (Amendment)  Act

in its application to and effect on Mullaperiyar dam is a legislation  other

than substantially legislative as it is aimed at nullifying  the  prior  and

authoritative decision of this Court. The nub of the  infringement  consists

in Kerala legislator’s revising the final judgment of this  Court  in  utter

disregard of the constitutional principle that the revision  of  such  final

judgment must remain exclusively within the discretion of the court.

5. Section 62A declares the  dam  to  be  endangered.  The  Second

Schedule appended to the Act fixes the height of the water level at 136  ft.

though this Court in its judgment had declared  Mullaperiyar  dam  safe  and

permitted the increase of the water level to  142  ft.  Moreover,  the  2006

(Amendment)  Act  authorises  the  Dam  Safety  Authority  to  adjudge   its

safety to  allow  raising  of  water  level.  The  provision  is  in  direct

disregard of the judgment of this Court.  Section 62A also freezes all  work

on the dam allowed by this Court in its judgment dated  27.2.2006.   In  our

opinion, by 2006 (Amendment) Act, the Kerala legislature  has  overturned  a

final judgment in  the  interest  of  its  own  executive  Government.   The

impugned law amounts to  reversal  of  the  judgment  of  this  Court  which

determines directly the question of safety of Mullaperiyar dam  for  raising

water level to 142 ft. and whereunder Tamil  Nadu’s  legal  right  has  been

determined.

6. On behalf of Kerala, it is strenuously  argued  by  Mr.  Harish

Salve that right to safety of the people being  a  public  right  could  not

have passed into 2006  judgment  of  this  court.   In  this  regard,  heavy

reliance is placed on  the  majority  decision  of  the  Wheeling  Bridge29.

Firstly, public right qualification in Wheeling Bridge29 has no  application

in  the  present  case  as  there  is  a  critical  difference  between  the

provisions impugned before us and the provisions which were impugned  before

US Supreme Court in Wheeling Bridge29.  The principle  question  before  the

US Supreme Court in Wheeling Bridge29 was whether or not the  compact  could

operate as a restriction upon the power of courts under the Constitution  to

regulate commerce among several States.  In response to the  argument  urged

before it that the Congress cannot have the effect to annul the judgment  of

the court already rendered or the rights determined thereby was accepted  as

a general proposition but this proposition was held not  applicable  in  the

matters of adjudication upon the public rights.  In our view, a  legislation

violating the separation of powers principle cannot be saved by carving  out

an exception that the legislature has regulated a public  right.   We  think

that the act of legislature designed  to  achieve  a  legitimate  regulatory

measure does not grant  constitutional  immunity  to  such  law  enacted  in

violation of separation of powers principle or in other words, rule of  law.

Once a judicial decision on ascertainment of  a  particular  fact  achieves

finality, we are afraid the legislature cannot reopen  such  final  judgment

directly or indirectly. In such cases, the courts, if brought  before  them,

may reopen such cases in exercise of their own discretion.

7. In our view, Wheeling Bridge29 qualification  by  the  majority

decision of U.S. Supreme Court cannot be read to permit the actual  revision

of the final judgment by the legislature.  If Wheeling Bridge29   lays  down

the proposition that a judgment declaring a public right may be annulled  by

subsequent legislation as contended by Mr. Harish Salve, then we say, as  we

must, that we are not persuaded  to  accept  such  proposition  of  majority

judgment in  Wheeling  Bridge29.  The  two  separate  opinions  in  Wheeling

Bridge29 one by McLean J. and the other by Wayne J. –  though  in  minority-

also did not accept such proposition.

8. The above discussion must  also  answer  the  argument  of  Mr.

Harish Salve that rules of inter partes  litigation  do  not  determine  the

obligation of the State for safety of its people. We  do  not  think  it  is

necessary to consider the opinion of Weeramantry, J. in  Gobcikovo-Nagymaros

Project (ICJ) in detail. The stress laid by Weeramantry, J.  is  that  where

issue of serious or catastrophic  environmental  danger  arises,  the  Court

must look beyond inter partes adversarial procedures.

 

9. It is true that safety of dam is an  aspect  which  can  change

from time to time in different  circumstances  but  then  the  circumstances

have to be shown based on which it becomes necessary to make departure  from

the earlier finding. It is always open to any of  the  parties  to  approach

the court and apply for re-assessing the safety aspect but absent change  in

circumstances, factual determination in the earlier proceedings even on  the

questions such as safety of dam binds the  parties.   If  the  circumstances

have changed which necessitates a re-look  on  the  aspect  of  safety,  the

Court  itself  may  exercise  its  discretion  to  reopen  such   case   but

legislative abrogation of judgment for even the very  best  of  reasons  and

genuine concern for  public  safety  does  not  clothe  the  legislature  to

rescind the judgment of the court by a legislation.

 

1. The contention of  Mr.  Harish  Salve  that  by  declaring  dam

unsafe, the legislature has not rendered any finding of fact; it  deems  dam

unsafe and sets up an Authority to regulate it, is  noted  to  be  rejected.

What has been found as a fact by judicial determination cannot  be  declared

otherwise by applying legal fiction. We are, however,  persuaded  to  accept

the submission of Mr. Vinod Bobde, learned senior  counsel  for  Tamil  Nadu

that the fact that the Mullaperiyar dam is safe was found by this Court  and

that finding of fact can never be deemed to be imaginary by a legal  fiction

which then proceeds to deem the opposite to be real, viz., that the  dam  is

endangered. This is not a matter of legislative policy as it is  being  made

out to be, rather in our opinion, it is incursion in  the  judicial  process

and functions of judicial organ. The declaration in Section  62A  read  with

item No. 1 of the Second  Schedule  leaves  no  manner  of  doubt  that  the

enactment is intended to reach the question decided by the Court.

 

1. The question whether or not the  legislature  has  usurped  the

judicial power or enacted a law in breach of separation of powers  principle

would depend on facts of each case after considering the real effect of  law

on a judgment or a judicial proceeding.  One of the  tests  for  determining

whether a judgment is nullified is to see whether the law and  the  judgment

are inconsistent and irreconcilable so that both cannot stand together.   In

what we have already discussed above, it is abundantly  clear  that  on  the

one hand there is a finding of fact determined by this Court on hearing  the

parties on the basis of the  evidence/materials  placed  on  record  in  the

judgment of this Court in Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection  Forum1  and

on the other in 2006 (Amendment) Act, the Kerala  legislature  has  declared

the dam being an endangered one and fixed the water level in the dam at  136

1. If the judgment of this Court in Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection

Forum1 and the 2006 (Amendment) Act are  placed  side  by  side  insofar  as

safety of the Mullaperiyar dam for raising the water level from 136  ft.  to

142 ft. is concerned, it is obvious that the judgment of this Court and  the

law enacted by Kerala State legislature cannot stand together and  they  are

irreconcilable and inconsistent. The impugned  law  is  a  classic  case  of

nullification of a judgment simpliciter, as in the judgment  of  this  Court

the question of safety of dam was  determined  on  the  basis  of  materials

placed before it and not on the  interpretation  of  any  existing  law  and

there was no occasion for the legislature to amend the law by  altering  the

basis on which the judgment was founded. When the  impugned  law  is  not  a

validation law, there  is  no  question  of  the  legislature  removing  the

defect, as the Court has  not  found  any  vice  in  the  existing  law  and

declared such law to be bad.

 

2. There is yet  another  facet  that  in  federal  disputes,  the

legislature (Parliament and State legislatures) cannot  be  judge  in  their

own cause in the case of any dispute with another State.  The  rule  of  law

which is basic feature of our Constitution forbids the Union and the  States

from deciding, by law, a dispute between two States  or  between  the  Union

and one or more States.  If this was permitted under the  Constitution,  the

Union and the States which have any dispute  between  them  inter  se  would

enact law establishing its claim or right against the other and  that  would

lead to contradictory and irreconcilable laws.  The Constitution  makers  in

order to obviate any likelihood of  contradictory  and  irreconcilable  laws

being  enacted  has  provided  for  independent  adjudication   of   federal

disputes.  Article 131 of the  Constitution  confers  original  jurisdiction

upon this Court in relation to the disputes between the Government of  India

and one or more States or between the Government of India and any  State  or

States on one side and one or more States on the other  or  between  two  or

more States insofar as dispute involves any question on which the  existence

or extent of a legal right depends. The  proviso  appended  to  Article  131

carves out an exception to the jurisdiction  of  this  Court  to  a  dispute

arising out of treaty,  agreement,  covenant,  engagement,  sanad  or  other

similar instrument which have been  entered  into  or  executed  before  the

commencement of the Constitution  and  continues  in  operation  after  such

commencement, which  are  political  in  nature.   In  relation  to  dispute

relating to waters of  inter-State  river  or  river  valleys,  Article  262

provides for creation of tribunal  or  forum  for  their  adjudication.   In

federal disputes, Parliament or  State  legislatures  by  law,  if  seek  to

decide a dispute between the two States or between  the  Union  and  one  or

more States directly or indirectly, the adjudicatory mechanism  provided  in

Articles 131 and 262 of the Constitution would  be  rendered  nugatory  and,

therefore, such legislation cannot be  constitutionally  countenanced  being

violative of separation of powers doctrine.

 

3. Mr. Harish Salve,  learned  senior  counsel  is  right  in  his

submission that a legislation can never be challenged on the  principles  of

res judicata and that  it  binds  a  party  and  not  the  legislature.  The

question here is not that the 2006 (Amendment) Act  is  unconstitutional  on

the ground of res judicata but the question is, when a  categorical  finding

has been recorded by this Court in the earlier  judgment  that  the  dam  is

safe for raising the water level to 142 ft. and permitted  the  water  lever

of the dam being raised to 142 ft. and that judgment has  become  final  and

binding between the  parties,  has  the  Kerala  legislature  infringed  the

separation of powers doctrine in enacting such  law?  In  what  has  already

been discussed  above,  the  answer  to  the  question  has  to  be  in  the

affirmative and we hold so.

 

4. Where a dispute between two States has already been adjudicated

upon by this Court, which it is empowered to deal with, any  unilateral  law

enacted by one  of  the  parties  that  results  in  overturning  the  final

judgment is bad not  because  it  is  affected  by  the  principles  of  res

judicata but because it infringes the doctrine of separation of  powers  and

rule of law, as by  such  law,  the  legislature  has  clearly  usurped  the

judicial power.

 

Res-judicata

5. It is true that 2006 judgment was rendered in exercise  of  the

jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32  of  the  Constitution  and  the

petitions which were transferred to this Court under  Article  139A  but  to

say that such judgment does not bind this Court while deciding  the  present

suit, which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon  it,  is  not  correct.  The

earlier decision of this Court by no stretch of imagination can be  regarded

as a judgment rendered without jurisdiction.  A  finding  recorded  by  this

Court in the proceedings under Article 32 is as effective and  final  as  in

any other proceedings.

 

6. The rule of res judicata is not merely a technical rule but  it

is based on high public policy. The rule  embodies  a  principle  of  public

policy, which in turn, is an essential part of the rule of law.  In  Duchess

of Kingston[62], the House of Lords (in the opinion of Sir William de  Grey)

has observed: “From the variety of cases relative to judgments  being  given

in evidence  in  civil  suits,  these  two  deductions  seem  to  follow  as

generally  true:  first,  that  the  judgment  of  a  court  of   concurrent

jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as  evidence,

conclusive, between the same parties, upon  the  same  matter,  directly  in

question in another court;  secondly,  that  the  judgment  of  a  court  of

exclusive jurisdiction,  directly  upon  the  point,  is,  in  like  manner,

conclusive  upon  the  same  matter,  between  the  same   parties,   coming

incidentally in question in another court, for a different purpose.”

 

7. Corpus Juris explains that res judicata is a rule of  universal

law pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put  upon

two grounds, embodied in various maxims of the common law; the  one,  public

policy and necessity, which makes it to  the  interest  of  the  State  that

there should be an end to litigation; and the other,  the  hardship  on  the

individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause.

 

8. In Sheoparsan  Singh[63],  Sir  Lawrence  Jenkins  noted   the

statement of law declared by Lord Coke, ‘interest reipublica  ut  sit  finis

litium,’ otherwise great oppression might be done under colour and  pretence

of law. – (6 Coke, 9A.)

 

9. In Daryao[64], P.B. Gajendragadkar,  J.  while  explaining  the

rule of res judicata stated that on general considerations of public  policy

there seems to be no reason why rule of res judicata should  be  treated  as

inadmissible or irrelevant while dealing  with  the  petitions  filed  under

Article 32 of the Constitution. P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. referred to  earlier

decision of this Court in M.S.M. Sharma[65] wherein the application  of  the

rule of res judicata to a petition filed under  Article  32  was  considered

and it was observed that the question determined by  the  previous  decision

of this Court cannot be reopened and must govern the rights and  obligations

of the parties which are subsequently the same.

 

1. In Gulab Chand Chhotalal Parikh[66], this Court stated  that  a

decision in a writ petition is res judicata in a subsequent suit.

 

1. In Nanak Singh[67] the question whether the decision in a  writ

petition operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit  filed  on  the  same

cause of action has been settled. In  Nanak  Singh67,  this  court  observed

that  there  is  no  good  reason  to  preclude  decisions  on  matters   in

controversy in writ proceedings under Article  226  or  Article  32  of  the

Constitution from operating as res judicata in subsequent regular  suits  on

the same matters in controversy between the same parties and, thus, to  give

limited effect to the principle of finality of decision after full contest.

 

2. Nanak Singh67 has been followed by a three Judge Bench of  this

Court in Bua Das Kaushal[68]. In our view, the rule of  res  judicata  which

is founded on public  policy  prevents  not  only  a  new  decision  in  the

subsequent suit  but  also  prevents  new  investigation.  It  prevents  the

defendant from setting up a plea in a  subsequent  suit  which  was  decided

between the parties in the previous proceedings.  The  legal  position  with

regard to rule of res judicata is fairly well-settled that the  decision  on

a matter in controversy in writ proceeding (Article 226  or  Article  32  of

the Constitution) operates as res judicata in subsequent suit  on  the  same

matters in controversy between the same parties. For  the  applicability  of

rule of res judicata it is not necessary that the decision in  the  previous

suit must be the decision in the suit so as to operate as res judicata in  a

subsequent suit. A decision in previous proceeding, like  under  Article  32

or Article 226 of the Constitution, which is not a suit, will be binding  on

the parties in the subsequent suit on the principle of res judicata.

 

3. For the applicability of rule of res  judicata,  the  important

thing that must be seen is that the matter was  directly  and  substantially

in issue in the previous proceeding and a decision has  been  given  by  the

Court on that issue. A decision on issue of fact in the previous  proceeding

– such proceeding may not be  in  the  nature  of  suit  –  constitutes  res

judicata in the subsequent suit.

 

4. In light of the above legal position, if the 2006  judgment  is

seen, it becomes apparent that after  considering  the  contentions  of  the

parties and examining the reports of Expert Committee, this Court posed  the

issue for determination about the safety of the dam to  increase  the  water

level to 142 ft. and came to a categorical finding that  the  dam  was  safe

for raising the water level to 142 ft. and, accordingly, in  the  concluding

paragraph the Court disposed of the writ petition and the connected  matters

by permitting the water level of Mullaperiyar dam being raised  to  142  ft.

and also permitted further strengthening of the dam as  per  the  report  of

the Expert Committee  appointed  by  the  CWC.  The  review  petition  filed

against the said decision was dismissed by  this  Court  on  27.7.2006.  The

2006 judgment having become final and binding, the  issues  decided  in  the

said proceedings definitely operate as res judicata in the suit filed  under

Article 131 of the Constitution.

 

5. Shri Harish Salve, learned senior counsel  for  Kerala,  placed

reliance upon the decision of this Court in N.D. Jayal[69]. In N.D.  Jayal69

Dharmadhikari, J. made general observations on the dam  safety  aspect  that

plea like res judicata on the earlier decisions passed by the Supreme  Court

cannot be allowed to be raised. The observations made by  Dharmadhikari,  J.

in N.D. Jayal69 have to be read as an exception to the res judicata rule  in

the  matters  where,  by  their  very  nature,  the  factual  situation  has

drastically changed in  course  of  time.  If  substantial  changes  in  the

circumstances  occur  and  such  circumstances  are  shown  to   the   Court

necessitating departure from the earlier finding on  the  issue  of  safety,

the Court can be approached and in that event the Court itself may  exercise

its discretion to reopen the safety aspect  having  regard  to  the  drastic

change in circumstances or in emergent situation as to the  safety  of  dam.

In our view, a judicial decision,  having  achieved  finality,  becomes  the

last word and can be reopened in the changed  circumstances  by  that  Court

alone and no one else.

 

6. On behalf of Kerala, it is contended that the  jurisdiction  of

this Court under Article 32 of  the  Constitution  for  enforcement  of  the

fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution  is  ousted  or

excluded in respect of disputes between  two  or  more  States:  since  such

disputes fall within the ambit of the original jurisdiction  of  this  Court

under Article  131  of  the  Constitution  or  jurisdiction  of  a  tribunal

constituted under the provisions of Inter-State River  Water  Disputes  Act,

1956 read with the provisions of Article 262 of the Constitution.  Thus,  it

was submitted that the 2006 judgment is not binding and  that  the  rule  of

res judicata can hardly be attracted in this situation.

 

7. We are unable to accept the submission of  the  learned  senior

counsel for Kerala. The label of jurisdiction exercised  by  this  Court  is

not material for applicability of principles of res judicata if  the  matter

in issue in the subsequent suit has already been concluded  by  the  earlier

decision of this Court between the same parties. The 2006 judgment  was  the

result of judicial investigation, founded  upon  facts  ascertained  in  the

course of hearing. The plea of lack of jurisdiction of this Court was  taken

in the earlier proceedings on  both  the  grounds,  viz.,  (1)  whether  the

jurisdiction of this Court is barred  in  view  of  Article  262  read  with

Section 11 of the Inter-State  River  Water  Disputes  Act,  1956,  and  (2)

whether Article 363 of  the  Constitution  bars  the  jurisdiction  of  this

Court. On both these questions the findings were  recorded  against  Kerala.

It is too much  for  Kerala  to  say  that  the  2006  judgment  is  without

jurisdiction and not binding.

 

8. The rule of res judicata is articulated in  Section  11[70]  of

the Code of Civil Procedure.

 

9. Explanations VII and VIII were inserted in the above  provision

by  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  (Amendment)  Act,  1976   w.e.f.   1.2.1977.

Explanation VIII in this regard is quite relevant.  The  principles  of  res

judicata, thus, have been made  applicable  to  cases  which  are  tried  by

Courts of limited jurisdiction. The  decisions  of  the  Courts  of  limited

jurisdiction, insofar as such decisions are within  the  competence  of  the

Courts of limited jurisdiction, operate as  res  judicata  in  a  subsequent

suit, although, the Court of limited jurisdiction that decided the  previous

suit may not be competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit  in  which

such question is subsequently raised. If a decision of the Court of  limited

jurisdiction, which was within its competence, operates as res  judicata  in

a subsequent suit even when the subsequent suit is  not  triable  by  it,  a

fortiori, the decision  of  the  highest  Court  of  the  land  in  whatever

jurisdiction given on an issue which was  directly  raised,  considered  and

decided must  operate  as  res  judicata  in  the  subsequent  suit  triable

exclusively by the highest Court under Article 131 of the Constitution.  Any

other view in this regard will be inconsistent with the high  public  policy

and rule of law. The judgment of this Court directly upon the point,  is  as

a plea, a bar, or as evidence, conclusive between  the  same  parties,  upon

the same matter, directly in question before this Court,  though,  label  of

jurisdiction is different.

 

1. The principles of res judicata are  clearly  attracted  in  the

present case. The claim of Kerala  in  the  earlier  proceeding  that  water

level cannot be raised from its present level of 136 ft. was  expressly  not

accepted  and  the  obstruction  by  Kerala  to  the  water  level  in   the

Mullaperiyar dam being raised to 142 ft. on the ground of safety  was  found

untenable. The judgment dated 27.2.2006 of this  Court,  thus,  operates  as

res judicata in respect of the issue of safety of the dam by increasing  its

water level from 136 ft. to 142 ft.

 

1. It is argued by Mr. Harish Salve, learned  senior  counsel  for

Kerala, that even agreements entered into between foreign sovereigns can  be

overridden in  exercise  of  legislative  powers.  He  argues  that  if  the

contention of Tamil Nadu that the  1886  Lease  Agreement  was  an  ordinary

lease  agreement  is  correct  and  assuming  that  such  an  agreement  was

continued, it clearly was open to the legislature of the State of Kerala  to

override such a contract.  According  to  him,  even  contracts  by  way  of

sanads, treaties, etc., by the Crown could, after the  Government  of  India

Act and also after the Constitution of India, be overridden by  exercise  of

the legislative power.

 

2. Learned senior counsel for Kerala in support of this contention

relied upon the Privy Council  decision  in  Thakur  Jagannath  Baksh19  and

Maharaj Umeg Singh20. Learned senior counsel also submits that  Section  108

of the SR  Act  does  not  create  any  limitation  upon  Kerala  exercising

legislative power, inter  alia,  to  cancel  1886  Lease  Agreement  and  if

Section 108 of SR Act is construed to  impose  a  permanent  fetter  on  the

State’s legislative power, such provision is unconstitutional.

 

3. It may be stated immediately that the constitutionality of  the

SR Act has not been raised by Kerala in its written statement. As  a  matter

of fact, there is no issue framed by the Court in this  regard.  Rather,  in

the earlier litigation the constitutionality of Section 108 of  the  SR  Act

was challenged. In the 2006  judgment,  one  of  the  questions  framed  for

consideration was, whether Section 108 of the SR  Act  is  unconstitutional.

The Court held that  law  making  power  under  Articles  3  and  4  of  the

Constitution was paramount and it was  neither  subjected  nor  fettered  by

Article 246 and Lists II (State List)  and  III  (Concurrent  List)  of  the

Seventh Schedule. The Court also held that power of Parliament to  make  law

under Articles 3 and  4  is  plenary  and  traverses  over  all  legislative

subjects as are necessary for  effecting  a  proper  reorganization  of  the

States. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the challenge  as  to  the

validity of Section 108 of the SR Act.

 

4. We are, therefore, not  persuaded  to  consider  constitutional

validity of Section 108(1)  of  the  SR  Act  again.  Moreover,  it  is  not

necessary to  consider  this  aspect  in  view  of  our  finding  that  2006

(Amendment) Act enacted by Kerala legislature is unconstitutional.

 

5. Thakur Jagannath Baksh19  and  Maharaj  Umeg  Singh20  have  no

application to the situation obtaining in the present case. The effect of  a

judgment which enforces a legal right flowing from a contract  is  that  the

right is incorporated as a right under the judgment and such a right  cannot

be overridden by legislature as it tantamounts to overriding a judgment.

 

6. Learned senior counsel for Kerala also relied upon  a  decision

of this Court in State of Orissa[71]. In State of  Orissa71,  while  dealing

with Article 131, this Court stated, “Article 131 has  no  doubt  given  the

Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any dispute  between,  inter

alia, two or more States. This exclusive jurisdiction is,  however,  subject

to two limitations — one contained in the  opening  words  of  the  Article,

namely, “subject to the provisions  of  this  Constitution”  and  the  other

which is contained in the proviso to the Article.”

 

7. There is no doubt that the jurisdiction to resolve any  dispute

between two or more States is conferred upon the Supreme  Court  by  Article

131 of the Constitution. However, it does not  follow  logically  from  this

that a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in a writ  jurisdiction  under

Article 32 amongst others between two States is not conclusive  and  binding

on such States. As already noted above, the 2006 judgment rendered  by  this

Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under  Article  32  binds  Kerala  and

Tamil Nadu. We have no hesitation and we state  with  all  emphasis  that  a

finding recorded by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article  32

is binding between the two parties, in a subsequent  suit  between  the  two

States under Article 131.

 

Safety of Mullaperiyar dam – Evidence and EC Report

8. Learned senior counsel for Kerala while assailing  the  finding

of fact on safety of Mullaperiyar dam recorded  in  2006  judgment,  and  in

support of his contention that it does not constitute res  judicata  as  the

circumstances have changed, has relied upon the evidence of its witness  Dr.

A.K. Gosain (DW-3) on the impact of Probable Maximum Flood  (PMF),  evidence

of Dr. D.K. Paul on the impact of seismic forces and certain  admissions  of

Tamil Nadu’s witness PW-1. Mr. Harish Salve  argues  that  the  doctrine  of

finality does not preclude this Court from correcting  the  errors.  Learned

senior counsel in this regard places reliance upon three decisions  of  this

Court in A.R. Antulay[72], Isabella Johnson[73], and Rupa Ashok Hurra[74].

 

9. Being the highest court  of  the  land,  this  court  possesses

powers to correct a judgment in a curative petition if the  parameters  laid

down in Rupa Ashok Hurra74 are satisfied. The present  case  does  not  fall

within the parameters laid down in Rupa Ashok Hurra74. Though  there  is  no

justification to reopen the dam safety aspect in view  of  the  judgment  of

this Court passed on 27.2.2006, yet  for  our  satisfaction  as  to  whether

there is any danger to the Mullaperiyar dam, despite  strengthening  of  dam

carried out by Tamil Nadu in  accordance  with  the  strengthening  measures

suggested by CWC, we briefly intend to look into this aspect.

 

1. Learned senior counsel for Kerala submits that danger posed  to

the safety of the Mullaperiyar dam arises from, (i) the impact  of  Probable

Maximum Flood (PMF), i.e., floods which impact the dam; (ii) the  impact  of

Maximum Considered  Earthquake  (MCE),  i.e.,  if  earthquake  happens,  the

impact of such event  on  the  dam;  and  (iii)  the  impact  on  structural

degeneration, i.e., with the  age,  the  dam  structure  has  been  rendered

unsafe.  Kerala’s emphasis is that in the 2006 judgment this  Court  wrongly

endorsed the PMF of 2.12 lakh cusecs estimated by the CWC  in  1986.  Kerala

asserts that the observed flood at Mullaperiyar dam in 1943  was  2.98  lakh

cusecs and according to Tamil Nadu’s own witness (PW-1), the  PMF  ought  to

be more than observed flood. Hence, estimation of PMF as  2.12  lakh  cusecs

by the CWC in 1986 is an underestimation.

 

1. As regards impact of MCE, Kerala has heavily  relied  upon  the

study conducted by Dr. D.K. Paul and Dr. M.L.  Sharma,  Professors  of  IIT,

Roorkee. Kerala says that these two  experts  have  categorically  concluded

that, “………..both the Main Mullaperiyar  dam  and  Baby  Dam  are  likely  to

undergo damage which may  lead  to  failure  under  static  plus  earthquake

condition and therefore needs serious attention….”.

 

2. Kerala submits that the dam suffered heavy  lime  loss  between

1930 and 1960 forcing Tamil Nadu to grout admittedly 542  MT  of  cement  in

this period.

 

3. On the aspect of impact of  structural  degeneration,  Kerala’s

submission is that Mullaperiyar dam is a composite gravity  dam  constructed

of lime surkhi mortar and lime surkhi concrete; that inner core of the  dam,

which constitutes 62% of the  total  volume,  admittedly  consists  of  lime

surkhi concrete; and that Mullaperiyar dam has suffered  heavy  leaching  of

lime and has lost as much as 30.48 MT  per  year  as  found  by  the  Expert

Committee of Tamil Nadu,  which  has  been  admitted  by  PW-1.  Kerala  has

highlighted that the density of the materials used in the dam has  gradually

gone down from 150 lbs/cft considered in 1895 to 135  lbs/cft  in  1986  and

that  such  gradual  reduction  testifies  structural  degradation  of   the

Mullaperiyar dam.

4. As noted earlier, when the matter was initially taken up by the

Constitution Bench it was felt that all the aspects of the matter  including

safety of Mullaperiyar dam need to be examined  by  an  Empowered  Committee

(EC),  which  may  help  the  Court  in  deciding  the  matter  effectively.

Accordingly, on  18.2.2010  the  Constitution  Bench  directed  the  Central

Government to constitute an EC under the Chairmanship  of  Dr.  A.S.  Anand,

former Chief Justice of India, and comprising of two  members  nominated  by

the States of Kerala and Tamil Nadu  and  two  renowned  technical  experts.

Kerala nominated Justice K.T. Thomas, a former  Judge  of  this  Court,  and

Tamil Nadu nominated Justice (Dr.) A.R. Lakshmanan, a former Judge  of  this

Court, to the EC. Two renowned technical experts, Dr. C.D. Thatte  and  Shri

D.K. Mehta were nominated in consultation with the Chairman of  the  EC.  As

per the terms of reference, the EC was free to receive further  evidence  as

it considered appropriate.  The two experts, Dr. C.D. Thatte and  Shri  D.K.

Mehta  have  long  experience  in  all  facets  of  water  sector.  EC   got

investigations, tests and technical studies carried out  through  the  three

apex  organizations,  besides  other  specialized   organizations   of   the

Government of  India  and,  especially,  expert  agencies  with  a  view  to

appreciate the diverse stand of the two States. In  all,  12  investigations

and technical studies, besides  some  site  studies,  were  directed  to  be

carried out to assist the EC to appreciate the stand of the two  States  and

for  submission  of  its  report  to  this  Court.  The  EC   also   visited

Mullaperiyar dam (main dam), Baby dam and  earthen  bund  from  the  Periyar

lakeside as well as from the downstream side. Before EC, the  representative

of both States explained theories of the existing  dam.  The  two  technical

members  made  a  visit  to  drainage  galleries  and  spillway  for  better

appraisal of the dam site. The two experts again visited the  dam  site  for

site appraisal and submitted their report.

5. The reports and investigations, tests and studies (ITS reports)

are contained in 50 CDs  and  4  DVDs.  The  report  of  EC  consists  of  8

Chapters. Chapter I has the title “Dams – An  Overview”.  Chapter  II  deals

with three aspects, viz., (a)  Use  of  Periyar  waters;  (b)  Evolution  of

Periyar Project; and (c) Mullaperiyar dam  Dispute  in  the  Supreme  Court.

Chapter III refers to the issues settled by the EC. Chapter  IV  contains  –

(i) Report of visit of the EC to  Mullaperiyar  dam  site/areas  during  19-

22.12.2010; (ii)  Resolutions of  the  EC  dated  21.12.2010,  7.1.2011  and

5.12.2011; and (iii) Report of visit by  two  technical  members  (Dr.  C.D.

Thatte  and  Shri  D.K.  Mehta)  during  22-26.12.2011.  Chapter  V  records

responses in brief of the parties to the issues framed by EC. Chapter VI  is

appraisal and analysis of the reports  of  technical  investigations,  tests

and studies. Chapter  VII  records  conclusions.  Chapter  VIII  deals  with

general  observation  with  the  title,  “Way  Forward-Towards  An  Amicable

Resolution”. Two notes, one from Justice K.T. Thomas, member of the EC,  and

the other from Justice (Dr.) A.R. Lakshmanan, member of the EC,  on  Chapter

VIII of the report of the EC are also appended to the report.

6. In Chapter  III,  the  EC  has   recorded   the   issues   for

consideration. One of the issues, viz., Issue No.4 for consideration  reads,

“Should the reservoir level be raised from 136 ft.?  If  yes,  what  further

measures for strengthening the existing dam, do the  two  parties  envisage,

to allow the raising of  reservoir  level  from  136  ft.  to  142  ft.  and

beyond?”

7. In Chapter V, the EC has noted  responses  by  Tamil  Nadu  and

Kerala to the issues framed by it.

8. Chapter VI, in which appraisal and analysis of ITS reports have

been made, shows that following tests and studies were formulated so  as  to

effectively deal with the concerns and grievances of the two States:

 

 

“A.      HYDROLOGIC SAFETY

 

 

|Title                       |Purpose of ITS             |

|Verification of the Probable|To determine:              |

|Maximum Flood (PMF)         |                           |

|computations with flood     |Probable Maximum Flood     |

|routing for revisiting      |(PMF)                      |

|spillway capacity.          |Outflow PMF hydrograph and |

|                            |its moderation from Mulla  |

|                            |Periyar Dam upto tip of    |

|                            |Idukki reservoir.          |

|                            |Outflow PMF hydrograph of  |

|                            |Idukki reservoir.          |

|                            |Maximum Water Level (MWL)  |

|                            |for various scenarios of   |

|                            |operative / inoperative    |

|                            |gates for different FRLs.  |

|                            |Free board                 |

|Integrated Dam Break Flood  |To assess Dam Break Flood  |

|study from Mulla Periyar Dam|that may be caused by      |

|to Idduki Dam and beyond to |different modes of         |

|enable preparation of an    |failure/cascade effect in  |

|Emergency Action Plan.      |case of occurrence of MPD  |

|Preparation of a sample of  |break.  To identify the    |

|likely inundation map.      |plausible worst case of Dam|

|                            |Break Flood going down     |

|                            |Periyar river from MPD to  |

|                            |Idukki reservoir tip (in   |

|                            |1st phase) and beyond (in  |

|                            |other 2 phases).  To       |

|                            |determine maximum          |

|                            |inundation on both banks   |

|                            |for preparation of         |

|                            |Emergency Action Plan under|

|                            |Disaster Management Plan.  |

|Back-water studies upstream |To determine afflux        |

|of tip of Mulla Periyar     |(swelling) above the MWL in|

|Reservoir into main stem and|the upstream from tip of   |

|tributaries.                |the reservoir caused due to|

|Contour map of reservoir    |inflow congestion.         |

|area from present water     |                           |

|level to 165 ft (50.29 m)   |                           |

|elevation.                  |                           |

|Computerized Reservoir      |To determine loss of       |

|Sedimentation Survey for    |storage due to             |

|assessment of present       |sedimentation and its      |

|elevation-area-capacity     |effect (if any) on Probable|

|relations.  Assessment in   |Maximum Flood attenuation. |

|higher elevations by Remote |                           |

|Sensing.                    |                           |

 

 

Note: Side items of ITS pertain to i) Dams built with spillway  design

flood less than PMF, ii) Availability of water  for  Tamil  Nadu,  and

iii) Requirement for environmental flow.

 

 

 

 

1. STRUCTURAL SAFETY

|Mapping of upstream face of |To scan upstream face of Dam|

|dam above water level by    |for discontinuities, cracks,|

|means of photography        |hollows, voids & joints etc.|

|                            |above water level by grid   |

|                            |based photography.          |

|Underwater scanning of      |To scan upstream face of Dam|

|upstream face of the dam by |for discontinuities, cracks,|

|means of a Remotely Operated|hollows, voids & joints etc.|

|Vehicle to assess its       |under water by means of a   |

|condition.                  |Remote Operated Vehicle.    |

|Studies of seepage and its  |To compile measured values  |

|free lime content.          |of seepage from dam body and|

|                            |foundation.                 |

|                            |To determine proportion of  |

|                            |seepage through dam         |

|                            |body/foundation by flow net |

|                            |studies.                    |

|                            |To determine leached free   |

|                            |lime content in seepage.    |

|Determination of            |To carry out core drilling  |

|in-situ/ex-situ strength &  |in Dam body/ foundation to  |

|integrity of the dam body   |enable following physical   |

|materials and foundation for|and chemical, in-situ and   |

|using in safety/stability   |ex-situ (in laboratories)   |

|status assessment.          |tests.                      |

|                            |                            |

|                            |In-situ Tests:              |

|                            |                            |

|                            |Sonic test                  |

|                            |Gamma – Gamma /             |

|                            |Neutron-Neutron             |

|                            |Dye Tracer                  |

|                            |Electrical Resistivity &    |

|                            |Geophysical Tomographic     |

|                            |Study                       |

|                            |Ex-situ Tests:              |

|                            |Compressive strength        |

|                            |Tensile Strength            |

|                            |Modulus of Elasticity       |

|                            |(Static as well as dynamic) |

|                            |Poisson’s ratio             |

|                            |Density                     |

|                            |Free Lime                   |

|                            |Chemical analysis of        |

|                            |materials                   |

|Measurement of loss of      |To determine loss of        |

|stress in the sample        |pre-stress and hence        |

|pre-stressed cable          |residual pre-stress in the  |

|                            |cable anchors installed in  |

|                            |1981, as part of            |

|                            |strengthening measures.     |

 

 

Note: Side items of ITS pertain to i) Thermal  properties  of  backing

concrete and  effect  on  interface,  ii)  Instrumentation,  and  iii)

Stability of Main and Baby Dam.

 

 

 

 

1. SEISMIC SAFETY

|Finite Element Method (FEM)  |To determine tensile stress  |

|analysis employing (response |caused due to Earthquake     |

|spectra) / (time histories)  |forces based on:             |

|to asses stability of dam    |2D FEM Studies based on      |

|under design basis/maximum   |Response Spectra method (in  |

|credible earthquake forces.  |two parts) submitted by SoK. |

|                             |3D FEM studies (two times)   |

|                             |submitted by SoTN.           |

|                             |2D FEM studies (in two parts)|

|                             |based on Time-History        |

|                             |analysis.                    |

|Identify evidence of         |To make a traverse and       |

|geological fault in the      |identify evidence if any, of |

|surroundings of the Baby Dam.|the suspected geological     |

|                             |fault in the Baby dam        |

|                             |foundation.                  |

 

 

Note: Side items of ITS pertain to i) Study  of  3D  FEM  Analysis  by

Prof. R.N. Iyengar of Indian Institute  of  Sciences,  Bangalore,  ii)

Seismic Design Parameters of Mulla Periyar Dam,  and  iii)  Impact  of

recent earthquake events.”

 

9. The above reports have then been carefully analysed and on  the

basis of the appraisal of the ITS reports, EC  held  that  Probable  Maximum

Precipitation (PMP) considered earlier was correct and the determination  of

observed maximum flood in 1943 was not reliable.  EC’s  assessment  is  that

peak of PMF reaching the Mullaperiyar dam reservoir / periphery  /  upstream

tip remains at 2.12 lakh cusecs (6003 cumecs).

1. EC has been of the view  that  spillway  designed  capacity  of

Mullaperiyar dam for flood lower than PMF is acceptable.  The  EC  carefully

analysed the two studies, viz., (i) study above water level by  photography,

and (ii) study below water level by means  of  a  Remote  Operated  Vehicle,

upto a safely reachable level, and  on  appraisal  from  both  scans/studies

read together did not apprehend cause for  concern  about  manifestation  of

any distress for the dam.

1. EC has also carefully  considered  the  concerns  expressed  by

Kerala with regard to (a) seepage measurement  and  assessment  of  loss  of

free lime; (b) loss of strength of dam body constituents due to  lime  loss;

and (c) vulnerability due to free lime loss. According to EC appraisal,  the

total lime leaching in 116 years of dam’s existence was about  3.66%,  which

is less than the upper permissible limit of 15-20%. EC  held  that  as  lime

loss as assessed was far within permissible limits, there is  no  cause  for

concern about loss of strength of Mullaperiyar dam.

2. The physical properties of dam  body  material  has  also  been

reviewed and assessed by applying in situ non destructive tests,  viz.,  (a)

sonic test from dam’s upstream face; (b) neutron-logging and  tracer  study;

(c) geophysical tomographic study; and (d) scanning of internal  surface  of

bore hole walls using digital video  recording  system.  EC  also  requested

Tamil Nadu to obtain and test core samples from dam body / foundation  rock,

besides carrying out in situ tests in 9 holes on Mullaperiyar  dam,  of  150

mm size and more, which were got done by  Tamil  Nadu.  These  test  reports

were also considered. The chemical tests on  constructed  material  used  in

the dam body and reservoir water  were  also  conducted.  The  test  results

indicate innocuous nature of all these materials.

3. All time seepage data of Mullaperiyar dam  has  been  appraised

and analysed by EC, which indicates that it is  within  permissible  limits.

Testing of one ungrouted cable anchor for residual pre-stress was got  done.

Analysis has also been done of thermal properties of  backing  concrete  and

effect on interface. The detailed appraisal and analysis of ITS reports  for

seismic design parameters on Mullaperiyar dam  show  the  recent  earthquake

events to be transient and inconsequential.

4. One of the apprehensions highlighted by Kerala is  that  a  dam

break flood would cause  large  scale  devastation.  This  aspect  has  been

considered by the EC under the head “Dam Break Flood and possible  cascading

effect”. EC in this regard has observed that Kerala has not supplied  to  it

inundation maps even for normal flood with return periods such  as  50,  100

years in downstream area for phase-I and between Idukki  and  lower  Periyar

dam or further downstream for later phases. Such inundation maps have to  be

prepared for Emergency Action  Plan.  Kerala  also  has  not  submitted  any

assessment  as  prescribed  in   CWC   ‘Guidelines   for   Development   and

Implementation  of  Emergency  Action  Plan  for  Dams,  May,  2006’.    EC,

accordingly, depended on maps developed by using Archived Satellite  Imagery

and  Survey  of  India  toposheets,  through  ‘Mapsets’,  and   accomplished

illustrative  contouring  of  area  between  Mullaperiyar  dam  and   Idukki

complex. EC has observed that all the projections / concerns by Kerala  were

not based on computations / studies. Despite the request made to  Kerala  to

supply contour map,  Kerala did not do so.  EC  has  further  observed  that

Kerala’s projection is conjectural since there is  deficiency  in  assessing

the likely inundated area. EC, therefore, did not accept the  scare  of  dam

break flood.

5. Having done elaborate and detailed appraisal  and  analysis  of

the voluminous tests and  reports  of  experts  and  having  regard  to  the

concerns expressed by Kerala about the safety of the  Mullaperiyar  dam,  EC

has summarized its conclusions on the three aspects,  viz.,  (a)  hydrologic

safety; (b) structural safety; and (c) seismic safety as follows:

 

“A)   Hydrologic Safety

 

 

3. The MPD is found  hydrologically  safe.   The  Probable  Maximum

Flood (PMF), with a peak flow of 2.12 lakh  cusecs  (6003  cumecs)  is

accepted by EC.  It can be routed over the reservoir FRL 142 ft (43.28

1. m) to safely pass over the MPD  spillway  with  13  gates  operative,

resulting into a peak out  flow  of  1,43,143  cusecs  (4053  cumecs),

raising the Maximum Water Level (MWL) to elevation 153.47 ft (46.78 m)

transiently.   Even  for  the  Test  Case  of  one  gate   remaining

inoperative, the MWL raises to elevation 154.10 ft (46.97 m) when  PMF

impinges the reservoir at FRL 142 ft (42.28 m).

 

 

1. B) Structural Safety

 

 

4. Both the main and Baby Dam (gravity and earth), are  structurally

safe.  FRL can  be  restored  to  the  pre-1979  position.   Following

maintenance and repair measures, should however be carried  out  in  a

time-bound manner: i) treatment of upstream surface,  ii)  reaming  of

drainage  holes,  iii)  instrumentation,  iv)  periodical  monitoring,

analysis and leading away the seepage from  toe  of  the  dam  towards

downstream, v) geodetic re-affirmation, etc., vi) the dam body  should

be grouted with a  properly  designed  grout  mix  of  fine  cement  /

suitable chemical / epoxy / polymer according to expert advice so that

its safety continues to remain present.

 

 

1. C) Seismic Safety

 

 

5. MPD is found to be seismically safe for FRL 152 ft (46.33  m)  /

MWL 155 ft (47.24 m) for the identified seismic design parameters with

acceleration time histories under 2-D FEM Analysis.  The strength  and

other properties of dam material presently available,  indicate  ample

reserve against the likely stresses  /  impacts  assessed  under  this

analysis.  In addition, reserve strength of cable  anchors  makes  the

dam further safe.  The suspicion about existence of a geological fault

in the Baby Dam  foundation  is  ruled  out.   The  recent  earthquake

activity in the dam area  is  considered  of  no  consequence  to  the

seismic safety.  Also, it has caused  no  distress  to  MPD  /  Idukki

dams.”

 

6. Kerala has  vehemently  challenged  the  EC  report  and   its

conclusions. Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior  counsel  for  Kerala,  argues

that the ITS reports contained in 50 CDs and 4 DVDs are not  admissible  and

should not be considered as part of material on record  before  this  Court.

He submits that EC suo motu decided to  conduct  investigations,  tests  and

studies  on  various  aspects  related  to  the  case   through   the   apex

organizations, the Coordination Committee was formed,  headed  by  Dr.  C.D.

Thatte, member of the EC, and consisting of representatives  of  Kerala  and

Tamil Nadu and though the representatives of States were made  part  of  the

Coordination Committee, but their role was  limited  to  more  of  being  an

observer and unilateral decisions regarding the studies,  etc.,  were  taken

by Dr. C.D. Thatte, which  were  prejudicial  to  the  interest  of  Kerala.

Kerala’s grievance is that the EC on  5.12.2011  declined  to  disclose  and

supply the copies of results  and  ITS  reports  without  dealing  with  the

question of prejudice. Subsequently, EC submitted  its  report  before  this

Court and the Court directed the Registry on 4.5.2012 to supply copy of  the

report of the EC to party States and,  accordingly,  the  Registry  of  this

Court made available a photocopy of the report.  The report supplied by  the

Registry to Kerala did not include  the  results  and  reports  of  the  ITS

listed in Annexure 6.1 of the report but later on pursuant to the  order  of

this Court dated 31.8.2012, all 50 CDs and  4  DVDs  were  supplied  to  the

counsel for Kerala. It is submitted  on  behalf  of  Kerala  that  the  fair

procedure and rules of natural justice demanded  that  the  EC  should  have

disclosed the results and reports of ITS relied upon  by  it  and  given  an

opportunity to Kerala on  the  acceptability  of  the  ITS  reports.  It  is

strenuously urged by learned senior counsel for Kerala that the ITS  reports

are the opinions of experts and, therefore, the EC  could  not  have  relied

upon such results and reports without giving an opportunity to  it  to  meet

the adverse contents and Kerala has the right to cross-examine  the  authors

and also to lead evidence  of  experts,  if  any,  challenging  the  adverse

results and reports of the ITS. In  this  regard,  Kerala  referred  to  the

application made before EC  on  21.11.2011.  Kerala  also  relied  upon  the

decision of Queens Bench in Regina[75].

7. We are not persuaded by the submissions of Mr. Harish Salve. It

is true that 50 CDs and 4 DVDs  containing  ITS  reports  were  supplied  to

Kerala pursuant to the order of this Court dated 31.8.2012 after the  report

had been submitted by the EC but the fact of  the  matter  is  that  the  EC

decided to conduct the investigations, tests and studies on various  aspects

relating  to  the  safety  of  the  Mullaperiyar  dam   through   the   apex

organizations pursuant to the task given to it by this Court. The EC in  its

proceedings dated 17.2.2011 formed a Coordination Committee which  comprised

the representatives of both the States. It is very difficult to accept  that

the role of the representatives of the States in the Coordination  Committee

was limited to that of being an observer. The ITS reports  have  been  given

by the organizations and bodies which are expert on  the  job.  We  have  no

hesitation in holding that the investigations, tests and  technical  studies

were  directed  to  be  carried  out  by  the   EC   in   association   with

representatives of both the States.

8. Moreover, this Court appointed EC to assure  itself  about  the

safety of the Mullaperiyar dam. The EC, we must say, has completed its  task

admirably by thoroughly going into each and every aspect of  the  safety  of

Mullaperiyar dam. We do not find any  merit  in  the  objections  of  Kerala

challenging the findings and conclusions of the  EC  on  hydrologic  safety,

structural safety and seismic safety of the dam. The  findings  of  EC  with

elaborate analysis of reports of investigations, tests and studies  lead  to

one and only one conclusion that there is no  change  in  the  circumstances

necessitating  departure  from  the  earlier  finding  on  the   safety   of

Mullaperiyar dam given by this Court in 2006 judgment. As a matter of  fact,

there is no change in circumstances at all much less any drastic  change  in

circumstances or emergent  situation  justifying  the  reopening  of  safety

aspect of Mullaperiyar dam which has been determined by this  Court  in  the

earlier judgment.

 

Findings on Issue Nos. 2(a), 3, 4(a), 4(b) and 10

9. In light of the above discussion, our findings  on  Issue  Nos.

2(a), 3, 4(a), 4(b) and 10 are as follows:

(i.)  Kerala Irrigation and Water  Conservation  (Amendment)  Act,  2006  is

unconstitutional and ultra vires in its application to and  effect  on

the Mullaperiyar dam.

(ii.)  The  rights  of  Tamil  Nadu,  crystallized  in  the  judgment  dated

27.2.2006 passed by this Court  in  W.P.  (C)  No.386/2001  cannot  be

nullified by a legislation made by the Kerala State legislature.

(iii.)      The earlier judgment of this Court given on  27.2.2006  operates

as res judicata on the issue of the safety  of  Mullaperiyar  dam  for

raising water level to  142  ft.  and  ultimately  to  152  ft.  after

completion of further strengthening measures on the Mullaperiyar dam.

(iv.) The plea raised by Kerala relating to the lease deed dated  29.10.1886

and structural safety of Mullaperiyar dam have been finally decided by

the judgment of this Court dated 27.2.2006 and Kerala is estopped from

raising or re-agitating these issues in the present suit.

(v.)  Kerala cannot obstruct Tamil Nadu from increasing the water  level  of

Mullaperiyar dam to 142 ft. and from carrying out repair works as  per

judgment dated 27.2.2006.

 

Issue No. 8.

1. This issue covers the  controversy  as  to  whether  Kerala  is

estopped from contending that Periyar river is not an inter-State river.

1. Tamil Nadu in the plaint has averred as follows:

“The plaintiff, defendant no.1, State of Kerala are the  two  riparian

States through which the Inter-State river Periyar flows.   The  river

is one of the west flowing rivers in  the  State  of  Kerala,  with  a

portion of its catchment lying with the State of Tamil Nadu………….”

 

2. Traversing the above pleading of the Tamil Nadu, Kerala has set

up the case that river Periyar is not an inter-State river but it is  intra-

State river; that it rises in Quilon District in Kerala and  traverses  only

through the territory of Kerala before falling into the Arabian sea.

 

3. In its replication, Tamil Nadu has averred that, in any  event,

in  the  earlier  proceedings,  Kerala  had  raised  the  plea  of  lack  of

jurisdiction of this Court  to  entertain  the  river  water  disputes  with

reference to Article 262 of the Constitution read with  Section  11  of  the

Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956.  This plea  was  raised  on  the

ground that river Periyar is an inter-State river.  Tamil  Nadu,  thus,  has

set up the plea that Kerala is estopped  from  raising  a  plea  that  river

Periyar is not an inter-State river.

 

4. Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior  counsel  for  Kerala,  argues

that river Periyar rises in Kerala and flows for a  length  of  244  km.  in

Kerala before entering in the sea at Kerala coast. River  Periyar  does  not

touch any part of Tamil Nadu. He submits that in  the  earlier  proceedings,

Kerala had not  admitted  that  river  Periyar  was  an  inter-State  river.

Learned senior counsel contends that river Periyar is an  intra-State  river

and Kerala’s averments in the earlier proceedings does  not  estop  it  from

raising the plea that river Periyar is not an inter-State river.

 

5. In 2006 judgment, one of the points considered and  decided  by

this court is whether the jurisdiction of this court is barred  in  view  of

Article 262 of the Constitution read with  Section  11  of  the  Inter-State

River Water Disputes Act, 1956. This point would not  have  been  raised  by

Kerala but for the fact that river Periyar happened  to  be  an  inter-State

river. While deciding this point, obviously,  the  court  proceeded  on  the

footing that river Periyar is an inter-State river. This court decided  this

point against Kerala. It appears that in the review petition, for the  first

time, Kerala took the specific plea that Periyar  is  an  intra-State  river

but covered by an  inter-State  agreement.  The  review  petition  has  been

rejected by this Court on 27.7.2006.

 

6. It is true that in the earlier proceedings there is no  express

and categorical admission of Kerala that river  Periyar  is  an  inter-State

river, but the  very  plea  of  lack  of  jurisdiction  of  this  court  for

considering the applicability of Article 262,  as  noted  above,  would  not

have been raised by Kerala  if  river  Periyar  was  an  intra-State  river.

Moreover, the entire area drained  by  the  river  and  its  tributaries  is

called the river basin. It is well-understood in the  water  laws  that  the

basin of any river includes the  river  valley.  The  topographical  map  of

Periyar river-basin shows that part of Periyar basin (about 114 sq. km.)  is

in Tamil Nadu. This is established from Water Atlas of Kerala  published  by

Centre for Water Resources Development and  Management,  Kazhikode,  Kerala.

Though the Periyar basin area that falls in Tamil Nadu is  very  small  but,

in our view, that does not make any difference  insofar  as  the  status  of

Periyar river as inter-State river is concerned. The fact of the  matter  is

that 114 sq. km. of Periyar basin area falls in Tamil  Nadu.  This  is  also

fortified by the advance report of Public Works  Department,  Government  of

Kerala, which, inter alia, states, “the rivers  which  have  their  drainage

area lying in more than one State have been brought under  the  category  of

Inter-State rivers and a  consolidated  study  has  been  admitted  in  this

chapter……………”  “Of the west flowing rivers, those which have  a  portion  of

their catchment area lying in Madras State  are  …………..(iv) Periyar.”

 

7. Kerala’s witness M.K. Parameswaran Nair has  admitted  that  in

Chapter LXIII under the heading “Interstate waters”  from  “Water  Resources

of Kerala” published by Public Works Department,  Government  of  Kerala  in

1958, Periyar has been mentioned as  an  inter-State  river.   This  witness

also admits that Water Atlas of Kerala wherein details of Periyar basin  are

given shows that part of the basin falls in the neighbouring State of  Tamil

Nadu.

 

8. Since Kerala has raised the plea that river Periyar is an intra-

State river, obviously, burden is on Kerala  to  prove  this  fact.  Kerala,

except asserting that Periyar river rises  in  and  traverses  only  in  the

territory of Kerala before entering into Arabian sea  and  no  part  of  the

land in Tamil  Nadu  abuts  river  Periyar,  has  not  produced  substantial

evidence to prove that river Periyar is an  intra-State  river.  Kerala  has

not discharged its burden to the satisfaction of the Court.

 

9. It is true that averment of Tamil Nadu in the plaint  that  the

two States – Kerala and Tamil Nadu – are riparian States  is  not  right  in

its entirety because Tamil Nadu is not a riparian State but  the  status  of

Periyar river as inter-State river, on the basis of what  we  have  observed

above, cannot be overlooked. It is not open to  Kerala  to  take  a  totally

inconsistent plea and begin fresh controversy about the  status  of  Periyar

river on the ground that the earlier plea  was  founded  on  some  erroneous

premise. In our view, Kerala cannot be permitted  to  contend  that  Periyar

river is not an inter-State river.

 

Finding on Issue No.8

1. In light of the above discussion, it is held that Kerala cannot

be permitted to contend that river Periyar is an  intra-State  river.  Issue

No.8 is answered accordingly.

 

Issue No.9

1. This issue is founded on the offer made by Kerala to Tamil Nadu

to construct a new dam across river Periyar  in  the  downstream  region  of

Mullaperiyar dam. EC in Chapter VIII under the title “Way Forward –  Towards

An Amicable Resolution” has dealt with this aspect as  a  first  alternative

and suggested as follows:

 

“1.   That the SoK may construct a new dam,  at  its  own  expense  to

serve its own  perceptions,  if  techno-economically  cleared  by  the

Planning Commission, and  cleared  by  MoEF  in  accordance  of  their

regulations. The construction of a new  dam,  giving  due  margin  for

inflation etc, may cost the exchequer more than  Rupees  one  thousand

crores. The statutory clearances, fixing  of  a  construction  agency,

preliminary works, the actual construction  and  decommissioning  with

demolition of existing dam is likely  to  take  8  to  10  years.  The

existing dam shall not be  dismantled,  demolished  or  decommissioned

till the new dam construction is completed and it becomes operational.

Till such time, the rights of the SoTN in  the  existing  Dam  to  all

waters of Mulla Periyar Dam arising out of the Lease Deed     of  1886

and the Agreements of 1970, shall be fully honoured.

 

2. However, the operation of the New Dam would commence only after:

 

 

 

2(a)  A fresh MOU is executed between the SoK and the SoTN.

 

2(b)  That to control, manage,  operate,  maintain  and  regulate  the

waters of the New Dam, an Independent Committee / Board,  to  be

chaired  by  a  representative  of  the  Union  of  India,  with

representatives of the SoK and the SoTN as its Members,  is  put

in place;

 

2(c)  That the terms of rent/levies etc payable by the SoTN to the SoK

are settled and the power generation rights of  the  two  States

are settled beforehand;

 

2(d)   That  before  construction  of  the  new  dam  and   till   its

commissioning, the existing dam  will  be  strengthened  by  the

measures suggested by the CWC, including Dam Safety requirements

as already voiced, which still remain to be carried out.

 

2(e)  That the SoTN will  be  entitled  to  all  its  existing  rights

including all water    levels under the Lease Deed of  1886  and

Agreement of 1970.

 

2(f)  That decommissioning or demolition of the existing dam would  be

subject to the conditions 2(a) to 2(e)  being  met  by  the  two

Party States.

 

2(g)  The Empowered Committee had  made  the  suggestion  to  the  two

States during the hearing on 2nd January, 2012. Learned  counsel

for the parties had sought time to consult the States  and  file

their responses. Counsel for the parties  later  on  gave  their

responses in     general terms, but there  has  been  no  direct

response or opposition to the alternatives suggested.”

 

 

 

2. Any amicable resolution of the present dispute between the  two

States would have been really good for the people of these States  but  this

has not been possible as  the  two  States  have  sharp  conflict  over  the

subject matter and their stance is rigid, inflexible  and  hard.  The  offer

made by Kerala for construction of new dam has been outrightly  rejected  by

Tamil Nadu. It is important to bear in mind that Mullaperiyar dam  has  been

consistently found to be safe, first, by the Expert  Committee,  and,  then,

by this Court in 2006 judgment. The  hydrological,  structural  and  seismic

safety of the Mullaperiyar dam has been confirmed by the EC as well.

 

Finding on Issue No.9

3. In this view of the matter for the  construction  of  new  dam,

there has to be agreement of both the parties.  The  offer  made  by  Kerala

cannot be thrusted upon  Tamil  Nadu.  Issue  No.9,  therefore,  has  to  be

decided against Kerala and it is so held.

 

4. EC has also suggested the following second alternative:

 

“2.   The  Dam  Safety  Organization  Central  Water  Commission,  the

Government of India (Ministry of Water Resources), has laid  down  the

Criteria and Guidelines for Evacuating Storage Reservoirs, Sizing  Low

Level Outlets and Initial Filling of Reservoirs.

 

1. i) According to the criteria, generally speaking,  Dams  should  be

provided with low level outlets of adequate  capacity  to  lower

the  reservoir  water  level  to  a  specified   elevation   for

inspection, maintenance and repair, and ii) to control the  rate

of reservoir pool rise during initial filling.

 

1. ii) The Guidelines recommend that an outlet should  be  provided  at

the lowest possible level and should be of sufficient dimensions

to cater to evacuation of storage with requisite flow  capacity.

The decision about level at which the outlet has to be  provided

is left to the concerned  dam  owning  entity.  The  level  will

depend upon assessment of the dam’s  condition,  a  judgment  on

location at which distress may be caused,  its  nature  and  the

time of evacuation needed for enabling completion of restoration

measures.

 

3. In the existing MPD project, as noted in Chapter-ll(b) (supra),  a

tunnel had been designed with a D-Section 12 feet wide and 7.5 ft high

with provision of the sluice head gate having sill at El 106.5 ft  for

diversion of water from Periyar reservoir to Vaigai basin in the SoTN.

This tunnel was modernized by widening and lining in  the  year  1958.

The tunnel can allow reservoir draw-down to 106.5 ft as  per  criteria

laid down in (i). Storage lower than El  106.5  ft  to  an  identified

elevation based on assessment of likely distress cannot be  drawn-down

through the present arrangement of drawl of water for the SoTN through

the existing tunnel.

 

4. Further, digging of a New Tunnel at say at EL 50 ft.,  of  course,

after conducting surveys,  designs,  and  techno-economic  feasibility

studies, with requisite sluice gates for evacuation of reservoir water

from EL 106.5 ft  to  say  50  ft.  These  studies  will  have  to  be

undertaken within a specified time frame. It goes without saying  that

the water flow from the New Tunnel can be used for power generation or

for  any  other  purpose   by   making   changes   in   its   existing

infrastructure. Depending upon a decision about the elevation  of  the

New Tunnel outlet, evacuation of the MPD reservoir will be possible in

corresponding time period.

 

1. a) The new tunnel, will need to be constructed by the  SoTN,  since

the ownership of  the  existing  dam  vests  in  it.  The  total

expenditure for construction of the new tunnel should  be  borne

by the SoTN. The costs may be small as compared to the  cost  of

the replacement of the  new  dam.  The  SoTN  should  accomplish

surveys and feasibility studies for the proposal of having a new

tunnel within a year.

 

1. b) The New Tunnel say at EI 50 ft  will  enable  the  SoTN  to  use

additional water available in storage between EL 106  ft  to  50

1. At present, these waters are remaining unused.

 

1. c) More importantly, if  this  alternative  is  implemented  in  an

agreed period of time, the  fear  perception  in  the  minds  of

people of the SoK will be set at rest. They can then  appreciate

that the New Tunnel is  going  to  help  evacuation  of  storage

faster and better, in case the dam develops any distress.  As  a

gravity dam seldom  gives  in  suddenly,  such  evacuation  will

reduce Dam Break flood (DBF) magnitude significantly.

 

1. d) Though, the  demand  of  the  SoK  for  1  TMC  of  water  for

Environmental Flow is not substantiated, yet, a legitimate  need

which is yet to be assessed, can be met with after  the  FRL  is

raised to 142 ft. A small pipe outlet  of  a  suitable  diameter

through  right  bank  hillock  can  be  dug   to   release   the

Environmental Flow as firmed up by the SoTN in consultation with

CWC & the SoK.

 

5. That a MoU would have to be executed by the SoTN and the SoK, in

the presence of a representative of the Govt. of  India,  Ministry  of

Water Resources, regarding the construction of the new tunnel within a

specified time.”

 

 

 

5. EC has itself noted that the second alternative is dependent on

agreement between  the  two  States  but  to  us  there  appears  to  be  no

possibility of mutual agreement on this aspect  as  well.  The  alternatives

suggested by EC are worth exploring by the two States but having  regard  to

the unbending stance adopted by them, this does not  seem  to  be  possible.

We, however, grant liberty to the parties to apply to the Court if they  are

able to arrive at some amicable solution on either of the  two  alternatives

suggested by the EC.

 

Issue Nos. 2(b) and 11

6. With reference to these issues,  it  is  strenuously  urged  by

Kerala that Tamil Nadu has not suffered any injury because of the  reduction

of the storage at Mullaperiyar dam to  136  ft.  since  1979.  According  to

Kerala, more water was drawn and more area was irrigated after 1979.  Kerala

has in this regard relied upon the data supplied by Tamil Nadu Public  Works

Department and the analysis thereof. It  is  submitted  that  average  water

drawn during the pre-1979 period was 19,277 Mcft.  while  in  the  post-1979

period the water drawn was 21,434 Mcf.  As  regards  extent  of  irrigation,

Kerala  submits  that  the  extent  of  irrigation  in   Tamil   Nadu   from

Mullaperiyar, water has  admittedly  increased  from  about  1,71,307  acres

before 1979 to 2,31,412 acres. Kerala has also relied upon  the  answers  of

PW-1 to question Nos. 585 to 601 and 58 to 59. Kerala has also  relied  upon

the decision of this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh3  wherein  this  Court

observed, “…….that in a suit for injunction filed by one State  against  the

other State, the burden on the complaining State is much greater  than  that

generally required to be borne by  one  seeking  an  injunction  in  a  suit

between private  parties.  The  complaining  State  has  to  establish  that

threatened invasion of rights is substantial and of a serious magnitude.  In

the matter between States, injunction would  not  follow  because  there  is

infraction of some rights of the  complaining  State  but  a  case  of  high

equity must be made out that moves the conscience of the Court  in  granting

injunction…….”

 

7. Tamil Nadu on the other hand asserts  that  raising  the  water

level in the dam to original FRL is absolutely  necessary  to  irrigate  the

lands in about 2 lakh  acres  in  five  drought-prone  districts  of  Theni,

Dindigul, Madurai, Sivagangai and Ramanathanpuram. About  6.8  lakh  farmers

and agricultural  labourers  besides  80  lakh  people  of  the  above  five

districts continue to suffer due to inadequate timely supply  of  water  for

irrigation and drinking purposes.

 

8. Pertinently, EC has also considered this aspect and observed as

follows:

 

“EC has assessed that increase in irrigation in Vaigai Basin is mainly

due to i) construction  of  Vaigai  Dam  in  1954  and  related  canal

distribution system post 1974, which worked as a  balancing  reservoir

for release from power station  in  non-irrigation  months  from  1954

onwards, and ii) World Bank assisted Modernization of  Periyar  Vaigai

Irrigation Project, phase-I & II, implemented in 1980’s, which enabled

improved Water Use Efficiency.

 

Although firming up of irrigation is achieved by the  SoTN,  there  is

still large drought-prone area in Vaigai  Basin  and  adjoining  area,

which needs  protective  irrigation.   Also  domestic  /  municipal  /

industrial  needs  of  the  area  are  significant.    These   present

requirements remain unmet, if FRL is not restored even partially.

 

EC is unable to accept the submission of the SoK that no harm will  be

done under these circumstances to the SoTN if FRL is not restored.”

 

 

 

9. Insofar as drawal of water in  pre-1979  period  and  post-1979

period is concerned, the sole witness of Tamil Nadu  has  admitted  that  in

the post-1979 period the water drawn was 21,434 Mcft. and the average  water

drawn pre-1979 period was 19,277 Mcft. Similarly, he has  admitted  increase

of irrigation from 1,71,307 acres before 1979 to 2,31,412 acres in  1992-93,

but, as observed by EC, this has been due to construction of Vaigai  dam  in

1954 and related canal distribution system  post-1974.  The  five  districts

Theni, Dindigul, Madurai, Sivagangai and Ramanathanpuram that are served  by

Periyar project are drought prone.  About 2  lakh  acres  of  land  fall  in

these five districts which needs to  be  irrigated.  The  inadequate  timely

water  supply  of  water  for  irrigation  and  drinking  purposes  to   the

population of these districts may affect their lives as well as  livelihood.

The increase of irrigation  and  more  drawal  of  water  post  1979  still

appears to be deficient for the population of more than 80  lakh  people  in

these districts.

 

1. In these facts, therefore, it can safely  be  said  that  Tamil

Nadu has been able to establish that invasion on its rights is  substantial.

Tamil Nadu has been able to make out a case for grant of injunction  on  the

principles laid down by this Court in State of  Andhra  Pradesh3.  Moreover,

present suit is not a suit for injunction simpliciter as the main prayer  is

that Kerala Irrigation and  Water  Conservation  (Amendment)  Act,  2006  be

declared unconstitutional and ultra vires in its application to  and  effect

on the Mullaperiyar dam.

 

Findings on Issue Nos. 2(b) and 11

1. In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that Tamil Nadu is

entitled to the reliefs as prayed in para 40  (i)  and  (ii)  of  the  suit.

Consequently,  it  is  declared  that  the  Kerala  Irrigation   and   Water

Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2006  passed  by  the  Kerala  legislature  is

unconstitutional in its application to and effect on the  Mullaperiyar  dam.

The 1st defendant –  State  of  Kerala  –  is  restrained  by  a  decree  of

permanent injunction from applying and enforcing  the  impugned  legislation

or in any manner interfering with or obstructing the  State  of  Tamil  Nadu

from increasing the water level to 142 ft. and from carrying out the  repair

works as per the judgment of this  Court  dated  27.2.2006  in  W.P.(C)  No.

386/2001 with connected matters.

 

2. However, to allay the  apprehensions  of  Kerala-  though  none

exists – about the safety of the Mullaperiyar dam on restoration of the  FRL

to 142 ft., a 3-Member Supervisory Committee is constituted.  The  Committee

shall have one representative from the  Central  Water  Commission  and  one

representative each from the  two  States  –  Tamil  Nadu  and  Kerala.  The

representative of the Central Water Commission shall be the Chairman of  the

Committee. The Committee will select the place for its office,  which  shall

be provided by Kerala. Tamil Nadu shall bear the entire expenditure  of  the

Committee.

 

3. The powers and functions of the Supervisory Committee shall  be

as follows:

 

(i)   The Committee shall supervise the  restoration  of  FRL  in  the

Mullaperiyar dam to the elevation of 142 ft.

 

(ii)   The  Committee  shall  inspect  the  dam   periodically,   more

particularly, immediately before  the  monsoon  and  during  the

monsoon and  keep  close  watch  on  its  safety  and  recommend

measures which are necessary.  Such measures  shall  be  carried

out by Tamil Nadu.

 

(iii) The Committee shall be free to take appropriate steps and  issue

necessary directions to the two States – Tamil Nadu and Kerala –

or any of them if so required for the safety of the Mullaperiyar

dam in an emergent situation.  Such directions shall  be  obeyed

by all concerned.

 

(iv)  The Committee shall permit  Tamil  Nadu  to  carry  out  further

precautionary  measures  that  may  become  necessary  upon  its

periodic inspection of the dam in accordance with the guidelines

of the Central Water Commission and Dam Safety Organisation.

 

4. The suit is decreed as above, with no order as to costs.

 

 

………..……………………CJI.

(R.M. Lodha)

 

 

………..………………………J.

(H.L. Dattu)

 

 

………..………………………J.

(Chandramauli Kr. Prasad)

 

 

………..………………………J.

(Madan B. Lokur)

 

 

………..………………………J.

(M.Y. Eqbal)

 

NEW DELHI;

MAY 07, 2014.

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 

 

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.13955 of 2012

 

 

C.R. NEELAKANDAN & ANR.                            … PETITIONERS

 

 

VERSUS

 

 

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                              … RESPONDENTS

 

 

 

O R D E R

 

 

In view of our separate judgment pronounced  today  in  Original  Suit

No.3 of 2006 (State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala and  another),  nothing

further remains to be decided in this  special  leave  petition  and  it  is

dismissed accordingly.

 

……..………………………CJI.

(R.M. Lodha)

 

 

………..………………………J.

(H.L. Dattu)

 

 

………..………………………J.

(Chandramauli Kr. Prasad)

 

 

………..………………………J.

(Madan B. Lokur)

 

 

………..………………………J.

(M.Y. Eqbal)

 

NEW DELHI

MAY 07, 2014

———————–

[1]     Mullaperiyar Environmental Protection Forum v. Union of India &

Ors.; [(2006) 3 SCC 643]

[2]      The salient features of the 2006 (Amendment) Act  are  as  follows:

 

1. In Section 2, clause (ja) defines ‘custodian’ to  mean  a  State

Government which has established or is running or otherwise  operating

any dam in Kerala. Further, clause (ala) defines  ‘Scheduled  Dam’  to

mean any dam included in the second schedule. The very first entry  in

the Second Schedule is the Mullai Periyar Dam.

1. In Section  57  (1)  the  words  “Surveillance,  inspection”  is

replaced by “ensuring the safety and security”

iii. Introduction of 57(3) in main Chapter XII – ‘Constitution of Dam

Safety Authority’ to give effect to Chapter XII inspite of  any  other

laws.

1. Replacement of existing section 62(1)(a) to (i) by  new  section

62 (1)(a) to (j). The newly substituted Section 62(1), in so far as is

material, reads as under:

62(1)  Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law,  judgment,

decree or order of any Court or in any  treaty,  agreement,  contract,

instrument  or  other  document,  the  authority  shall  exercise  the

following powers viz:-

(a)(b)(c)  xxx   xxx   xxx

(d)  to direct the custodians  to  carry  out  any  alteration,

improvement, replacement or strengthening measures  to  any  dam

found to pose a treat to human life or property;

(e)   to direct the custodian to suspend the functioning of  any

dam, to decommission any dam or restrict the functioning of  any

dam if public safety or threat to human  life  or  property,  so

requires;

(f)   to advise the Government,  custodian,  or  other  agencies

about  policies  and  procedures  to   be   followed   in   site

investigation, design, construction, operation  and  maintenance

of dams;

(g)   to conduct studies, inspect and advise  the  custodian  or

any other agency on the advisability of raising or  lowering  of

the Maximum Water Level or Full Reservoir Level of any  dam  not

being a scheduled dam, taking into account the safety of the dam

concerned;

(h)   to conduct studies, inspect and advise  the  custodian  or

any agency on the sustainability or suitability of any  dam  not

being a scheduled dam, to hold water in its  reservoir,  to  get

expert opinion of international repute, and  provide  advice  by

dam-break  analysis  and  independent  study   and   to   direct

strengthening measures or require the commissioning of a new dam

within a timeframe to be  prescribed  to  replace  the  existing

dam;”

[3]    State of Andhra Pradesh v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.; [(2013) 5

SCC 68].

[4]    Dr. Babu Ram Saksena v. State;  [AIR 1950 SC 155]

[5]    State of Himachal Pradesh v. Union of India & Ors.; [(2011) 13 SCC

344]

[6]    Virendra Singh & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh; [(1955) 1 SCR 415 :

AIR 1954 SC 447]

[7]    363. Bar to  interference  by  courts  in  disputes  arising  out  of

certain treaties, agreements, etc. – (1) Notwithstanding  anything  in  this

Constitution but subject to the  provisions  of  Article  143,  neither  the

Supreme Court nor any other court shall have  jurisdiction  in  any  dispute

arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement,  covenant,  engagement,

sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed  before

the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of an  Indian  State  and

to which the Government of the Dominion of India or any of  its  predecessor

Government was a party and which has or  has  been  continued  in  operation

after such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right  accruing

under or any liability or obligation arising out of any  of  the  provisions

of this Constitution relating  to  any  such  treaty,  agreement,  covenant,

engagement, sanad or other similar instrument

(2) In this article –

(a)  “Indian  State”  means  any  territory  recognised  before   the

commencement of this Constitution by His Majesty or the  Government  of  the

Dominion of India as being such a State; and

(b)  “Ruler” includes the Prince, Chief or other person recognised

before such commencement by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion

of India as the Ruler of any Indian State.

[8]    Art. 131. Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.— Subject to

the provisions of this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall, to the

exclusion of any other court, have original jurisdiction in any dispute—

1. a) between the Government of India and one or more States; or
2. b) between the Government of India and any State or States on one

side and one or more other States on the other; or

1. c) between two or more States,

if and in so far as the dispute involves any question (whether of law

or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends:

Provided that the said jurisdiction shall not extend to a dispute

arising out of any treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other

similar instrument which, having been entered into or executed before the

commencement of this Constitution, continues in operation after such

commencement, or which provides that the said jurisdiction shall not extend

to such a dispute.”

[9]    294.   Succession  to  property,  assets,  rights,  liabilities   and

obligations  in  certain   cases.—As   from   the   commencement   of   this

Constitution—

(a)     ……………

(b)  all rights, liabilities and obligations of  the  Government  of

the Dominion of India and of the Government  of  each  Governor’s  Province,

whether arising out of any contract  or  otherwise,  shall  be  the  rights,

liabilities and obligations respectively of the Government of India and  the

Government of each corresponding State,

subject to any adjustment  made  or  to  be  made  by  reason  of  the

creation before the commencement of this Constitution  of  the  Dominion  of

Pakistan or of the Provinces of West Bengal, East Bengal,  West  Punjab  and

East Punjab.

[10]   Article 295 – Succession to  property,  assets,  rights,  liabilities

and obligations in other cases. –

(1) As from the commencement of this Constitution-

(a)  all  property  and  assets   which   immediately   before   such

commencement were vested in  any  Indian  State  corresponding  to  a  State

specified in Part B of the First Schedule shall vest in the  Union,  if  the

purposes for which such property and assets  were  held  immediately  before

such commencement will thereafter be purposes of the Union relating  to  any

of the matters enumerated in the Union List, and

(b) all rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government  of  any

Indian State corresponding to a State specified  in  Part  B  of  the  First

Schedule, whether arising out of any contract or  otherwise,  shall  be  the

rights, liabilities and obligations of  the  Government  of  India,  if  the

purposes for which such rights were acquired or liabilities  or  obligations

were incurred before such commencement will thereafter be  purposes  of  the

Government of India relating to any of the matters enumerated in  the  Union

List,

subject  to  any  agreement  entered  into  in  that  behalf  by  the

Government of India with the Government of that State.

(2) Subject as aforesaid, the Government of each  State  specified  in

Part B of the First  Schedule  shall,  as  from  the  commencement  of  this

Constitution, be the  successor  of  the  Government  of  the  corresponding

Indian State as regards all property and assets and all rights,  liabilities

and obligations, whether arising out of any  contract  or  otherwise,  other

than those referred to in clause (1).

[11]    Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. and Anr. v. Broach Borough

Municipality and Ors.; [(1969) 2 SCC 283]

[12]    Don John Francis Douglas Liyanage & Ors. v. The Queen; [(1966) 1

All E.R. 650]

[13]    Indra Sawhney v. Union of India and Others; [(2000) 1 SCC 168]

[14]    Madan Mohan Pathak & Anr. v. Union of India and Others; [(1978) 2

SCC 50]

[15]    People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and Anr. v. Union of

India and Anr.; [(2003) 4 SCC 399]

[16]    Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad & Anr. v. New Shrock

Spg. And Wvg. Co. Ltd.

[(1970) 2   SCC 280]

[17]    Janapada Sabha Chhindwara v. Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. and

Anr.; [(1970) 1 SCC 509]

[18]    Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, Re; [1993 Supp (1) SCC 96 (2)]

[19]   Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. The United Provinces; [73 IA 123]

[20]   Maharaj Umeg Singh and Ors. v. State of Bombay and Ors.; [(1955) 2

SCR 164]

[21]    Arthur M. Manigault v.  Alfred A. Springs et al; [(1905) 199 US

473]

[22]    “The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Contexts” by

Roderick E. Walston; 29 Natural Resources Journal 585.

[23]    Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen et al. v. Chicago,

Rock Island & Pacific Rail-Road

Co. et al.; [(1968) 393 US 129]

[24]    Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. et al. v. Zel S. Rice et al.;

[(1978) 434 US 429]

[25]    Raymond Kassel et al. v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of

Delaware; [(1981) 450 US 662]

[26]    American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Thomas D. Larson; [(1982)

683 F.2d 787]

[27]    Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council of the European Union; [(2002)

ECR II-03305]

[28]   “Science and Risk Regulation and International Law” by Jacqueline

Peel; Published by Cambridge University Press, 2010.

[29]    The State of Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling and Belmont Bridge

Company, et al.;[ (1855) 59 U.S. 421]

[30]    The Clinton Bridge case; [(1870) 77 US 454]

[31]    Hodges et al. v. Snyder et al.; [(1923) 261 US 600]

[32]    Charles B. Miller, Superintendent, Pendleton Correctional Facility

et al.  v. Richard A. French et al.; [(2000)

530 U.S. 327]

[33]    Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. and

Ors.; [(2001) 4 SCC 139].

[34]    Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and

Anr.; [(1983) 1 SCC 147]

[35]    M/s. Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors.; [(1988)

2 SCC 299]

[36]    Mahal Chand Sethia v. State of West Bengal;  Crl. A. No. 75 of

1969, decided on 10th September, 1969;

[1969 (2) UJ 616 SC]

[37]   Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas v. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad ;

[(1964) 2 SCR 608]

[38]   State of M.P. v. Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. and Anr; [(1970) 1 SCC

509].

[39]    P. Sambamurthy and Ors.  v. State of A.P. and Anr.;[ (1987) 1 SCC

362]

[40]    Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms and Anr.;

[(2002) 5 SCC 294]

[41]   His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala

and Anr.;[(1973) 4 SCC 225]

[42]    Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain and Anr; [1975 (Supp.)

SCC 1]

[43]    State of Bihar and Anr. v. Bal Mukund Sah and Others; [(2000) 4 SCC

640]

[44]    I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. v. State of T.N.; [(2007) 2 SCC 1]

[45]    I.N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh; [(1976) 4 SCC 750]

[46]    Hari Singh and Ors. v. Military Estate Officer and Anr.; [(1972) 2

SCC 239]

[47]    Hindustan Gum and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Others;

[(1985) 4 SCC 124]

[48]   Vijay Mills Company Limited and Others v. State of Gujarat and Ors.;

[(1993) 1 SCC 345]

[49]   P. Kannadasan and Others v. State of T.N. and Others; [(1996) 5 SCC

670]

[50]    Indian Aluminium Company and Others v. State of Kerala and Others;

[(1996) 7 SCC 637]

[51]    State of T.N. v. Arooran Sugars Ltd.; [(1997) 1 SCC 326]

[52]   Dharam Dutt and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.; [(2004) 1 SCC 712]

[53]    Sri Sri Sri K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa; [AIR 1953

SC 375]

[54]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi v.

State of Delhi (now Delhi Administration)

and Anr.; [AIR 1962 SC 458]

[55]    Virender Singh Hooda (II) and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Another;

[(2004) 12 SCC 588]

[56]    Virender Singh Hooda (I) and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Another;

[(1999) 3 SCC 696]

[57]    Sandeep Singh  v. State of Haryana and Anr.; [(2002) 10 SCC 549]

[58]    Tirath Ram Rajinder Nath, Lucknow  v. State of U.P. and Anr.;

[(1973) 3 SCC 585]

[59]    S.S. Bola and Ors. v. B.D. Sardana and Ors.; [(1997) 8 SCC 522]

[60]    Nicholas v. the Queen; [(1998) 193 CLR 173]

[61]    Plaut et al. v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., et al.; [(1995) 514 U.S.

211]

[62]   Duchess of Kingston; 2 Smith Lead Cas 13 Ed. Pp. 644, 645.

[63]   Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Prashad Narayan Singh; [AIR 1916 PC

78]

[64]   Daryao and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors.; [AIR 1961 SC 1457]

[65]   Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha and Ors.; [AIR 1960

SC 1186]

[66]   Gulab Chand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Bombay; [(1965) 2 SCR 547]

[67]   Union of India v. Nanak Singh; [(1968) 2 SCR 887 : AIR 1968 SC 1370]

[68]   State of Punjab v. Bua Das Kaushal; [ (1970) 3 SCC 656]

[69]   N.D. Jayal and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.; [(2004) 9 SCC 362]

[70]   Section 11 – Res judicata

No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and

substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue  in  a

former suit between the same parties, or between parties under  whom  they

or any of them  claim,  litigating  under  the  same  title,  in  a  Court

competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue  has

been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided  by  such

Court.

 

Explanation I. – The expression “former suit”  shall  denote  a  suit

which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was

instituted prior thereto.

 

Explanation II. – For the purposes of this section, the competence of

a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to  a  right

of appeal from the decision of such Court.

 

Explanation III. – The matter above referred to must  in  the  former

suit have been alleged  by  one  party  and  either  denied  or  admitted,

expressly or impliedly, by the other.

 

Explanation IV. – Any matter which might and ought to have been  made

ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be  deemed  to  have

been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.

 

Explanation V. – Any relief claimed  in  the  plaint,  which  is  not

expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this  section,

be deemed to have been refused.

 

Explanation VI. – Where persons litigate bona fide in  respect  of  a

public right or of a private right claimed in common  for  themselves  and

others, all persons interested in such right shall, for  the  purposes  of

this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.

 

Explanation VII. – The provisions of this section shall  apply  to  a

proceeding for the execution of a decree and references in this section to

any  suit,  issue  or  former  suit  shall  be  construed  as  references,

respectively, to a proceeding for the execution of  the  decree,  question

arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for  the  execution  of

that decree.

 

Explanation VIII. – An issue heard and finally decided by a Court  of

limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res

judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of  limited

jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit  in

which such issue has been subsequently raised.

[71]    State of Orissa Vs. State of A.P.; [(2006) 9 SCC 591]

[72]   R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay; [(1984) 2 SCC 183]

[73]    Isabella Johnson (Smt.) v. M.A. Susai (Dead) by Lrs.; [(1991) 1 SCC

494]

[74]    Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Anr.; [(2002) 4 SCC 388]

[75]   Regina v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, Ex parte Jones;

[(1962) 2 QB 677].

 

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